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1
Introduction
In August of 1929, shortly after the end of the outbreak of violence that had fl ared up over access to the Wailing Wall (or Western 
Wall) in Jerusalem, one Arabic press editorial concluded that the riots 
stemmed from the Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council issued four 
years prior, in 1925. That citizenship order-in-council, the author 
of the editorial wrote, supported not only Jewish immigration in 
large numbers into the territory but it did not foster any sense of 
loyalty between newly created Jewish Palestinian citizens and the 
Palestine Mandate Government. He described many of the Jewish 
immigrants to Palestine as English, Italian or French and argued that 
they remained English, Italian or French after their arrival. Not only 
did they fail to truly integrate into local society, they did not immedi-
ately naturalise as Palestinian citizens. This, the writer claimed, was 
contrary to the post-war principle of nationality. Within Palestine, 
the journalist added, their lack of naturalisation created an impos-
sible situation wherein Jewish residents would not be solely loyal to 
the Government of Palestine; rather, they were loyal to what the gov-
ernment termed their ‘country of origin’ despite habitual residence 
within the territory of the mandate. In the journalist’s opinion, the 
problem with this was that such Jews who did not take Palestin-
ian citizenship could individually and collectively infl uence the gov-
ernments and other residents of their home countries with respect 
to policy towards Palestine.1 In the wake of the 1929 riots such an 
accusitive type of news editorial was not unusual: in the previous 
three years, a generous amount of page-space in the Arabic press had 
been given over to opinion pieces, editorials and letters related to 
the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council and what most of 
their authors felt to be its detrimental effects upon the Arab emigrant 
population. The order itself, according to press reports, served only 
the Jewish immigrants since it offered European Jews almost unfet-
tered access to naturalisation and citizenship while at the same time 
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it denied ipso facto citizenship to Palestinian Arabs who happened 
to reside, even temporarily, outside of the borders of the mandate.
In studies of Palestine under the mandate the term ‘citizenship’ 
has been used as if it was an accepted and uncontested reality for the 
population of Palestine from the earliest years of the British Adminis-
tration. Indeed it was not; rather, the provisions, status and terminol-
ogy of citizenship continued to be contested and reshaped through 
the 1940s and until the creation of Israel in 1948. Such assumptions 
of the term’s ubiquity are misleading and do not consider the histori-
cal processes through which Palestinian nationality and citizenship 
came into existence in a particular colonial, interwar context. The 
1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council and its amendments 
spurred a wide-reaching debate over what constituted Palestinian 
nationality and citizenship and, importantly, the origins and defi ni-
tions of Palestinian civic and political identity during the years of the 
mandate. This debate took place within Arab society and in political 
circles as well as at the highest levels of the Palestine Administration 
in Jerusalem and the British Government in London. 
National identity at the close of the First World War had been 
pinned down by a generation of post-Second World War scholars in 
absolutes, infl uenced by sources penned within a certain national-
ist discursive fi eld. More recently, postcolonial and so-called ‘new 
imperial’ historians have framed national identity in light of its ambi-
guities and focused on those aspects of identity, particularly colonial 
identity, for which the public opinion and popular discussions found 
within primary sources neglect to overtly demonstrate. Yet, the rhe-
torical language of the League of Nations and the post-war imperial 
powers supported the former type of linear nationalist history during 
the fi rst half of the twentieth century. These imperial powers them-
selves, and a generation of scholars who emerged from within their 
academies by mid-century, justifi ed British and French assumption 
of sovereignty in the Arab Levant with the argument that protec-
torates, mandates and trusteeships would bring the region’s inhabit-
ants closer to a higher political and social standard necessary for 
self-determination. The impact of such arrangements of territorial 
control and the system of quasi-colonial trusteeship over indigenous 
inhabitants upon processes of legal and civic identity formulation by 
these inhabitants has not been the traditional focus of ‘nationalist’ 
scholarship.
More recently, historians have posited identity as a category of 
analysis, used to break down and understand the impact of the mul-
tiple classifi cations into which colonial or imperial powers placed 
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individuals. In particular, categories of subjecthood manipulated by 
colonial offi cials from the late eighteenth century onwards used the 
headings of nation, race, ethnicity and a so-called civilisational or 
developmental level, among others. With few exceptions, the Arab 
Levant has been largely absent from historical studies on how certain 
European powers classifi ed and managed subject populations at the 
turn of the twentieth century and during the years between the two 
world wars.2 Indeed by the twentieth century, the inhabitants of the 
former provinces of the Ottoman Empire were rarely classifi ed by 
Europeans as ‘natives’ or ‘uncivilised’ souls in need of development 
assistance in order to bring them politically, morally, culturally and 
economically into the age of modernity. The founding covenant of 
the League of Nations, approved in 1919, noted that Greater Syria 
(Bilād al-Sham) and Mesopotamia needed some form of trusteeship 
in order to foster self-governing institutions before the League could 
grant complete sovereignty to the inhabitants of these territories to 
run their own political and national affairs. However, the victori-
ous Allied Powers and the United States recognised what the French 
delegation to the twenty-fourth session of the League of Nations 
Council referred to in 1923 as the ‘differences between the natives’ 
state of civilization’ when they compared West and East Africa, or 
even Algeria, with Syria, Lebanon, Iraq or Palestine.3 These differ-
ences of civilisation had a clear bearing on the methods used by the 
League and the Allied powers to create new categories for ‘citizens’ 
and ‘nationals’ of post-war entities. 
During the course of the nineteenth century the principle of 
nationality, which Rogers Brubaker defi nes as the concept of states 
as and for certain nations, became the major factor in the organ-
isation and imagination of territorial space as political space.4 
Essentially, this concept translated into the nation-state, the politi-
cal entity that embodied the ‘nation’ and whose institutions privi-
leged the centralisation of administrative power in the hands of the 
majority ethnic or otherwise historically dominant group in a par-
ticular territory. The League propagated the same concept, and its 
Permanent Mandates Committee visualised the Arab mandates as 
states-to-be for certain ‘nations’. The Allies divided these territories 
detached from the defeated Ottoman Empire with the promise to 
hand them over as sovereign states-in-the-making to the national-
ity that formed the majority of the population resident within each. 
Yet the actual meaning of ‘nationality’ did not remain a static con-
cept linked to ideas of race and ethnicity, and its defi nition in the 
nineteenth century did not transfer over to the twentieth. In fact, 
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nationality and sovereignty complicated the implementation of the 
entire mandates system from its inauguration to its end. The practi-
cal application of this principle of nationality in the Levant has yet 
to be fully explored by historians of the Middle East or historians of 
imperial citizenship. This book attempts to begin that exploration 
for the case of Mandate Palestine. 
The mandate is fascinating as both a period of time and an insti-
tutional structure. It represents a transition on a number of levels in 
the Arab Levant: on the one hand, that between Ottoman modern-
ist and reformist changes in political, social and civic realms and, 
on the other, the spread of indirect colonial rule marked by the 
contradictory policies of self-determination and ‘ethnic unmixing’ 
in anticipation of the nation-state becoming the primary, interna-
tionally accepted political organisation. After the end of the First 
World War the entirely new mandate category, a territory held 
in trust, did not theoretically allow for imperial powers to make 
claims of outright sovereignty. Rather, the ideas behind the style 
of indirect rule popularised by Frederick Lugard in West Africa 
infl uenced the structures of administration and control by France 
and Great Britain over their mandates in the Arab Levant. For the 
study at hand what is important to stress is that without British 
or French nationality, mandated citizens (indirectly ruled) could 
not claim to be subjects of the Crown in the case of Great Britain 
nor nationals of France. Even so, as historian Rieko Karatani has 
shown, the interwar period marked the beginning of the develop-
ment of nation-state citizenship in Great Britain, in contrast to 
imperial subjecthood.5 
In the former Ottoman Arab provinces, the political and civic 
identities of the region’s inhabitants underwent gradual – although 
at times more drastic – changes directly related to the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire and the Arabs’ subsequent integration into the Brit-
ish and French imperial systems. As part of these transitions, pre-
war reforms and notions of legal and political modernity informed 
the growing arguments by the region’s inhabitants that the imperial, 
mandate powers surely had to grant what sociologists and political 
theorists now refer to as the ‘bundle of rights’ associated with mem-
bership in a nation-state polity. Within French and British colonial 
territories from the Caribbean to India the rise of nationalism, pan-
Islamism, pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism among subject popula-
tions are represented by the multi-faceted demands of individuals 
and groups to a legally recognised and rights-bearing status – that of 
the citizen – vis-à-vis the state. 
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Marking Nationals, Making Citizens
After 1918 to the mid-1940s, both nationality and citizenship became 
less like abstract political concepts as mandatory offi cials, the British 
government and the Arab population negotiated, manipulated, shaped 
and integrated them into political, social and civil life as markers of 
civic, national and international identity in a changing society. The ulti-
mate aim of the chapters in this book is to trace the historical process 
of, in the words of Engin Isin, ‘making citizens’. Such a process involves 
more than paper decrees that determine a legal status as issued from 
the imperial centre; instead, making citizens involves practices that are 
social, political, cultural and symbolic. Isin’s work, which infl uences 
this project, interrogates and probes at the conditions under which sub-
jects act as citizens and thus transform into citizens, as well as how 
they make claims to rights, benefi ts and responsibilities.6 The making of 
the Palestinian citizen entailed not only an ideological process through 
which notions of citizenship and the rights associated with that citizen-
ship were crafted by the British administration and redefi ned by the 
Palestinian Arabs, but it also involved changes to the political language 
and the vocabulary of identity and belonging as well as engagement 
with certain types of behaviours. By the end of the First World War, 
citizenship began to take on a rather different meaning, apart from 
European and Ottoman understandings of nationality. The citizen 
came to be defi ned as much by political and civil rights and activities as 
by his or her historical membership in, and engagement with, a particu-
lar broader community.7 
The mandatory powers in the Levant, under the auspices of the 
League of Nations, represented a different institutional form of 
authority markedly separate from older methods of colonial gov-
ernment and territorial control. This authority was manifested in 
a number of ways, one being in the relationship between the man-
date as a state-in-the-making with the population of the territory 
under mandatory control. The following chapters trace this man-
ifestation in Palestine under mandate administration through the 
creation of the categories of legal citizenship and internationally 
recognised nationality. The institutionalisation of citizenship as a 
legal status of identity conferred by the government stirred tensions 
in Palestine among those Arabs who professed social, civic, cultural 
and, ultimately, communitarian understandings of nationality as an 
identity granted by birth or descent in the Arab world. These intel-
lectuals and leaders perceived nationality as a status imbued with 
certain inherent rights that gave nationals alone the ownership of 
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the territorially defi ned nation-state and its government. In Palestine 
in the fi rst two decades under the mandate, this understanding of 
nationality and citizenship as linked to primordial national identity 
and exclusive political rights based on membership in a particular 
historic community resulted in discourses, vocabularies and behav-
iours that underscored and emphasised multi-faceted acts of resis-
tance on the part of Arab nationalist and populist leaders as well 
as émigrés outside of the territory against Great Britain’s legislative 
constructions of the national and the citizen. In particular, Pales-
tine’s educated Arab nationalist leadership both in Palestine and in 
the diaspora were well-versed in the meaning of citizenship and the 
rights associated with it in the Western European context, as well as 
in the meaning of and the rights associated with a particular Arab-
Ottoman nationality. The mandates system not only dismantled 
most Ottoman imperial institutions, but it also caused a progres-
sive rupture of the Arabs’ understandings of Ottoman subjecthood 
and national belonging. The institutions introduced by the British 
colonial offi cials in Palestine challenged traditional and Ottoman 
reform-era understandings of identity and cultural belonging in the 
Levant. Signifi cantly, the style of government by Great Britain chal-
lenged the Palestinian Arabs’ own, often wildly optimistic, under-
standings of British democracy, liberal citizenship and governmental 
duties towards citizens. 
The book presents a new understanding of the Arabs’ reactions 
to colonialism and Jewish immigration into Palestine by framing 
resistance to mandate policies and the early stages of the develop-
ment of the political project of Palestinian nationalism through the 
articulated appeals, discussions, ideologies and demands for a politi-
cal, as opposed to simply legal, identity. Political citizenship came to 
be linked to Arab nationality and an understanding of the inherent 
nature of political, social and civil rights and duties for the Arabic-
speaking or otherwise formerly Ottoman population. These interpre-
tations existed by the nineteenth century in Ottoman Syria but the 
advent of the mandate and new political languages in the post-war 
era reformulated them. Contrary to European or North American 
understandings of contemporary citizenship, Palestine’s Arab leaders 
framed demands for a communitarian style of citizenship whereby 
birth or descent in a particular national community granted that 
community the ownership over its territorially bound political entity 
and its resources. Anti-mandate sentiment and resistance developed 
in tandem with the Arabs’ agitation for rights to the state, particu-
larly as the Palestinian Arabs began to frame the mandate as the 
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tool by which Great Britain allowed a foreign, non-Arab group to 
take control over and have the rights to Palestine. Neither citizenship 
nor nationality, according to these demands, could be imposed upon 
natives by a foreign power, and neither rights nor duties could be 
granted by governmental, or colonial, authorities. Instead, national 
identity and the accompanying rights and duties existed as natural 
elements of membership within a nation.
To focus purely on the political demands and conditions for citi-
zenship and nationality in Palestine would neglect the varied under-
standings and meanings of both statuses for the British, the Arabs 
both in Palestine and in the diaspora and the Jewish immigrants. 
Citizenship, as understood by natives of Palestine, did not imme-
diately become political – citizenship in 1920 evolved in meaning 
and practice and it had a different set of accompanying vocabulary 
by 1937, for instance. The book aims to trace how, and to what 
extent, citizenship became politically linked to nationality and civic 
identity as a reaction to the legal parameters of the British-created 
citizenship status in the post-1918 period. Similarly, the civic com-
ponent of citizenship did not appear immediately or fully formed 
in the Palestinian Arabs’ reactions against the policies and laws of 
the mandate government from 1920 onwards. The so-called ‘bundle 
of rights’ that went along with citizens’ membership in the state – 
civil, social and political – was understood in various localised ways 
by the Palestinian Arabs. However, only once ‘citizenship’ became 
tied to political projects of belonging as well as to an understanding 
of ownership over the nation did particular written and ideological 
discourses, responsibilities and behaviours become associated with 
the concept of ‘the Palestinian citizen’. It is useful to cite William 
Hanley’s argument in favour of historians who offer a more nuanced 
understanding of the multiple layers of citizenship in the Middle 
East in the early twentieth century. He stresses that, for the case of 
Egypt, any study of citizenship that focuses solely on political agency 
or that is purely through the lens of political citizenship ‘impoverishes 
analysis of Middle Eastern citizenship’. To do so would be to give 
the conventional, European defi nition of citizenship as the prescrip-
tion to political, colonial and post-colonial ills. This sets historians 
of the Middle East who ‘seek to restore honor to the region’s past’ 
on an ‘impossible quest for something like indigenous citizenship’ 
that had inherent political elements before its supposed destruction 
by outsider, colonial forces.8 My intent here is to steer away from 
falling into the trap of framing the history of the Palestinian Arabs’ 
understandings and notions of citizenship and nationality as dictated 
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by and based primarily upon political – and more contemporary 
European – meanings of citizenship.
After 1918, the understanding by Palestinian Arabs of subject-
hood, nationality and citizenship experienced a signifi cant shift. 
Under the institutions of the Ottoman Empire, Arabs constituted 
Ottoman citizens in a legal sense, but as subjects of the sultan 
they could expect protection from the state in return for loyalty. 
Changes underway in Europe and in a number of colonial posses-
sions even before the outbreak of war conceptualised subjecthood 
as based on allegiance (by the collectivity of subjects) to a state or 
ruler with populations and territories coming under the sovereign 
control of that state or ruler. The British in Palestine emphasised a 
type of individual allegiance to their own authority but in the eyes 
of many Palestinian Arab politicians and nationalists, the British 
offered few of the expected protections in return. Similar to what 
Hanley describes as part of the Egyptian nationality laws created 
under the British Government in Egypt, the eventual passage of 
the citizenship order-in-council in Palestine did not delineate rights 
but rather jurisdiction. It focused on who was a Palestinian citizen, 
and how one could became a citizen through naturalisation.9 The 
key problem for the Palestinian Arabs was what they continually 
stressed to be the lack of British protection of their ‘majority’ rights 
in Palestine. Unrestricted (European) Jewish immigration and 
settlement and the laissez-faire attitude of the British in Palestine 
towards this angered the Arabs more than the colonial nature of the 
mandate itself: its policies signifi ed a lack of British protection for 
Palestine’s Arab citizens. Citizenship was a recognised legal status 
but it offered none of the rights for the Arab population that would 
have enabled the latter to mount a challenge to the perceived lack 
of protection by the local administration. 
An ongoing point of confl ict between the colonial administration 
of Palestine and the Palestinian Arab leaders was the lack of rep-
resentative institutions. As Benjamin Thomas White has shown for 
Syria during the interwar period, alongside representation, institu-
tions such as citizenship are necessary in order to facilitate a sense 
of commonality upon which a public sphere develops.10 Citizenship 
is thus a key part of the formation of civil society and the institu-
tions through which inhabitants of a territory and the state negotiate 
rights and duties. The discussions articulated within civil society and 
political institutions linked empire and the place of the Palestinian 
Arabs within a larger imperial system to colonialism, the Palestine 
Administration and the defi nitions of citizenship and nationality. 
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Although Arab populist and nationalist leaders might not have ini-
tially demanded a modern, rights-bearing notion of citizenship, they 
emphasised the aspect of protection of the ‘native’ community of 
Palestine and saw themselves as akin to British subjects with some 
sort of legal standing.11 These leaders assumed that due to the raison 
d’être of the mandates system, this legal standing would soon trans-
late into political standing within a nation-state controlled by, and 
for, the majority Arab citizens.
Not surprisingly for colonial powers, the Palestine Administration 
and the British Government failed to take into full account the Pales-
tinian Arabs’ own discourses of nationality. As a result, the fi gures of 
the national and the citizen have been in confl ict with each other not 
only during the mandate but also since the creation of the state of Israel 
through to today. The book uses the term ‘discourse’ often, and refers 
largely to political and ideological discourses. The ideologies, notions, 
discussions, interactions, and debates over the primordial nature of 
nationality, race, citizenship and belonging, and rights combined to 
create the discourses under study here. The British administration had 
its own set of discourses on the meanings and applications of citi-
zenship, nationality and rights, framed by understandings of Britain’s 
role in Palestine, the mandate’s position within a larger imperial sys-
tem and a number of values and categorisations of race and identity. 
The Palestinian Arabs, too, had their own discourses on citizenship 
and nationality based on historical experiences and traditional under-
standings of identity; similarly Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish immi-
grants were informed by a number of discourses on these two terms, 
although these themes are outside the scope of the book. We cannot 
overlook the fact that colonial, or mandated, subject-citizens did not 
act as passive receptors of imperial policies. Whether in decisions to 
assimilate or in the realm of self-defi nition, the Palestinian Arabs and 
their notions of identity fi t within wider trans-imperial networks that 
contributed to multiple defi nitions of ‘the citizen’ and that shaped mul-
tiple civic identities.
And yet Palestine has been left out of British ‘imperial’ history 
studies, even though we can categorise the mandate administration 
and its institutions as serving what John Darwin terms a ‘bridgehead’ 
between the imperial centre and the colonial sphere. As the entire 
book shows, the institutions of the mandate – the different bridge-
heads – were certainly not oriented towards compatible imperial aims, 
a not uncommon phenomenon in British imperial history as Alan 
Lester notes. The incompatible nature of these institutions, including 
those directed by Foreign Offi ce and Colonial Offi ce advisers, further 
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stimulated what postcolonial historians such as Ann Laura Stoler and 
Frederick Cooper refer to as ‘the tensions of empire’ among the colo-
nialists themselves.12
It is useful here to turn to an analysis on the British precedents 
for categorising subject populations. In the eighteenth century, for 
British and French colonialists, race in the context of imperial nation-
ality and citizenship is best analysed in reference to culture and 
lineage. Racialised notions as applied to colonial subjects allowed 
Great Britain to defi ne the grounds of inclusion or exclusion with 
cultural characteristics such as language, descent and religion as the 
primary factors by which to judge the prospects for assimilation 
into the realm of ‘Britishness’ or ‘whiteness’. Kathleen Wilson has 
shown that such racialised notions developed in the eighteenth cen-
tury during a period of accelerated British imperial expansion and 
were channelled through the discourses, cultural understandings and 
practices that accompanied that expansion.13 As Stoler has shown 
in reference to one of the principle architects of colonial law in the 
Indies, by the nineteenth century colonialism made obsolete jus san-
guinis (by descent) and jus soli (by domicile) as the sole determinants 
of nationality. In the late nineteenth century, colonial offi cials felt 
that these two qualifi cations no longer determined whether an indi-
vidual shared qualities of his fellow nationals: a common culture, 
history, language and morals.14 Indeed, shared qualities became the 
all-important factor in imperial decisions as to which individuals or 
groups acquired a certain nationality. In British colonies, as in Dutch 
and French colonial possessions, new criteria to mark citizens and 
nationals included middle-class values and morals as well as privi-
leged ‘white’ backgrounds.15
By the nineteenth century, nationality came to be conceived of as 
related to legal status. At home and abroad, subjects of Great Britain 
were subjects of the monarch rather than to a state. Until 1870, British 
subjects did not commonly lose their nationality even if they settled 
in a foreign country. Imperial experts constructed British national-
ity regulations after that date to keep pace with international norms 
and increased emigration (and, importantly, economic emigration) of 
subjects from British possessions. Only in 1907 did a new law stan-
dardise nationality for all British subjects in the empire including in the 
Dominions. In 1914, the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 
assumed that all British subjects were bound together through alle-
giance to the Crown. Birth or naturalisation of an individual (male) 
in British territory conferred British nationality, and these nationals 
were recognised as such internationally. Ethnicity or ‘race’ had far less 
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to do with this status, but rather nationality came through the shared 
allegiance and loyalty to Great Britain – assumed to be a given for 
individuals born or naturalised in imperial territory.16
As early as the late eighteenth century, a range of groups in British 
and French territories used their sense of a protégé-type national-
ity to make claims to citizenship as political subjects.17 In infl uential 
and illuminating studies, Stoler and Cooper have both shown how 
colonialism, colonial subjecthood and imperial citizenship refl ected 
and even extended racial hierarchies and hierarchies of the ‘protégé’. 
This type of citizenship was also highly stratifi ed despite the sup-
posedly equal grant of it through domicile in imperial possessions.18 
Indeed, British colonial citizens in one territory (for example, India), 
were treated by imperial offi cials according to racial hierarchies once 
those citizens entered other British colonies or possessions (such as 
South Africa or Egypt). The hybrid subject-citizen, which existed in 
British India, as an analytical category of colonial identity represents 
a clear anomaly if approached from the vantage point of the post-
imperial age. Citizenship, particularly the liberal citizenship of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the metropole, assumed 
that individuals held certain rights and performed certain duties as 
free men. The colonial citizen, by contrast, only exercised rights and 
duties vis-à-vis his or her colonial or settler administration. 
By the early twentieth century, even as empire began to slowly 
lose some of its grandeur and meaning, empire as a practice provided 
a particular arena that allowed for discussions, notions, rhetoric, and 
examples of behaviour to circulate between metropoles, colonies and 
diasporic sites within which colonial offi cials made their home and 
exercised political sovereignty. This circulation infl uenced the Brit-
ish and French perceptions of the League of Nations mandates as 
quasi-colonial trusteeships. Indeed, colonial subjecthood, protection 
and citizenship came to be redefi ned through the fi rst decade of the 
twentieth century. In particular, as both France and Great Britain 
established protectorates from the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, their role in the assumption of control over affairs translated 
into the provision of protection. The categories of imperial protec-
tion transitioned alongside international norms of diplomacy. In 
the cases of Morocco and Egypt, French and British protectorates 
respectively, inhabitants held a different juridical status than did sub-
jects in outright colonies such as Algeria or India. Protectorates had 
their own nationality separate from the nationality of the power that 
administered their affairs. However, as Stoler notes, imperial powers 
had more of a stake in ensuring that subjects become integrated into 
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the social, cultural, moral and political life of the metropole before 
true assimilation into the national status of that particular sovereign. 
Cooper argues this as well, noting that, for French Algeria, individ-
ual colonial subjects could only become citizens of the wider French 
Empire if they reached a certain degree of evolution.19
In his work on colonial citizenship in French West Africa, Cooper 
notes that just as citizenship defi nes inclusion and exclusion in com-
munities it also melds a person’s rights to that person’s state.20 The 
British concept of citizenship is not one that necessarily came with 
certain citizenship rights and duties. Of course, Great Britain has never 
had a basic law or bill of rights that listed rights and duties of its 
subject-nationals.21 It is no surprise, then, that in Palestine under the 
British-administered mandate, colonial offi cials and Cabinet members 
promoted an apolitical citizenship. As Ilana Feldman explains, this 
citizenship transcended nationality as it offered rights in a social and 
perhaps diplomatic, rather than political, sense.22 
Contextualising the ‘Mandated National’
In studies on the ideological development of the nation, scholars such 
as Jurgen Habermas have posited two types of nationhood whose 
roots lie in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The French notion 
has been discussed above as a nation of citizens whose identities do 
not come from common ethnic, cultural or linguistic properties but 
instead from the practice of citizens exercising their civil rights as 
participants in the state. Political unity as related to the territorial 
and institutional structure of the French state has been the decid-
ing factor of inclusive belonging to the nation as citizens (demos).23 
Therefore, citizenship was a right through the provision of jus soli. 
The German notion of the nation differs from the French notion in 
that national identity developed before the nation-state in the terri-
tory that became modern Germany. Citizenship and nationality were 
much more exclusive than in France: the community formed the 
nation through its shared culture, language and ethnicity (ethnos). 
The right to citizenship came from the provision of jus sanguinis.24 
To put this into perspective for the Levant, the Ottoman Empire rec-
ognised both jus soli and jus sanguinis. 
Nationality as defi ned by Brubaker as jus sanguinis ethno-cultural 
membership in a nation developed out of the concept that the ethno-
cultural nation came to defi ne the political identity of its citizens.25 
Once the nation-state comes into existence with sovereign borders 
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and democratic political and legal structures, it becomes responsible 
for deciding the terms of citizenship as a legal and recognised sta-
tus and then granting rights associated with it. National identity, as 
opposed to nationality and citizenship, is a more abstract collective 
consciousness and a nation can exist without being sovereign. A sov-
ereign entity, however, is essential to regulate citizenship and provide 
the proper identifi cation to its citizens.26 By the nineteenth century, 
people slowly became dependent on the state that they lived under 
to legislate their identity in terms of borders. As John Torpey notes, 
nationality is implemented through a state’s bureaucratic measures 
(such as the passport) to control movement and borders.27 Citizen-
ship, then, refers to the legal relationship between an individual and 
the state, and the individual’s full membership in a community with 
civil, political and social rights and responsibilities. T. H. Marshall, 
the notable scholar on citizenship, stresses that the rights of citizen-
ship must be shared equally by all citizens in a given community.28 
Importantly, citizenship status determines access of an individual to 
the resources of the state and is used as a way to distribute power. 
Bryan Turner defi ned citizenship as a set of social practices of rights 
and obligations that defi ne the nature of social membership of a 
community.29 
The importance of nineteenth-century Ottoman history for under-
standing the post-1918 evolution of claims to nationality and citi-
zenship in Palestine cannot be understated. Ottoman nationality can 
be placed into the broader history of citizenship in the nineteenth 
century.30 Nineteenth-century Ottoman law classifi ed inhabitants as 
nationals in a territorial, rather than ethno-cultural, sense. Central to 
its Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman Government actively promoted 
a new national ideology termed Osmanlilik (Ottomanism) in order 
to reinforce an Empire-wide concept of equality of subjects.31 Prior 
to the law, the population’s relationship to the state was mediated 
through their millet, or religious community. By the turn to the twen-
tieth century and after the 1908 Young Turk takeover of the Ottoman 
government, the notion of Turkish nationality as separate from Arab 
nationality became incorporated into citizenship legislation, and citi-
zenship became more akin to nationality in the imperial codifi cations 
of identity.32 In sharp contrast with this, by the turn of the century 
Great Britain could no longer adhere solely to grants of nationality by 
birth and by descent within amendments to Empire-wide legislation. 
Upon later assumption of the Palestine Mandate, in part to maintain 
their position as the ultimate sovereign, Great Britian refrained from 
grants of explicit liberal citizenship rights such as to representation 
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in a legislative council or proportional voting rights. These types of 
proposed democratic measures, while implemented partially by the 
Ottoman government in the Arab provinces before 1914, severely 
challenged the foundation of British policy in Palestine – the facilita-
tion of a Jewish national home. Palestinian citizenship had to be cre-
ated in order to legally – and diplomatically – classify the inhabitants 
of the mandate, and to regulate who could acquire such a status. 
For offi cials who served in the government of Palestine, the 
construction of legal and internationally accepted identity was a 
complicated process. In the early years of the civil administration, 
the colonial administrators’ notions of nationality were infl uenced 
by their empire’s own citizenship legislation and history of colo-
nialism in the ‘Orient’ (including India and Egypt), the perception 
of Palestine as divided into Muslim, Christian and Jewish reli-
gious communities and the Jewish national home policy that the 
mandate encompassed.33 The entire process of inventing citizen-
ship in the crucial early 1920s resulted in unanswered questions 
that pertained to the changing statuses, sovereignty and political 
and civil rights of Palestinian Arabs and Jews. The process also 
formally separated Arab from Jewish Palestinian citizenships as 
both communities received, lost and used their citizenship in dif-
ferent ways. Aside from the separation of Arab and Jewish citizen-
ship acquisition and loss, offi cials in London and Palestine did not 
consistently use the terminology of nationality and citizenship in 
the same ways. The empire’s bureaucrats – in this case, colonial 
and mandate offi cials – had their own clear understandings of 
nationality and citizenship in the context of British policy in the 
metropole and in colonies and protectorates but this understand-
ing was situated at a unique juncture in the history of empire.34 
The tutelage system of the mandates in the Levant called into 
question traditional, colonial practices of delineating identity. 
The National and the Citizen in Vocabulary and Behaviour
The current study focuses on two broad groups: the native, largely 
Arabic-speaking population of Palestine, and the largely English 
imperial and local offi cials and administrators who essentially for-
mulated and applied British policy in Palestine. In order to better 
defi ne ‘discourse’ as throughout the chapters, a brief note of vocab-
ulary is necessary. The terms of reference used by the two groups 
to describe political and civic identity rarely coincided in terms of 
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their meanings and defi nitions. In fact, Palestinian Arab leadership 
did not use consistent terminology in reference to nationality and 
citizenship during the interwar period, and so it is often hard to 
pin down the best Arabic-to-English translations of the terminology 
used in documentary sources without a good deal of context. Con-
sequently, any attempt to pin one specifi c meaning or set of values 
and practices to the Arabic and Ottoman terms such as ‘national-
ity’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘rights’, is to step onto subjective grounds and 
indeed making such an argument is not the purpose of the study.35 
Arab nationalist and more populist leaders seemed to have picked 
and chosen the words that they used and the concepts they attached 
to them in order to suit certain circumstances, slogans, audiences 
or locales. By the early 1920s if not before, the terms for ‘nation-
ality’ (‘jinsiyya’), citizenship (‘muwātana’) and civil rights (‘huquq 
midaniyya’) took precedence in written discussions of identity and 
political membership in the nation. Their meanings in the context 
of the Palestine Mandate became familiar to a larger segment of 
Palestinian society as the readership of newspapers grew through-
out the fi rst decade of British rule. Most commonly, writers and 
politicians used ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ interchangeably and 
incorporated other meanings for citizenship such as ‘midaniyya’, 
which denoted a greater sense of urban civic identity. The terms that 
accompanied this discourse such as ‘qawmiyya’ (in reference to pan-
Arab nationalism) emphasised the synthesis of Palestinian national-
ity with a pan-Arab national identity. As Helen Haste has shown, in 
the construction of the citizen the historian must take into account 
the ways in which individuals negotiate rhetoric, meaning and defi -
nitions of citizenship and particularly the narrative that explains 
and justifi es the citizen and the nation.36 In the case of Palestine 
during the era of British mandatory rule, the representation and 
the understanding of the citizen was directly linked to Ottoman-era 
social categories of (Arab) nationhood, community (southern Syria) 
and a sense of an Arab ethnic identity. 
The year 1918 did not represent a clear break in the history of Pal-
estine’s Arab population, nor did it represent a break or transforma-
tion for the wider region. As the book demonstrates, self-identifi cation 
by the Arab population of Greater Syria in particular, including those 
Arabic-speaking peoples who migrated away from these provinces, 
remained in line with late-Ottoman era identifi cation. The end of the 
Ottoman Empire did not signal a singularly new conception of politi-
cal selfhood or even nationhood by the Palestinian Arabs; rather, they 
continued to stress their legal and ideological identifi cations as that of 
5028_Banko.indd   15 24/06/16   4:34 PM
16 | the invention of palestinian citizenship, 1918–1947
Arab, yet former Ottoman, nationals.37 This is in line with the argu-
ment of Awad Halabi who maintains that the Palestinian population 
nurtured strong links with their Ottoman identity into the 1920s and 
during the Turkish War of Independence.38 Although the year 1918 
marks the start of British administration in Palestine, it cannot be 
characterised as the year of any abrupt change in political or ideologi-
cal identifi cation from that of Ottoman citizens to strictly Palestinian 
nationals. Indeed, the two were not mutually exclusive in the early 
years of the mandate.
The place of Mandate Palestine, as well as the other Arab man-
dates, in the global context of the emergence of nation-states and 
international and diplomatic norms is understudied. The book 
attempts to shed light on a small corner of this dimension in the 
history of the Levant and its diasporic and migratory population 
and their practice of citizenship. The nationalism of the twenti-
eth century shaped laws on nationality and immigration and the 
authorities in states determined which individuals or ethnic groups 
belonged to which nation-state as its nationals.39 Hanley has writ-
ten that just before the First World War identity documents were 
‘portable signs of sovereignty’ that defi ned ‘the human boundaries’ 
of the state.40 Residence documents, or nationality documents as 
they came to be known, conferred an obligation of consular and 
diplomatic protection to their holder by the state or colonial power 
that granted them. Pre-First World War citizenship was a local sta-
tus and largely irrelevant in international contexts. Imperial sys-
tems incorporated bureaucratic measures to differentiate between 
categories of human beings and to classify peoples according to 
their subject status, race, religion, and, until the end of the war, 
their nationality.
It is in this context that the issue of Palestinian Arab emigration 
from Ottoman Greater Syria and Mandate Palestine becomes sig-
nifi cant. Arab emigrants, while the subject of newer studies in recent 
years, have been almost entirely left out of the historical discourse of 
national politics in the Levant. The political agency of the Palestinian 
Arab emigrants (muhājarīn) is signifi cant in its connection with the 
process of ‘making citizens’ during the mandate period, particularly 
through links of civic associations. The Palestinian Arab diaspora 
(mahjar), especially the emigrants in Latin America, played a major 
role in crafting a counter-defi nition of Palestinian citizenship inti-
mately linked with that of Arab nationality. Until quite recently, his-
torians of Palestine have long neglected the role played by Ottoman 
emigrants from southern Syria in ideological and political movements 
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against the mandate government and its policy of support for the 
establishment of a Jewish national home.41 The emigrants’ discourses 
on the questions of identity and belonging – shaped within the varied 
discursive fi elds of the diaspora – demonstrate that their ‘outside-
in’, ethnically segregated existence in the Americas allowed for these 
diasporic Arabs to make clear the realities of the British administra-
tion to their families, to the national movement and to socio-polit-
ical organisations in the homeland. Sections of the book approach 
citizenship from the standpoint of the Palestinian Arab diaspora in 
order to offer a more nuanced understanding of multiple meanings 
of citizenship, Arab nationality and civic and political identities that 
at times converged with or diverged from the development of these 
same meanings and movements within the mandate’s territory. The 
diaspora also offers a third community through which the historian 
can understand the impact of British policies in Palestine, especially 
in light of changing imperial policy. The history of the mahjar is also 
crucial to contemporary understandings of Palestinian statelessness 
and refugee status. 
In order to trace the legislative development of Palestinian 
nationality and citizenship, historians must rely on records of the 
Colonial, Foreign, Home, Dominions, and India Offi ces, as well as 
records from Parliamentary debates, Trade and Treasury Offi ces, 
the Crown Agents and the Law Offi cers. The opinions of British 
(and French) offi cials in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, 
India and Africa infl uenced the drafts of the nationality order, and 
so too did the Zionist Organisation. Mandate legislation, the Arabic 
press and documents of nationalist and local societies and leaders 
are all crucial sources to trace the construction and evolution of 
the post-war national and citizen. The Arabic sources for the topic 
of citizenship in the diaspora (such as letters, fi les of civic associa-
tions and newspapers printed in places such as the Americas, the 
Caribbean and the Philippines) are numerous and widespread par-
ticularly since citizenship and nationality became important issues 
for Palestinian Arabs and Jews who lived across the globe. Unfor-
tunately, a number of these sources outside of the Levant and Great 
Britain have not been consulted due to the focus of this project as 
well as a number of uncertainties over their locations – however, 
sources from the Syrian and Lebanese Arab diaspora from the 
interwar period have only recently been uncovered by other histo-
rians. This book has used documentary sources located in personal 
archives, libraries, and state archives in the United Kingdom, Israel, 
the West Bank and Beirut. 
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A certain amount of the historiography on Mandate Palestine has 
emphasised Britain’s creation of dual structures of administration and 
society.42 Chapter 2 delves deeper into this, to investigate whether 
the structures put in place by Great Britain for the acquisition of 
Palestinian citizenship favoured Jewish immigrants in any way, and 
the chapter demonstrates how and why Great Britain felt the dual 
administration structure necessary to preserve its own sovereignty 
from 1918 through 1925. In terms of legislation and administration, 
the mandate offi cials took cues and direction on policy from London, 
and Great Britain acted as a colonial power in Palestine in its legisla-
tion and administration. Perhaps most signifi cantly for the early years 
of the Palestine Administration, Foreign and Colonial Offi ce perma-
nent members were guided by their mission to ensure that legislation 
in the mandate territory was in line with post-war norms and that 
it did nothing to prejudice the establishment of the Jewish national 
homeland. The main focus here is on the history of British legislation 
in Palestine and the main actors – and tensions between these actors 
and their departments – involved in making that legislation, including 
the mandate’s fi rst attorney-general, Norman Bentwich. The aim of 
British legislation, however, was to simply create a legal citizenship 
for the mandate’s inhabitants, and to provide the means by which this 
citizenship could be acquired. 
The third chapter is somewhat in debt to the theoretical work on 
democracy, civil society, belonging and communitarian citizenship 
formulations by Raymond Rocco. The chapter shifts focus from the 
British aspect of nationality and citizenship legislation to the Arab 
inhabitants of Palestine, in order to analyse the development of the 
civic and political community during the early years of the mandate 
administration. The new types of spaces and institutions introduced by 
the new administration in Palestine challenged traditional, Ottoman-
style ways of understanding identity, community and nationality. The 
challenges and disruptions wrought by the incorporation of Palestine 
into a new imperial system reconfi gured social relations and commu-
nal and national boundaries. These disruptions strengthened the Arabs’ 
sense of communitarian belonging to Palestine, allowed for the for-
mation of new civic and political associations and laid the foundation 
for engagement of Arab society with particular notions, ideologies and 
claims frequently discussed in a plethora of press articles. These would 
later constitute a series of demands and appeals for citizenship rights. 
At its core, the chapter traces how citizenship and nationality took on 
a specifi cally political and rights-based understanding of Arab civic 
belonging in Palestine.
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Chapter 4 contextualises the discourses, infl uences, notions and 
political transformations that informed the Palestinian Arabs’ under-
standing of nationality and citizenship in the diaspora (particularly 
in Latin America) and at home in the years leading up to and just 
after the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council. Importantly, it focuses 
on the impacts of these understandings in Palestinian society and as 
part of Arab relations with Great Britain as the mandatory power. 
Just as signifi cantly, the Arab nationalists and local, civil society 
leaders began to change their perceptions of the identity of Jewish 
immigrants, largely informed by the situation of the Arab emigrants 
outside of Palestine. It offers an entirely new history of the emigrants 
and their reactions to, and counter-defi nitions of, the type of legal 
and apolitical nationality and citizenship that Palestine Mandate 
and colonial offi cials attempted to craft during the same time period. 
With reference to work by Engin Isin, the chapter analyses how citi-
zens were ‘made’ in the diaspora and the roles played by civil society 
organisations to link Palestinian natives abroad with their homeland 
as mandate institutions and Jewish immigration became ever more 
an entrenched part of life for the Arab population of Palestine. The 
impact of citizenship legislation on the diaspora frames the intro-
duction of debates, discussions and slogans within Palestine, such 
as the demand for the ‘right to return’ and letters of protest to the 
British and international community that underscored the grievances 
of the emigrants who lacked citizenship. The emigrants, for their 
part, historically represent both civic and political belonging in the 
entity that Arab nationalists increasingly stressed their right of own-
ership to – the Palestinian nation-state. 
British rule in Palestine, as elsewhere in the overseas Empire, was 
reinforced through laws, regulations and orders-in-council. The power 
and rule of Great Britain, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, was sovereign – 
British offi cials often neglected or selectively applied the League of 
Nations, international treaties and international and regional norms. 
However, other layers of history can be added to British rule in Pal-
estine in the decade after 1925: tensions between London and Jeru-
salem and between individual offi cials hindered attempts by local 
administrators to implement regulations and policies that would ease 
the increased ill-feelings and discord between the Arab and Jewish 
communities. Certainly, this was the case with citizenship legislation, 
although the Arab leadership attributed British reluctance to turn the 
citizens’ legal status into a political one to British favouritism for the 
Zionist movement and Jewish immigrants. The reality was far more 
complicated, not only due to internal tensions between offi cials but 
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also because of insistence by members of the Cabinet and various 
corners of Whitehall to promote imperial standards with respect to 
any policies or regulations on Palestinian citizenship and national-
ity. The chapter demonstrates how Palestinian citizenship was offered 
and revoked in different ways for Arabs as opposed to Jews, and 
that the differences between administrators specifi cally with respect 
to policy towards Jewish immigrants had an effect on changes to citi-
zenship legislation. Although the distinctions created by legislation 
were very much a part of the wider colonial project and the changing 
fortunes of the British Empire, the chapter also emphasises that the 
unique nature of the mandate and its national home policy meant that 
administrations had to account for a certain internationalisation of 
Palestinian citizenship. 
By the latter half of the 1920s and the early 1930s, British and 
Arab misunderstandings of each other’s intentions with respect to 
identity and citizenship status encouraged even stronger claims by the 
Arabs to the bundle of rights that they felt entitled to in accordance 
with their own particular understandings of nationality and citizen-
ship. Different socio-economic Arab groups in Palestine used a num-
ber of ways to express their wishes, demands and comprehension of 
rights to the state, rather than the civil and religious rights they were 
offered within the state. The sixth chapter ties the discussions of citi-
zenship that circulated in the territory from 1918 through the mid-
1930s to the projects of belonging that the nationalists, populists and 
the Arabic press attended to and actively worked towards. The active 
engagement of the press and social groups in political actions with 
the aim of changing mandate institutions fostered a new vocabulary 
of rights, political and civic identity and citizenship belonging in the 
years just before the start of the Palestine Revolt in 1936. The chap-
ter frames certain discourses on citizenship and national identity as 
more dominant and others as more subaltern during the latter half of 
the 1920s and 1930s. The key case study within this chapter is that 
of the Palestinian Arab Istiqlal (Independence) Party, whose policies 
aimed to redefi ne citizenship and access to rights under the mandate. 
Chapter 7 chronicles the changes to the various meanings of citi-
zenship and civic identity during the three years of the Palestinian 
Arab Revolt. Effectively, citizenship claims became rather ‘stalled’ 
in Palestine upon the outbreak of the nationwide revolt against the 
British. Rural rebels and revolt commanders co-opted certain claims, 
which in turn infl uenced newer meanings of patriotic loyalty and 
practices of citizenship. In particular, the Peel Commission report, 
which offered recommendations on policy in Palestine following the 
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initial disturbances, is described in terms of its impact on citizen-
ship in order to offer a historical explanation of the continuities and 
changes of both the British and the Arabs’ perceptions of nationality, 
citizenship and rights by 1937. The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, 
offers further insight on citizenship in Palestine after 1939 and until 
the end of the mandate in 1948 and the changing levels of the Arabs’ 
political subjectivity. The differences between the multiple doctrines, 
vocabularies, expressions and concepts of citizenship during the fi rst 
two decades of the mandate administration are refl ected in the leg-
islation on citizenship passed by the British administration and in 
the reactions by the Arab citizens to that legislation. It explores the 
immediate reactions of Great Britain and the Palestine administration 
to the increased Jewish immigration to the territory and the changes 
made to the mandate’s citizenship legislation in the wake of the Peel 
Commission’s recommendations. The conclusion demonstrates that 
on the eve of the Second World War, citizenship claims, particularly 
that of the right to administer Palestine, continued to be a central and 
defi ning issue for Arab residents and emigrants as the two groups 
increasingly feared the impact of the increased Jewish immigration 
and the demographic and political changes to the citizenry. 
After Great Britain rescinded control over the mandate and when 
the state of Israel came into being in 1948, it remained a fact that the 
territory’s native Arab population had been constituted as political 
subjects as well as legal citizens for more than two decades: they did 
not simply exist in nationalist imaginings but were defi ned legally 
in regulations as a demographic entitled to passports, identity doc-
uments, measures of civil, political and social rights and interna-
tional recognition. Palestinian Arab emigrants, especially those in 
the Americas, also saw themselves as Palestinian nationals entitled 
to Palestinian citizenship, whether they chose to return to reside in 
that territory or not. The unavoidable displacement of these native 
Palestinians due to the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council is an 
unspoken yet crucial element of the Palestinian Arab diaspora today 
as well as during the interwar years. On the surface, the contempo-
rary political implications of Palestinian citizenship may be few and 
far between for policy-makers in Palestine and Israel. However, this 
not-too-distant historical existence of – and the Arabs’ own engage-
ment with – notions and understandings of a rights-based Palestin-
ian citizenship cannot be separated from the development of the 
twentieth and twenty-fi rst centuries of the political, social and civic 
identity of the Palestinian Arab population both at home, in the 
occupied territories and Israel, and in the wider diaspora. Palestinian 
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nationalism did not appear in 1918 as a movement whose adherents 
had a clear political identity; rather, citizenship and nationality were 
forged through reinterpretations of traditional and cultural notions 
of civic identity, rights and protections of the imperial subjects vis-
à-vis the state and Ottoman precedents, alongside acts of political 
participation, political behaviour and civic engagement.
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Inventing the National and the Citizen in 
Palestine: Great Britain, Sovereignty and the 
Legislative Context, 1918–1925
In October 1922, just two years after the establishment of the mandates system by the League of Nations, the Arab members 
of the Palestine Mandate’s administrative advisory committee met 
High Commissioner Herbert Samuel in Jerusalem to read through 
the draft of a law to regulate Palestinian nationality. Nationality 
did not yet exist as a legal status within the territory ceded to Great 
Britain’s administrative control as a mandate, nor as an interna-
tionally recognised identity. By that point Palestine’s fi rst attorney-
general, an Englishman named Norman Bentwich, wrote a large 
portion of the draft legislation and submitted drafts to the Colonial 
Offi ce for approval. Prior to the First World War, Bentwich served 
as a barrister in England but he had no specialisations in national-
ity law. None of the offi cials in the Palestine Administration, whom 
historian Michael Cohen once classifi ed as either ill-trained or not 
at all trained for their positions, had such a specialisation.1 Those 
seven Arabs who attended the meeting with Samuel and looked 
over Bentwich’s proposal on Palestinian nationality belonged 
to prominent Palestinian families. Most of these men received a 
Western-style education, had some knowledge of Ottoman-era law 
and they all professed sympathies with the anti-Zionist Palestinian 
Arab nationalist movement. As the men – certainly not specialists 
in English law – studied the draft, they were struck by Bentwich’s 
plan to give Jewish immigrants ‘provisional nationality’ while the 
Arab population in Palestine remained ‘former Ottoman subjects’ 
categorised as ‘ex-enemy aliens’ by Great Britain. One member of 
the committee, Abdul Khader al-Muzaffer, bewildered as to why 
the mandate’s Arab-majority population was not given the same 
status as the new immigrants nor even that of offi cially recognised 
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nationals, proclaimed ironically that ‘Palestine is a land of mar-
vels and this new regulation [for provisional nationality] is one 
of them’.2 
The so-called provisional status held by the Jewish immigrants 
reinforced the identity of the Arabs as akin to ‘natives’ in colonial 
terminology. By 1922, as the mandatory in Palestine, Great Britain 
undeniably acted more as an imperial power than as a trustee and 
the colonial nature of its rule is evidenced by the ways in which the 
civil administration created and implemented nationality and citi-
zenship as well as other pieces of legislation in cooperation with the 
British Colonial, Foreign, Home, and Dominions Offi ces, the Crown 
and the Zionist Organisation. Until 1938, the Colonial Offi ce’s per-
manent members jointly devised policy for Palestine in cooperation 
with each high commissioner, and ultimate approval for policy came 
from the Cabinet and government in London.3 The members of the 
short-lived High Commissioner’s Advisory Council disbanded soon 
after the meeting, owing to these Arab members’ dissatisfaction with 
the limitations of their solely advisory role. 
When the fi nal draft of the order-in-council to institute Pales-
tinian citizenship came into effect in 1925, its regulations offered 
more favourable means for the acquisition of citizenship to Jewish 
immigrants than to Arabs from the former provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire, Egypt and North Africa. Even Palestinian Arab students or 
merchants who had temporarily relocated outside of Palestine were 
disadvantaged by the provisions of the order-in-council. The nation-
ality-turned-citizenship order bolstered the cornerstone of mandate 
policy: the facilitation of a Jewish national homeland as embodied in 
the mandate charter. Despite misgivings by certain members of the 
Colonial Offi ce and the Palestine Administration, this policy infl u-
enced most pieces of legislation proposed for Palestine from 1918 to 
1925. The intricacies of Palestinian nationality and citizenship legis-
lation refl ected the obligation of Great Britain to adhere to the man-
date’s policy to support the establishment of a Jewish national home. 
In order to ensure the successful establishment of that national home, 
which the government professed to be its moral duty, Cabinet min-
isters in London favoured arrangements that allowed Jewish immi-
grants to acquire easily Palestinian citizenship upon their arrival to 
the territory. At the same time, Great Britain worked – albeit with 
varying degrees of success – to ensure that the legislation in each 
of their mandates remained in line with new, post-war international 
regulations. Alongside consideration of the country’s obligations to 
the Zionist Organisation, broader debates on nationality, citizenship 
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and colonialism by Great Britain and, to some extent, other mandate 
and colonial administrations, framed the specifi c creation of nation-
ality and citizenship in the quasi-colonial Palestine Mandate. 
Discussions and disagreements among colonial offi cials, inhabitants 
and immigrants over sovereignty in Palestine and in the mandates sys-
tem, as well as over the meaning of post-war identity prior to the 1922 
ratifi cation of the mandate, infl uenced the shape of nationality legisla-
tion for the territory from 1922 through 1925. These same discussions 
did not take place only for the case of Palestine, but were replicated 
in the wider British Empire and throughout the post-Ottoman Levant. 
In particular, direct colonialism had given way to indirect colonial 
rule in many parts of the Empire. A number of colonial administra-
tors expounded upon the benefi ts of indirect rule from the turn of the 
century, and the trusteeship system proposed for the mandated ter-
ritories was not construed as outright colonialism. These discussions, 
ideas, practices and identities developed trans-imperially as offi cials of 
empire (and others in non-offi cial capacities) moved between imperial 
sites. However, as ‘new’ imperial historians David Lambert and Alan 
Lester argue, ideas about race, national identity, governance, civilisa-
tion and, in our case, citizenship, were not simply imported from the 
imperial centre or from the periphery, but developed across multiple 
spaces. Even within the same region, not all imperial ideas, practices 
and ideologies travelled well from place to place.4 At the same time, 
external discussions of the nature of empire impacted these ideas and 
practices even while they were in transit. 
The new language of internationalism and self-determination in 
a number of locales meant that traditional notions of subjecthood 
lost their former meanings in the metropole as well as in colonies, 
protectorates and the Dominions. These changes are refl ected in the 
muddled nature of belonging in Palestine as envisioned by mandate 
and colonial authorities and policy-makers, as well as those prec-
edents that they turned to for guidance. As demonstrated in what 
follows, the disagreements over sovereignty and the growing uncer-
tainty by colonial offi cials over the post-war imperial world-view led 
to the separate codifi cation of Jewish-Palestinian nationality from 
Arab-Palestinian nationality as fi rst mentioned in the mandate’s 1922 
basic law. Through the early 1920s as the British codifi ed nation-
ality provisions, Arab natives were treated differently from Jewish 
‘provisional’ citizens in the practical matters of travel, passports, 
diplomatic protection and the regulation of the franchise. The lat-
ter represent some of the immediate impacts upon Palestine’s Jewish 
immigrants and native Arab inhabitants of the Treaty of Lausanne 
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and the subsequent Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council as a citi-
zenship order signed by the King of England rather than a nationality 
law passed by the local administration. The debates over the creation 
of Palestinian citizenship were not confi ned to Whitehall and the 
Palestine Administration, but were framed more broadly by ambigu-
ity and various defi nitions of nationality and citizenship based upon 
Britain’s experience with imperial subjecthood, national status and 
imperial consular protection.
Immediately after the end of the First World War and by the 
time of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, British offi cials and the 
military administration in Palestine grappled with the contradiction 
between fulfi lling both the trusteeship obligations of the proposed 
mandate and the obligations of the Balfour Declaration that required 
sovereignty and direct administration of the territory. Although offi -
cials found points of comparison with colonial administrations else-
where in the Middle East and India, the post-war rhetoric of national 
self-determination and the strength of nationalist movements that 
inspired the idea of trusteeship over certain groups of people ran 
sharply against imperial practice. Although, as enshrined in the 
declaration, the mandate could not prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of the Arab majority, Great Britain could not offer Jews and 
Arabs an equal, rights-based citizenship or even equal representative 
institutions for self-government. Administrators feared that giving 
political rights to the Arabs to vote or sanction the enactment of leg-
islation would pose a threat to their obligations towards the Zionist 
movement. Therefore, citizenship had to be framed as a legal, apolit-
ical status with minimal accompanying civil rights, and the ultimate 
power to give or take away citizenship status rested with the British 
high commissioners in Palestine overseen by London. 
The British in Palestine institutionalised a dual administrative 
structure that offered Arab and Jewish individuals separate and 
unequal civil, economic, social and political positions. A number of 
historians, including Bernard Wasserstein and Zachary Lockman, 
have debated the limits of classifying the mandate’s administration 
in such a way, but for the creation of legal nationality two different 
classifi cations existed for the territory’s inhabitants.5 In light of Brit-
ish practice before and after 1922, the bewilderment expressed by 
Abdul Khader al-Muzaffer and his colleagues was not misplaced. 
The foundations of this structure can be traced back to the years 
immediately after 1918 when the British, in their capacity of mili-
tary administrators in Palestine, made every attempt to exclude the 
demands of the Arab leadership on matters of political rights from 
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the commentary on nationality and citizenship. In response to the 
unwillingness of High Commissioner Samuel to consider certain 
measures of self-government and to repeal the Balfour Declaration’s 
inclusion in mandate policy, his Arab advisors expressed their dis-
agreement with the nationality law draft in 1922, and not only ter-
minated their service on the advisory committee but also supported 
a popular boycott of elections to a proposed legislative council that 
same year. First, however, it is to the parameters of state succession 
after 1918, and the notions and debates within the League of Nations 
and by Great Britain on sovereignty in the mandate system, that the 
chapter now turns.
Great Britain, Palestine and the League of Nations: 
Sovereignty, Nationality and State Succession, 1919–1922
The end of the First World War did not immediately change the status 
quo of legislation on the ground in the Ottoman Empire’s Arab prov-
inces; in fact, no internationally recognised bureaucratic measures 
existed to allow for any changes. The practice of sovereign rule by 
Great Britain, whose soldiers entered southern Syria and Jerusalem 
at the end of 1917, was ushered into a new era in which direct colo-
nialism of conquered lands could no longer be considered legitimate 
in the eyes of the newly created international community of nations.6 
Still, despite Woodrow Wilson’s declaration of support in early 1918 
with groups resisting imperialism, the British Government initially 
had space in which to claim measures of sovereign control over the 
Arab-majority provinces that became the mandates of Palestine, Syria, 
Transjordan and Iraq.
The fi rst order of business for the British occupation forces was 
to install a temporary administration in southern Syria, which lasted 
from December 1917 to mid-1920 and became known as Occupied 
Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) South. The military offi cials 
in this area, unoffi cially referred to as Palestine, decided in 1918 to 
keep the status quo of Ottoman laws until bureaucratic measures 
could be undertaken by a civilian administration. The arrival of the 
fi rst High Commissioner Herbert Samuel in July 1920 marked the 
start of civil rule. During these two years of military government, and 
for quite some time after, the most pressing issue was that of sover-
eignty in the territory that was to become the Palestine Mandate. The 
basic structures of the League of Nations were not yet fully formed 
when the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 decided the future status 
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of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces of Syria and Mesopotamia 
(Iraq). The political uncertainty of the early post-war years in the 
Levant affected the status of the inhabitants of Palestine – one of the 
most pressing issues linked to sovereignty proved to be the dissolution 
of Ottoman nationality. 
The concept of sovereignty was not clear-cut for any of the par-
ties involved in the creation of the mandate system or even in the 
creation of the League of Nations. The British, for their part, faced a 
number of basic questions on the sovereignty of Palestine as related 
to nationality prior to the ratifi cation of the Palestine Mandate in 
1922. Susan Pedersen has argued that the League of Nations man-
date system served as a discursive arena – of debate, discussion and 
ideology – rather than one of practical political action. Here, Britain 
and France interacted in certain rhetorical ways in order to estab-
lish or defend political claims to territory.7 This left the question of 
sovereignty over the Arab territories up for debate but delegates to 
League bodies undertook little concrete action to defi ne the appro-
priate exercise of power in the cases of trusteeship. Britain, France, 
and League offi cials saw themselves as the only legitimate discus-
sants on the issue and British offi cials held a particularly high view of 
Great Britain as a leader in the Allies’ decision-making. Through the 
nineteenth century, the British envisioned sovereignty and particular 
policies of rule to make their empire ‘home’, familiar and a space 
that legislation and regulations from the metropole could pass into 
smoothly.8 British delegates to the League were reluctant to consider 
any loss of control over their territories to an international body.
The League of Nations sidelined opinions from nationalist move-
ments and political representatives of the former Ottoman territo-
ries, whose ideas of sovereignty over those territories varied greatly 
from that held by the Allied Powers. A historical analysis of sover-
eignty, particularly over nationality legislation, can help to answer 
the question of whether the concept itself mattered to the League 
and to Great Britain in the early years of the Palestine Mandate. 
Colonial offi cials, including the architects of indirect rule, did not 
have a clear defi nition of the concept by 1919. The League sought to 
create and defi ne a new type of sovereignty through the mandates-
as-trusteeships concept. Nationality regulations, fi rst in the 1920 
Treaty of Sèvres and then in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, were one 
medium through which the international body attempted to defi ne 
sovereignty. 
This early uncertainty over authority in Palestine played a role in 
the conceptualisation of the nationality of its inhabitants. Initially, the 
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colonial experts in Britain and in Geneva who supervised the estab-
lishment of the mandates did not place much emphasis on the neces-
sity to formulate new provisions to clarify sovereignty and nationality 
in each mandate. During 1919 and 1920 offi cials concerned them-
selves more with the international validation of Great Britain’s 
claim to become the mandatory power in Palestine.9 Locally, from 
the beginning of the military administration in Palestine, the British 
Colonial Offi ce and the Foreign Offi ce diverged on policy and only 
reluctantly worked together. Historian Aaron Klieman, for example, 
argues that the two departments had fundamental differences of ori-
entation and priority for Palestine that emerged out of the post-war 
tensions over their shared responsibilities for British interests in the 
Arab world. With the beginning of the civil administration the Colo-
nial Offi ce and its new Middle East Department (established in 1921) 
assumed responsibility and control over the policy and the adminis-
tration of the Palestine Mandate, but by that point tensions became 
apparent locally in Palestine. Meanwhile, the Foreign Offi ce assumed 
responsibility for the conduct of relations between the mandates and 
independent states.10 Yet Colonial and Foreign Offi ce power were not 
absolute: the India Offi ce, Air Ministry, Home Offi ce, Dominions 
Offi ce and other departments also claimed measures of responsibility 
for Palestine or its foreign relations. 
After the appointment of Samuel in 1920, the Colonial Offi ce 
and the Cabinet in London guided the activities of Palestine’s civil 
administration through the newly established High Commissioner’s 
Offi ce once the latter passed ‘on-the-ground’ information to policy-
makers in the British capital. The government formed directives 
and issued decrees that it sent to Jerusalem for implementation. 
Throughout this process, divergences in opinions became clear: 
in 1921, Winston Churchill noted that 90 per cent of the British 
offi cials in Palestine, at that time closely aligned with the Foreign 
Offi ce, opposed the Zionist policy of the local British administra-
tion headed by Samuel.11 Although the Colonial Offi ce was con-
cerned with Arab public opinion specifi cally to maintain political 
stability and public security, by contrast the Foreign Offi ce was 
aware of Palestine’s importance for the wider Arab and Muslim 
world and felt more sympathetic toward the general Arab oppo-
sition to Zionist policy.12 In later years the Zionist Organisation 
came to view the Colonial Offi ce as especially against its cause. 
Tensions went deeper, however: Cabinet Ministers disagreed con-
sistently on policy for Palestine and the Cabinet often disagreed 
with the local administration in Jerusalem and the ways in which 
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the high commissioners could ‘set’ policy. For its part, the Colonial 
Offi ce in the 1920s and 1930s suffered from frequent changes to its 
secretary and under-secretary.13 Offi cially, the high commissioners 
were meant to be unbiased towards either the Arab or Jewish resi-
dents of Palestine but in the metropole the situation differed. The 
Zionist Organisation and its head, Chaim Weizmann, had a great 
deal of infl uence in the British Parliament. Unoffi cially, memoirs 
by members of the local administration report upon assumed and 
real biases of various offi cials and the tensions that these caused in 
Jerusalem during the early years of the mandate.14
The relationship between Great Britain and the League of 
Nations refl ected another dimension of uncertainty over the type of 
power that the former held in Palestine. As the process of drafting 
the mandate charters began in 1919, Great Britain recognised that 
it needed to work with the League of Nations to administer its Arab 
territories, although the former continued to claim, as it had since 
1918, to be the sovereign power in Palestine. In 1919, Lord Robert 
Cecil, head of the British delegation to the League and president 
of the League of Nations Union (LNU), stated his opposition to 
any League interference with future administrative decisions made 
by mandate governments. Other British statesmen had prominent 
roles, writing the proposals for the three classes into which man-
dates came to be divided. Disputes with the other Allied Powers 
in 1920 over who would take the Arab mandates postponed the 
actual implementation of the mandate system.15 From 1919 to 1922, 
although colonial offi cials delegated power to other members of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), a largely advisory body, 
to help formulate the framework of each future British-administered 
mandate Great Britain greatly infl uenced the ultimate acceptance 
or refusal of mandate charters. In the case of Palestine, differences 
of opinion over these specifi c preparations for its future indepen-
dence surfaced between colonial offi cials in London, members of the 
civil administration and Zionist Organisation leaders. To varying 
degrees, the differences of opinion impacted the work of the director 
of the League’s Mandate Section, Switzerland’s William Rappard, 
who supervised the day-to-day running of the PMC and collected 
data on the proposed mandates. His colleague Sir Frederick Lugard 
served as Britain’s fi rst representative on the commission, despite his 
lack of diplomatic and political experience.16 
By the end of January 1920, the British delegation to the League 
had a general understanding of the structure of the mandates but no 
consensus existed as to how they would work in practice, especially 
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as to provisions of nationality and the actual status of the inhabit-
ants of the territory.17 Internally, in the battle between the Colonial 
and Foreign Offi ces over the supervision of the mandates, Lugard 
argued that each fell within the realm of colonial rather than foreign 
policy. In order to pre-empt further disagreement, control of the civil 
administration of Palestine was transferred in 1921 to the Colonial 
Offi ce.18 The mandatories were offi cially nominated at the San Remo 
conference in April of 1920 but the situation in Anatolia and the 
refusal of the Turkish nationalists to endorse a peace treaty further 
complicated the practical implementation of the Arab mandates and 
dissuaded any change in the national status of their inhabitants. Brit-
ish Prime Minister Lloyd George and French Prime Minister Georges 
Clemenceau decided to grant the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain 
despite strong Arab nationalist objections, from within the Levant 
and from the diaspora, as clearly evident from the conclusions of the 
King–Crane Commission Report.19 
It must be stressed that the territories of the former Ottoman 
Empire remained nominally part of that empire until the conclusion 
of a peace treaty with the forces of Mustafa Kemal and the new 
Republic of Turkey in 1923. The Turkish nationalists did not accept 
the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and therefore Mustafa Kemal remained 
symbolically at war as the Ottoman Empire with the Allied Powers. 
The Treaty of Sèvres’ importance to the current discussion can be 
related to its provisions for the enforcement of nationality in Pales-
tine and in all of the Ottoman Empire’s former territories. The treaty 
sanctioned the League’s consensus on state succession: Ottoman 
nationality would effectively cease to exist and the new administra-
tions that took the place of the empire would be responsible for the 
creation and regulation of nationality. However, without Turkey’s 
approval of the treaty, the inhabitants of the mandated territories 
remained Ottoman nationals. They included not only Arabs but 
also ethnic Kurds, Turkomen, Circassians, Armenians and Eastern 
European Jewish immigrants. 
As the Allied Powers considered questions of nationality in the 
international, post-war context, the British placed the population of 
Palestine into categories and accorded different treatment to them. 
Beginning in 1918 and until the ratifi cation of the Treaty of Lausanne 
in 1923, the civil administration dealt with two different ‘national-
ity’ groups: the native inhabitants, Arab or otherwise, who had all 
been Ottoman subjects, and the immigrant Jews who arrived after 
1914. The method of categorisation was not without imperial rea-
soning. During the later decades of Ottoman rule, immigrant Jews 
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from Europe who resided in the empire came under the protection of 
European consuls. In contrast, Jews who came from the other Arab 
lands, including North Africa, usually took Ottoman nationality.20 
Some groups of Jews from the empire, Egypt or North Africa (such 
as merchant Baghdadi Jews) acquired British-protected status in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.21 The new immigrants, however, 
did not generally take Ottoman nationality and they did not remain 
under European protection after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. 
When the British offi cials arrived, one of their priorities towards this 
group was to defi ne it in provisional national terms.
Prior to 1923, the Euro-centric Zionist Organisation led by Chaim 
Weizmann (a close friend of Secretary of State for the Colonies at the 
time, Winston Churchill) lent a great amount of infl uence in offering 
commentary and advice, in accordance with Article 4 of the Man-
date whose provisions gave the organisation the advisory role on 
Palestine policy, into the initially nebulous discussions of nationality 
that affected the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, the separation of 
‘national’ groups in the territory and the framework of the mandate. 
Indeed, the mandate charter allowed only for the Zionist Organisa-
tion, rather than the Arab leadership, to offer assistance and advice 
to the British administration. Due to the Balfour Declaration’s obliga-
tions and the increased Jewish immigration after the war, the British 
confronted the unique question of how to create a legal and political 
framework of nationality and citizenship to satisfy the conditions in 
Palestine. The advice offered by the colonial experts, Cabinet mem-
bers and the Zionist Organisation shaped both the mandate charter 
and nationality legislation. After he viewed the earliest draft of the 
mandate charter in 1919, Weizmann proposed to Britain’s Secretary 
of State for the Colonies that Palestine’s inhabitants must have full 
freedom of religion as part of the ‘civil rights’ of citizenship. His pro-
posal did not explicitly defi ne ‘civil rights’ or citizenship. Weizmann’s 
close friend Baron Rothschild added his own commentary to the pro-
posal. He suggested that Jews should receive preferential treatment 
with a separate citizenship in order to satisfy the Zionist leaders of 
British sincerity for the national home policy. Rothschild elaborated 
further by suggesting that the Jews of Palestine should also be given 
the status of full British subjects. The British noted the potential dif-
fi culties of such a measure: Arab demands for the same status as 
British subjects and widespread opposition to the Palestine Mandate, 
a mass emigration from Palestine of Jews who had full British protec-
tion and the impossibility of maintaining a suitable administration 
with such a provision.22 Surely, the British also must have worried 
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about the sincerity of the loyalty to the Crown that such subjects 
presumably would never cultivate. 
While British offi cials and the League worked on drafts of the 
mandate, it became clear that departments within the government 
needed clarifi cation as to the application of Palestinian nationality 
since colonial precedents could not be used in their entirety. The dis-
cussions framed Article 7 of the mandate: the article required the 
enactment of a nationality law specifi cally for Jewish immigrants. 
Colonial legislators, guided by imperial and diplomatic concerns, 
focused their attention on the means through which they could pro-
vide these immigrants with a new national status. Initially, the drafts 
stated that immigrants who took up residence in Palestine within 
two years of the ratifi cation of the mandate would lose their exist-
ing nationality and automatically become Palestinian citizens.23 The 
concept behind the proposal of automatic loss of one nationality 
and automatic substitution with another did not fi t harmoniously 
with the aim of the Zionist movement: namely, the desire for a self-
governing Jewish national homeland was at odds with the forced 
imposition of the nationality of a non-Jewish, British-administered 
territory. Until the ratifi cation of the mandates, however, Zionist 
leaders such as Weizmann requested that the Foreign Offi ce offer 
consular protection to Palestine’s Jewish immigrant population. This 
request framed Article 12 of the mandate charter, which entitled all 
citizens to British protection when abroad.24 
The debates and discussions highlighted above – whether between 
British administrators in the Colonial and Foreign Offi ces, offi cials 
in London and Jerusalem or members of the Zionist Organisation – 
informed the practical application of the mandate charter from 
1919 to its ratifi cation in 1922. This practical application took into 
account the visualisation by the local government of two separate 
national communities resident in Palestine. The international context 
is no less important to this visualisation. The abrogation of the Treaty 
of Sèvres by Mustafa Kemal forced the administration to recognise 
Jewish immigrants as provisional nationals but reinforced the status 
of the majority Arab natives as former Ottoman subjects who were 
accorded different treatment. The Palestine Mandate charter stated 
in Article 7 that the mandatory was to enact a law for the acquisition 
of Palestinian nationality by Jewish immigrants but crucially did not 
defi ne nationality or citizenship and it made no mention of the Arab 
population. Arguments over whether Great Britain as a sovereign 
power separate from the Palestine Administration could offer con-
sular protection to residents further complicated matters. Members 
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of the administration repeatedly failed to come to a unifi ed opinion 
on the international status of the Palestinian population.
Neither the League nor the Mandate charter stated if author-
ity in Palestine came from the League, the Cabinet, Parliament, the 
king himself, or an international treaty. The League did not make 
clear the procedures through which the British could administer the 
mandated territories, which meant that from 1920 to 1923 the civil 
administration headed by High Commissioner Samuel hesitated to 
pass legislation. The charter itself was not a constitution or basic 
law for the territory. The question of sovereignty remained largely 
unsolved through Samuel’s term of offi ce although the British fl ew 
the Union Jack in their mandated territories with the belief – along-
side the practical impression that the symbol of the fl ag gave – that 
the Crown, rather than the League, was the sovereign.25 Ultimately, 
these and other variables forced administrators to delay the comple-
tion of a nationality law to regulate citizenship.
Norman Bentwich and the Meanings of Nationality, 
Citizenship and the Imperial Protégé
In 1939, fi fteen years after the implementation of the Treaty of 
Lausanne, the English mastermind of Mandate Palestine’s Citi-
zenship Order-in-Council explained his reasoning as to the differ-
ences between nationality and citizenship in an article written for 
an international law journal. Norman Bentwich maintained that the 
terminology in the Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council of 1925 
emphasised citizenship, as opposed to nationality, in order to divert 
from the ‘Oriental’ defi nition of the latter. In Oriental countries, he 
wrote, citizenship marked the allegiance to a state whereas nation-
ality was a matter of race and religion. Both Arabs and Jews were 
equally Palestinian citizens, stated Bentwich, but throughout his 
decade-long tenure in Palestine, both groups claimed to have sepa-
rate Arab or Jewish nationality.26 In order to avoid instances of fric-
tion between an emotive, sentimental status and attachment such as 
that of national identity with a British-imposed legal and apolitical 
citizenship, Bentwich intended for the order-in-council to foster a 
civic (but not political) identity that members of both ‘national’ cat-
egories in Palestine would assume in equal measure. 
Discussions on the legal, political and civic meanings of citi-
zenship and nationality in the British and French empires in the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth became increasingly 
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common within various indigenous national movements and the 
members of their diasporas who agitated for measures of self-rule. 
Before the outbreak of war, citizenship as a specifi c status began to 
matter in the context of demands for greater political representa-
tion. Indian nationalist leaders, for example, began to make this 
demand to Great Britain in the years just prior to the war. Several 
Indian nationalists went as far as to ask for an equality of rights for 
all British subjects.27 In French Algeria, Muslims were considered 
French nationals and subjects but not French citizens and thus they 
did not have rights of representation in the metropole. In French 
protectorates, inhabitants came under the protection of France in 
the decades prior to 1914 with a separate juridical status from that 
of the native inhabitants of French colonies. After the end of the war, 
the French continued to insist that any grant of French citizenship 
to their colonial subjects would jeopardise the subjects’ indigenous 
cultures. The First World War itself, as Frederick Cooper explains, 
resulted in an even greater number of statuses and classifi cations 
of territories and of individuals, a phenomenon that increased the 
possibility of shifts between these multiple statuses.28 In large part, 
these statuses did not refl ect the demands for autonomy put forth 
by burgeoning national movements in colonial and formerly colo-
nial territories. The intricacies of creating legal and documentary 
identity statuses in the entirely new polity of the Palestine Mandate 
were magnifi ed once British offi cials took into account imperial and 
nation-state meanings of citizenship, international law norms, the 
opinion of the leadership in the Zionist Organisation and the chal-
lenges to imperial subjecthood. 
Herbert Samuel, his advisors in the Palestine Administration and 
Colonial and Foreign Offi ce experts in London spent a great deal of 
time and paperwork in their attempts to come to an agreement on 
the categorisation of the status of the native, largely Arabic-speaking 
(including Ottoman Jews) population. In particular, and largely due to 
implications at local and regional levels, offi cials disagreed on whether 
to treat these inhabitants as British-protected persons, Ottoman sub-
jects, foreigners or as members of an altogether new legal category. As 
was the nature of the empire by the early interwar period, the offi cials 
who served in London and those who had experience in the overseas 
empire each had their own understandings of nationality, citizenship 
and subjecthood in the context of British imperial policy. These under-
standings were situated at a unique juncture in the history of empire, 
and thus were subject to change in accordance with transformed impe-
rial and international realities. 
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During the war, both the British and French created two entirely 
new national statuses for Ottoman Jews who resided in each metro-
pole or imperial possession in order to offer a separate categorisation 
for those not considered ‘enemy aliens’. France categorised thou-
sands of Ottoman Jews in its metropole and colonies as ‘of Jewish 
nationality from the Levant’. The status refl ected a fi ctional cate-
gory specifi cally for Ottoman Jews who had been French protégés 
under the Ottoman capitulations. What the French attempted to do, 
explains Sarah Abrevaya Stein, was to fi t legal imperial categories 
of personhood into new categories to correspond with the nation-
state.29 Great Britain responded in a similar fashion to the presence of 
Ottoman ‘Turks’ in its empire during the war. Aviva Ben-Ur describes 
the British imitation of French practice: Whitehall invented the cat-
egory of the ‘Ottoman (Spanish) Jew’. These Ottoman Jews had also 
been protégés of the empire under the capitulations and their new 
categorisation in 1914 exempted them from deportation or deten-
tion as enemies of the Allied Powers. Ottoman Spanish Jews (who 
did not all claim to be from the Iberian Peninsula) could also natu-
ralise as British subjects.30
Ottoman Jews and other Ottoman nationals in the Allied-
controlled territories in the Middle East who were not immedi-
ately recognised as protégés came under general classifi cation as 
‘enemy aliens’. Prior to the Treaty of Lausanne’s ratifi cation, this 
classifi cation of the region’s inhabitants as ‘enemy aliens’ compli-
cated diplomatic and consular matters. One of the fi rst practical 
concerns faced by the Palestine Administration after the demise of 
the Ottoman Empire in 1918 was the cancellation of protection 
and capitulations granted by the British Government to some of 
the empire’s Jewish and Christian residents and the effect that this 
had on the Jews in Palestine. As a result, the Foreign Offi ce failed 
to come to an agreement with the Colonial and Home Offi ces as 
to whether all Ottomans came under British protection or if Great 
Britain could instead grant Jewish immigrants the status of impe-
rial subjects.31 As part of these transformations within and outside 
of the British Empire, offi cials wondered how other states would 
treat residents of an international mandate when they left its terri-
tory and tried to enter a sovereign state or colony. Practical prob-
lems arose when Jewish immigrants and Arabs wished to travel 
outside of Palestine, whether to places as close as Egypt or as far 
as Brazil or Chile. While the mandatory powers provided consular 
protection to inhabitants of B and C mandates, the administration 
of the A mandates (like Palestine), not the home government of the 
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mandatory power, was obliged to offer such protection. The dis-
agreements over how Great Britain could regulate protection for 
Palestine’s inhabitants – whom were then neither British subjects 
nor Palestinian citizens – meant that both Arabs and Jewish immi-
grants had an ambiguous international and national status. The 
task of defi ning the new legal status of Palestinian citizenship, as 
well as offering advice on other matters of nationality, fell to one 
man: Norman Bentwich.
In crafting legislation, Bentwich worked closely with Samuel and 
both men outwardly professed support for the facilitation of a Jewish 
national home. Shortly after his appointment as Palestine’s attorney-
general, Bentwich expressed hope that the majority of foreigners in 
Palestine – the non-Ottoman Jewish immigrants – could automati-
cally receive Palestinian citizenship. Incoming Jewish arrivals received 
different diplomatic and legal treatment dependent on their country 
of origin. The administration offered a certifi cate for the immigrants 
to claim provisional Palestinian nationality until the time that an offi -
cial nationality could be created. When the new arrivals made appli-
cations for these certifi cates some lost the nationality of their birth 
country in accordance with the nationality regulations of that coun-
try, while others kept their original nationality even as they acquired 
provisional Palestinian nationality. It must be kept in mind that these 
certifi cates had little international standing but rather conveyed 
British imperial protection to their holders.
The Foreign Offi ce helped Bentwich to arrange for consular 
facilities to be offered to provisional nationals as part of the offi ce’s 
overall management of the international relations of the Palestine 
administration. Bentwich and the Foreign Offi ce legal advisor H. W. 
Malkin felt it important that Jews who settled in Palestine became 
full citizens with the right to take part in political and other activi-
ties. To ensure this, he advised Bentwich during the early days of the 
draft nationality legislation process that it would be undesirable to 
allow foreign Jews who resided in Palestine to be entitled to the pro-
tection of their own country. At the time, Malkin doubted that most 
immigrants would take the necessary steps to naturalise in order to 
lose their original nationality. He suggested that Palestinian citizen-
ship be automatically given to them – in other words, imposed – and 
warned that if this was not to be the case Britain ‘shall have the 
spectacle of the Jewish National Home containing quantities of Jews 
who are not citizens’.32 
The work of Bentwich had to be done with the standards of impe-
rial policy as the guiding factor. Bentwich worked with the Foreign 
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Offi ce to draft model regulations for dual nationality, the revoca-
tion of nationality, and naturalisation. These regulations needed 
to conform to British standards and especially to the 1914 British 
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act and the 1919 Aliens Restric-
tion (Amendment) Act. These acts legally defi ned British nationality 
in order to unify the empire. In addition, they stipulated a fi ve-year 
residency requirement before foreigners could naturalise as British 
subjects.33 Meanwhile, the immigrants’ entrances to Palestine were 
coordinated with the Zionist Organisation. A third ‘party’ was also 
involved in the process: Bentwich turned to the Treaty of Sèvres as a 
guide to ensure the compatibility of the Palestinian nationality law 
with international regulations. However, the latter regulations could 
not be implemented until the Turkish nationalist forces signed the 
treaty. Thus, the Arab inhabitants of the former Ottoman Empire 
remained Ottoman nationals while Bentwich worked on the law. 
British consular confusion over how to treat Palestinian Arab 
residents of neighbouring Egypt in the early 1920s is illustrated in 
the following example taken from Foreign Offi ce correspondence. 
The Foreign Offi ce classifi ed Palestinian Arabs and Palestinian Jews 
who resided in Egypt separately based on their ‘race’ and ‘culture’. 
British Foreign Secretary Curzon, a man with an extensive back-
ground in colonial administration, presented his concerns to High 
Commissioner Samuel as they related to consular protections and 
capitulatory privileges for these Palestinians in Egypt and in other 
British protectorates. In Samuel’s opinion, the Palestinian Arabs lost 
the protection of the Ottoman Empire and therefore in their trav-
els abroad Great Britain assumed the responsibility to provide con-
sular services.34 He also assumed that the Palestinians could benefi t 
from capitulatory privileges while in another territory under British 
administration. The frame of reference for Samuel and Curzon was 
the former system of capitulations between Great Britain and cer-
tain nationals of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt: British-protected 
persons and British subjects were offered favourable diplomatic 
treatment. In 1920, Curzon asked Samuel for advice on whether 
to continue to treat certain individuals from Palestine as Ottoman 
nationals or as British-protected persons in Egypt.35 In the opinion 
of the Foreign Offi ce, if the Palestinian Arabs received British pro-
tection and privileges such as trial at the Mixed Courts, at the very 
least this would affi rm their international status as British-protected 
persons without a separate Palestinian nationality. At most, this 
treatment would indicate that the Palestinians were akin to British 
colonial subjects not only in Egypt but elsewhere. 
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The correspondence further reveals the telling attitude of Curzon 
who argued that the British in Egypt should attempt to grant privi-
leges only to select Palestinian individuals.36 These ‘select individu-
als’ specifi cally referred to the ‘better-educated’ Palestinian Arabs 
and Jews in Egypt. In a letter to Samuel, Curzon stated that the 
Egyptian administration assumed the Muslim Levantine Arabs to 
be ‘on a lower plane of civilisation than the average Egyptian’.37 
Indeed, the existence of the mandate system justifi ed such an opin-
ion on Levantine Arabs since the structures of the mandates were 
meant to provide them with further measures of assistance before 
the populations could manage independence. Curzon’s opinion was 
also backed up with the reality that only educated Jews and a select 
few Arab Christians qualifi ed for special treatment such as trial in 
British courts outside of Palestine. Their international statuses, then, 
mirrored that of subjects under imperial protection in the years 
before the citizenship order. 
The debates over consular protection diverged into related issues 
including new questions that referred to passports and visas for Arab 
and Jewish residents of Palestine. Before the implementation of the 
mandate, travellers used Ottoman passports.38 After the end of the war, 
British consulates treated Palestinians in a number of often arbitrary 
ways: alternately as ‘former alien enemies’, foreigners or protected per-
sons. As noted above, the British and French treatment of Ottoman 
Jews during the war underscored the post-war classifi cation of Arabs 
as former Ottomans and Jewish immigrants as provisional Palestin-
ian nationals. In one particular instance in 1920, immigration offi cials 
in Jerusalem treated a Palestinian holding a British passport and an 
Ottoman passport as a ‘former alien enemy’.39 Because Ottoman pass-
ports became invalid after 1918, British consular offi cials were unable 
to endorse them for travel to and from Palestine. Neither the Foreign 
Offi ce nor the Palestine Administration appealed to the League for 
advice but instead, in contravention of the future mandate charter, the 
Foreign Offi ce in 1920 advised consular offi cers not to recognise any 
claims to British protection by Arabs who lived abroad. In practice, 
however, the Foreign Offi ce provided emergency certifi cates for Arabs 
and Jews that entitled them to receive one-way Palestinian visas or lais-
sez-passer in order to travel. 
As part of the development of separate ‘national statuses’, in 
August 1920 the Foreign Offi ce published the details of the two 
categories devised for the Arab and Jewish population of Palestine. 
The fi rst category included those people born in Palestine who pos-
sessed Ottoman nationality but whom were not habitual residents. 
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Ottoman nationals (by birth or descent) who lived abroad but 
wanted Palestinian nationality could either obtain their nationality 
by exhibiting their Ottoman passport or other identity documents 
as proof of paternal descent from an Ottoman subject.40 The sec-
ond category featured non-Ottoman residents who wished to adopt 
Palestinian nationality, and this group consisted mainly of Jewish 
immigrants. The Zionist Organisation issued certifi cates to Jews 
who intended to go to Palestine in order for the mandate admin-
istration’s immigration offi cials to grant them a laissez-passer.41 To 
receive a laissez-passer, individuals in both categories needed to 
reassure the authorities that they would opt for Palestinian nation-
ality as soon as a law passed to that effect and conditional on their 
permanent residence in the territory. The measure also ensured that 
travelers did not use their status as provisional Palestinian nationals 
only to obtain British consular protection. 
At this point, the Foreign Offi ce and Bentwich expressed the same 
belief that Palestinian natives, whether Arab or Jewish, could not 
have changed their allegiance as Ottoman nationals prior to the rati-
fi cation of a peace treaty with the empire.42 Natives did not imme-
diately fall into either of the two classifi cations listed by the Foreign 
Offi ce, as the majority remained habitually resident in Palestine. 
Their Ottoman identities placed them in a sort of diplomatic limbo. 
By the time of the 1923 formal assumption of the Palestine Mandate 
by Great Britain, a nationality law had not been promulgated and 
the concerns of the Foreign and Colonial Offi ces, Bentwich and Sam-
uel regarding the national status of the Arabs remained unresolved. 
The Draft ‘Nationality’ Order: Defi nitions, Concepts, 
and the Status of Palestine, 1922–1924
Although the status of the native and immigrant residents of Palestine 
did not drastically change before 1924, the administrative status of 
the territory itself did. Historians have described the system of laws 
and regulations put into place by the British administration in terms 
of their impact on land, tax policies, the courts and the economy of 
the mandate.43 It was vital that the offi cials who wrote these laws, 
including the 1922 constitution (or organic law), the 1922 electoral 
order and the nationality law drafts, ensured that their articles and 
provisions did not run counter to any of the obligations to the Arab 
or Jewish inhabitants. For instance, legislation (at least on paper) 
could not contradict the trusteeship status of the mandate: laws and 
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directives could not work to re-classify Palestine into a Crown colony 
or protectorate nor could they impose provisions of British subject 
status upon inhabitants. According to the mandate system, laws of 
each mandate had to ensure the well-being and development of the 
inhabitants.44 
Nationality and citizenship, and the rights associated with both 
were connected with the enactment of an organic law and the estab-
lishment of a partially elected legislative council. As early as 1921, 
High Commissioner Samuel expressed hope for the rapid forma-
tion of a legislative council and the enactment of a constitution. The 
administration in Palestine and the government in London debated 
the framework and function of such a council but decided that an 
electoral law could not be passed before the ratifi cation of the man-
date by the League. However, the administration felt it necessary to 
issue an order-in-council to regulate Palestinian nationality in order 
to compile electoral registers. The administration depended on such 
registers in order to classify inhabitants as citizens entitled to vote, 
but it fi rst faced the task of defi ning the parameters of nationality. 
The British Government outlined three options: the fi rst was to pass 
a nationality order-in-council; the second was to issue an electoral 
order-in-council so that an elected legislative council could discuss a 
nationality law and constitution; and the third was to pass a temporary 
nationality order-in-council before an elected assembly could work to 
fi nalise provisions to regulate nationality. High Commissioner Samuel 
favoured the fi rst option as he had promised early municipal elections 
to the Arab leadership.45 The mandatory government did not opt for 
any of the three options before the League approved the Mandate for 
Palestine on 24 June 1922 but instead completed orders-in-council for 
a constitution and legislative council. Consultation with the League or 
the Arab leadership over the specifi cs of the legislation was unneces-
sary as the mandate charter gave the mandatory full power of legisla-
tion and administration. 
Following the ratifi cation of the mandate in July 1922, His Maj-
esty’s Government approved the Palestine Order-in-Council as an 
organic law. Enacted on 10 August 1922, it outlined the functions 
of the Palestine Government and provided for the composition of 
the legislative council of appointed British offi cials and elected rep-
resentatives from each religious community. The text of the 1922 
Order-in-Council defi ned a foreigner as any national or subject of 
Europe, America or Japan, whereas natives from a British mandated 
territory or any area under direct British rule, Ottoman subjects or 
any person who lost his Ottoman subject status were not offi cially 
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considered foreigners in Palestine (in practice, former Ottoman sub-
jects were considered foreigners). Crucially, the order defi ned the 
Palestinian citizen for the purpose of enfranchising inhabitants for 
the legislative council. Citizens included ‘Turkish subjects’ (mean-
ing Ottoman) habitually resident in Palestine, and all other inhabit-
ants who did not possess ‘Turkish nationality’ but were habitually 
resident in Palestine (referring to Jewish immigrants) provided they 
applied for provisional citizenship within two months.46 Jewish 
immigrants did not need to renounce their birth nationality to be 
enfranchised since the 1922 Legislative Election Order-in-Council, 
passed in conjunction with the organic law, did not actually con-
fer any nationality.47 The electoral order-in-council provided Jewish 
immigrants with provisional nationality while the conditions in the 
Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869 remained in place as the basis for 
the provisional nationality of the Arabs. The subsequent citizenship 
law reproduced this 1922 codifi cation of two distinct categories of 
‘the national’. 
The order-in-council stipulated that the right to vote, the fi rst polit-
ical right linked with nationality, would be on the basis of communal 
identity – an important concept to British rule in Palestine. The pro-
posed elected legislative body limited the power of Arab representa-
tives to pass laws because the nominated British and Jewish members 
would outnumber them and the high commissioner (with two votes) 
could veto or change any legislation.48 Furthermore, the use of com-
munal and religious divisions as the basis of the new voting system 
did not refl ect the realities that secular Ottoman nationality had cre-
ated on the ground in the Arab provinces since the mid-nineteenth 
century. In general, the mandate administration believed that the 
status of Palestine’s inhabitants came from their belonging to a reli-
gious – not a national – community.49 Some offi cials, such as Edward 
Keith-Roach, suggested that proportional representation was a bet-
ter option. Other offi cials deemed his suggestion too complicated 
and argued that the Arabs lacked knowledge of self-government due 
to high illiteracy rates.50 Instead, the order-in-council implemented a 
system of secondary electors in electoral colleges and in each district 
community leaders determined the number of secondary voters for 
the legislative council’s elections. These voters formed electoral col-
leges divided by religion and a fi xed number of ‘provisional’ citizens 
could stand for election from each religious community. The fi rst 
legislative council elections were held that same year but due to the 
Arabs’ boycott of them, the creation of a legislative council failed. 
The institutional separation between Arabs and Jews based on their 
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communal identities remained important in the minds of British offi -
cials. The British did not devise this separation on their own: the 
treaties of Sèvres and of Lausanne institutionalised racial separation 
in the post-war Levant.
Both peace treaties stipulated that nationality orders needed to 
be passed in each mandate within twelve months from the date of 
endorsement by Turkey.51 In Palestine, Attorney-General Bentwich 
constantly updated the draft of a nationality law in order to adapt it 
to the conditions stipulated by the peace treaty. In 1920, Bentwich ini-
tially modelled the nationality draft on a number of interesting inter-
national provisions regarding Palestine in the Treaty of Sèvres. Article 
129 of the treaty directly benefi ted the Zionist ambitions in Pales-
tine. The article allowed for the ipso facto acquisition of Palestin-
ian nationality for all non-Ottoman Jewish residents of Palestine who 
had resided in that territory for two years on the date of the treaty 
ratifi cation. This automatic acquisition of nationality meant that 
Jewish residents could keep their birth nationality. Bentwich argued 
in 1920 that although political diffi culties would arise in Palestine 
if the article remained in the treaty or if it was used in the national-
ity law, it could not be eliminated. He was well aware that not all 
Jews resident in Palestine would want to automatically receive Pal-
estinian nationality. He predicted protests by Jews against the article 
and suggested an amendment for the Lausanne Treaty that allowed 
the non-Ottoman Jews of Palestine the option to receive citizenship 
and renounce their former nationality.52 The Zionist Organisation 
seconded this proposed amendment and the Treaty of Lausanne did 
indeed exclude the text of Sèvres’ Article 129.
Some Zionist leaders disagreed with Bentwich’s amendment on 
the grounds that Jewish residents would be forced to give up their 
birth nationality upon receipt of Palestinian nationality. Both the 
Joint Foreign Committee of the Jewish Board of Deputies, headed by 
the British statesman Lucien Wolf, and the Anglo-Jewish Association 
termed their disagreement ‘a very grave objection’.53 The Colonial 
Offi ce took up this objection and suggested that Jewish immigrants 
could also declare their desire not to become citizens and that the 
mandate administration could authorise them to remain in Palestine. 
This suggestion allowed for British and American Jews who may 
wish to stay in Palestine and help establish the national home to 
keep their own nationality.54 The Foreign Offi ce agreed and even sug-
gested that non-habitually resident Jews who wished to help build the 
national home should have the option to acquire Palestinian citizen-
ship ‘to take their full part in [the Jewish national home’s] political 
5028_Banko.indd   43 24/06/16   4:34 PM
44 | the invention of palestinian citizenship, 1918–1947
life instead of remaining foreigners’. British and Zionist leaders came 
to a consensus with Bentwich that Palestinian citizenship should not 
be enforced on Jews either resident or non-resident but should be 
made an option just as people resident in other territories detached 
from Turkey opted for their new nationalities in accordance with 
international regulations.55
Article 125 of the Sèvres Treaty particularly affected Palestine. 
The article stated that only those individuals who belonged to racial 
minorities in their new post-war states could opt for the nationality of 
other territories composed of the racial majority they desired to join. 
In his position as colonial secretary, Winston Churchill advocated 
that Palestine be included as one of the territories listed as compliant 
with this article. The inclusion of Palestine among such territories 
exclusively benefi ted the Jewish national home plan: it meant that 
Arabs of Syria or Iraq could not opt for Palestinian nationality since 
they belonged to the racial majority in their own country. Although 
Arabs in places like Armenia could opt for Palestinian nationality, 
the British administrators felt that this would be unlikely and ‘would 
not probably make a serious difference to the balance of the popula-
tion [in Palestine]’.56 Since Jews in Arab lands were not considered 
‘racially’ Jewish but rather ‘Arab’, they could not opt for Palestinian 
nationality. The lack of options for Jews in Arab lands to become 
Palestinian citizens is understandable: the Zionist Organisation in the 
1920s simply did not consider or reach out to these Jewish groups as 
part of their aims and agenda, and vice versa. The British, for their 
part, likely had little knowledge or understanding of Arabised-Jews, 
and did not give them consideration.57
In light of disagreements by Zionist leaders and pro-Zionist British 
statesmen with certain articles in the Sèvres Treaty, Bentwich attempted 
to shape Palestine’s nationality regulations in order to accommo-
date for the Jewish national home policy and its increased support 
from within the Cabinet and Parliament. The Palestine Administra-
tion realised that it was not possible to exempt any ‘special class’ of 
European Jews from the nationality provisions of the peace treaty as 
applied to the mandate territory. However, Bentwich could insert arti-
cles into the nationality law to give the mandate government options 
for discretion in how it regulated the nationality of Jewish immigrants 
– as long as the articles did not contravene the treaty.58 The Home 
Offi ce initially suggested what would become the most important of 
these nationality provisions, that jus sanguinis (right to nationality by 
blood) should be limited so that nationality did not pass indefi nitely 
through native-born Palestinian fathers to future generations resident 
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outside of Palestine. Contrary to the Sèvres Treaty, the Home Offi ce 
recommended that citizenship should pass only to the fi rst generation 
born outside of Palestine.59 Offi cials felt that this limitation should 
be made clear in the legislation but Bentwich ultimately chose not to 
mention it explicitly in the fi nal draft of the citizenship law despite its 
inclusion in that law.60 
Colonial offi cials and Bentwich never quite resolved the issue of 
terminology in the early draft nationality ordinance. The early drafts 
adopted the terms ‘Palestinian subject’ and ‘Palestinian nationality’ 
to indicate the international status of Palestinians under the man-
date. The Sèvres (and Lausanne) Treaty used ‘citizen’ with the same 
assumed international dimension. In a memo to the Foreign Offi ce in 
February 1921, High Commissioner Samuel argued that ‘nationality’ 
was the better term to use since it indicated belonging to a nation-
state. His opinion ran counter to that of Bentwich. On the other hand, 
the Foreign Offi ce noted that the phrase ‘Palestinian citizen’ should be 
used and argued that the term ‘citizen’ was used to denote a national 
of a state whose constitution was not monarchial.61 ‘Subject’ seemed 
unfi tting for the Palestinians because it incorrectly indicated that the 
inhabitants were subjects of the British Crown. 
In London, the Foreign and Colonial Offi ces disagreed on other 
important practicalities in the law and their disagreements length-
ened the process of drafting nationality legislation. One important 
disagreement concerned the link between habitual residence in Pal-
estine and eligibility for nationality. Here again, the obligation that 
the institutions of the mandate not prejudice support for the Jewish 
national home infl uenced naturalisation and residency arrangements. 
For his part, Bentwich advocated a short residency period for Jew-
ish immigrants who wished to naturalise, as compared with immi-
grants to other British-administered territories. By providing for the 
two-year residency provision Home Secretary Edward Shortt wrote 
to Bentwich that such ‘very special provision’ would modify Great 
Britain’s ordinary requirements of residence (fi ve years) for the pur-
pose of naturalisation.62 However, administration members remained 
somewhat unsure of setting a precedent different to the standards 
followed elsewhere in the empire. In their communication with Bent-
wich, Zionist leaders stressed that all Jews resident in Palestine could 
become ‘Palestinian subjects’ but crucially asked that the nationality 
law allow Jews usually resident in other countries the right to hold 
dual nationality. Somewhat paradoxically the organisation declared 
that they would oppose the latter proposal if it meant that Arabs 
would also be entitled the right to dual nationality.63 Owing to their 
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infl uence, the fi nal legislation met the demands of the Zionist leaders 
such as Chaim Weizmann: immigrants had to surrender documentary 
papers and passports upon naturalisation but they were not required 
to actually renounce any other nationality. 
On the other hand, the Foreign Offi ce adamantly opposed grant-
ing nationality to native Palestinian Arab emigrants who lived even 
temporarily abroad if any chance existed that applicants would use 
their status to claim British protection. The offi ce had maintained 
this position since the fi rst years of the civil administration.64 In the 
fi nal months of 1922 in the midst of the above-mentioned debates, 
the Palestine Administration and His Majesty’s Government (HMG) 
began to receive petitions from Palestinian Arabs stranded in Latin 
America, Haiti and Cuba. British consuls had not received defi nite 
instructions on Palestinian nationality or the dissolution of Ottoman 
nationality and the qualifi cations for grants of laissez-passers and 
provisional certifi cates of nationality were not uniformly recognised 
by consular representatives. In these early years of the 1920s, consuls 
sometimes refused to issue passports or visas to Palestinian Arabs 
(many of whom claimed Ottoman nationality) wishing to return to 
Palestine or to travel on business, due to either misinformation or a 
lack of information on how to treat natives of the mandates. These 
travellers were often forced to remain in one country for extended 
periods although a number applied to French consuls in bids to 
obtain Syrian passports or visas to enter Mandate Syria.65 
Throughout 1923, offi cials were keenly aware of the debates 
among delegates to the League over the national status of inhabit-
ants of mandated territories. Members of the PMC grappled with 
the complex and undefi ned concept of mandate nationality and the 
Allied Powers’ perceptions of citizenship. For example, one British 
delegate insisted that a mandate power could not grant a status other 
than its own national status to inhabitants. In other words, the del-
egate claimed that Britain did not have the power to create a new 
nationality.66 Other delegates agreed, noting that ‘native inhabitants 
should not be led to think they were not under the protection of 
the Mandatory Power’. This posed the danger that ‘natives, or those 
who incited them’ would be more diffi cult to control if they thought 
their nationality was separate from the nationality of the manda-
tory.67 These same themes were mentioned in the debates that took 
place within the British Government with respect to Palestine prior 
to the signing of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. The Foreign Offi ce wrote 
to the Home Offi ce that Palestine did ‘not bear the slightest resem-
blances to an independent state’ and its citizens had no such status 
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as belonging to one. Foreign Offi ce leaders declared that Palestinian 
inhabitants had a local national status in Palestine but, internation-
ally, they were British-protected persons.68 The Home Offi ce, respon-
sible for naturalisation, agreed and stated that Palestinian nationality 
was a ‘creation’ that gave Palestine a defi nite status while it remained 
a state under external British protection.69 
In a general sense, the debates as well as the uncertainties over 
the status of Palestine and its place in the wider empire clearly 
infl uenced future legislation, including the nationality law. Most 
notably, if Palestine were a protected state (let alone a foreign coun-
try), the king had no jurisdiction over it, yet the king had already 
ratifi ed the 1922 Palestine Order-in-Council. Even Bentwich, the 
most senior legal scholar in Palestine, was confused as to the nature 
of British power in Palestine.70 In late 1923, the Colonial Offi ce 
argued that the phrase ‘the Government of Palestine’ was not just 
a title but rather ‘the instrument by which HMG is exercising his 
authority under the Mandate’ even if Palestine did not fall into any 
existing Dominion, Protectorate or British-protected state category. 
In that case, nationality legislation, like the orders-in-council, could 
be drafted by various departments and by the Palestine Adminis-
tration, but it could only be ratifi ed by order of the king. By early 
1924, the Colonial Offi ce and law offi cers concluded that the popu-
lation was under a type of unique British protection.71 Despite the 
opinion of departments in Great Britain, the League of Nations did 
not consider Palestine to be a protectorate of Great Britain.72 
The Treaty of Lausanne and the Implementation of 
Citizenship Legislation, 1923–1925
The international recognition of Palestinian nationality (alongside 
Turkish, Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Egyptian and other nationalities) came 
as a result of the application of the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey 
and the Allied Powers in September 1924 (a year after it had been signed 
in July 1923). Its regulations for state succession forced the Palestine 
Administration and the British Government to rush the completion of 
the Palestine nationality law in order to regulate the relationship between 
the population and the mandatory power. A little more than nine 
months prior, in December 1923 High Commissioner Samuel recom-
mended that the Palestine Administration adopt into law the framework 
for conferring nationality stipulated in the 1922 Legislative Election 
Order that, it must be remembered, codifi ed separate provisions for the 
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acquisition of nationality. Samuel had postponed municipal elections 
until the adoption of these provisions in a nationality law so the ‘right 
of voting’ could be exercised by all inhabitants with the ‘defi nite and 
incontestable right to Palestinian citizenship’.73 In the interim before the 
completion of the nationality law, members of the Foreign Offi ce argued 
against the terms of provisional nationality listed in the Legislative Elec-
tion Order-in-Council. They stated that a class of ‘undesirable people’ 
such as communists, prostitutes and fugitives could remain in Palestine 
as habitual residents who received provisional nationality through the 
order. These individuals would then acquire citizenship without a wait-
ing period once the proper legislation was ratifi ed.74 The short residency 
requirement for citizenship primarily only impacted Jewish immigrants 
and the requirement itself led to intense debates that further delayed the 
fi nal draft of the law.75 
Not all offi cials agreed with the stance on two-year residency and 
many certainly were sympathetic towards the number of complaints 
by the Palestinian Arabs over the liberal immigration regulations for 
immigrants. One of the chief administrators in Jerusalem, Edward 
Keith-Roach, opined that the two years’ residency requirement for 
naturalisation would be abused by Jewish immigrants who wanted 
British protection and not Palestinian nationality. He gave exam-
ples of residency requirements in Great Britain and its Dominions, 
the United States, Switzerland, Belgium, France and Italy that all 
required at least fi ve years. He maintained that the Jews in Palestine, 
with their two-year residency qualifi cation, would have been greatly 
advantaged, and pointed out the Arabs would give a ‘tremendous 
howl’ that a Jewish individual from Europe could become a citizen 
of Palestine in two years.76 Zionist leaders had accused the local 
administration of favouritism towards the Arabs, and the Arabs 
had accused the administration and British Government of favourit-
ism for the Zionist movement; however, the sense one gets from the 
correspondence of administrators on the ground in Palestine with 
Whitehall is of attempts from Jerusalem and London to placate both 
groups in order to ensure political and social stability.77 Offi cials in 
London and the Foreign Offi ce saw naturalisation and nationality 
in its legal and diplomatic rather than political dimensions. They 
acted with imperial concerns but also in accordance with changing 
international norms on nationality and documentary identity. As for 
nationality and citizenship, little concern for either pro-Zionist or 
pro-Arab biases or political ramifi cations is evident in the correspon-
dence from London. 
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In 1923 the most immediate repercussion in Palestine of the pub-
lication of the Treaty of Lausanne was that the Arab inhabitants 
would, upon implementation, no longer be treated as former Ottoman 
subjects. Still, the treaty presented a new concept: it required native 
inhabitants to be resident in Palestine on the date that it came into 
force and to possess proof of their Ottoman nationality in order to 
become subject as citizens to the laws and regulations of the Palestine 
administration.78 Residence in the territory at the specifi c date that the 
treaty went into effect trumped jus sanguinis and jus soli provisions for 
nationality. Previously, descent from an Ottoman national (the jus san-
guinis route) and birth in Ottoman territory (the jus soli route) granted 
nationality. However, nationality in the early 1920s was complex and 
on a global scale, in evolution and not yet standardised. The situation 
was made more complex—particularly for the former Ottoman ter-
ritories and also in a global scope – by the fact that an ever-increasing 
number of individuals had the means and the reasons to emigrate and 
settle far from the territory of their birth. Although traditionally in the 
Ottoman Empire national status passed through patrilineal descent 
without offi cial restrictions upon how many generations could claim 
Ottoman nationality, the post-1900 migrations made such claims to 
nationality more complex because generations of individuals were 
born abroad. Birth in a territory, on the other hand, was far easier to 
track and to accord nationality based upon. In part for that reason, 
in the early 1920s international lawyers professed preference for the 
jus soli acquisition of nationality.79 From the perspective of the British 
Foreign and Home Offi ces as well as the United States immigration 
authorities any allowance for nationality to pass by descent through 
more than one generation, rather than for descendants of immigrants 
to receive nationality by birth in a particular territory, began to be seen 
as potentially suspect and posed the threat that it could create disloyal 
elements of the population. 
In light of the complications that surrounded nationality in terms 
of diplomatic and security concerns, the Treaty of Lausanne and the 
British locally in Palestine disregarded the jus sanguinis component 
of Ottoman nationality. Former Ottoman nationals who lived abroad 
upon the date of the treaty ratifi cation in July 1924 were obliged 
to fi rst declare their willingness to become nationals of their new 
post-Ottoman states within two years and then to return to those 
states to reside. By 1924, the circulated draft of the Palestine nation-
ality law nearly conformed to these specifi c regulations posited by 
Lausanne. It stipulated that native-born Arabs who resided abroad 
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on the date of the enactment of the law (not the treaty) had to return 
to Palestine in order to be considered permanent residents able to 
opt for citizenship.80 By the end of 1924, the Colonial Offi ce noted 
that because of the Jewish policy in Palestine and expected numbers 
of migrants (termed ‘a set of unparalleled circumstances in the his-
tory of the world’) the draft order required further administrative 
tweaks. These were completed one year after the implementation of 
the Lausanne Treaty. 
After fi ve years, during which Arabs and Jews in Palestine held 
ambiguous statuses of varying degree, HMG approved the Palestine 
Citizenship Order-in-Council and its provisions offi cially came into 
force on 1 August 1925. This was the only citizenship order that the 
British Government enacted in any of its mandate territories. In Iraq 
and Transjordan, the mandate power placed local Arab authorities 
in charge of nationality legislation. In Britain’s African mandates, 
inhabitants remained British-protected persons.81 Article 1 of the 
order, which mirrored Article 30 of the Lausanne Treaty, declared all 
‘Turkish subjects’ habitually resident in Palestine on 1 August 1924 
(the date that Lausanne came into force) to become automatically 
Palestinian citizens on 1 August 1925. Turkish subjects referred to 
all Ottoman nationals as defi ned by the Ottoman Nationality Law of 
1869. This article did not account for individuals who had been given 
provisional nationality under the 1922 Legislative Election Order, 
most of whom were Jewish immigrants. It also did not take into 
consideration Ottoman subjects who lived abroad on 1 August 1924 
– the number unlikely to have been even considered at that point by 
Bentwich or anyone else in the administration or the Foreign Offi ce. 
In total, the number of Ottoman nationals resident in Palestine on 
the date of the order who became Palestinian citizens was nearly 
730,000.82 A subsequent article addressed the immigrants as the non-
Ottoman residents who received provisional Palestinian nationality 
through the 1922 electoral order and automatically became Palestin-
ian citizens under the 1925 Order-in-Council regulations. 
The order did address natives of Palestine who lived abroad. 
According to Article 2, individuals who were more than eighteen 
years of age born in Palestine and with Ottoman nationality who had 
habitual residence abroad on 1 August 1925 could opt for citizenship 
‘subject to the consent of the Government of Palestine’ in accordance 
with the regulation that they have been in Palestine for six months 
prior to opting and on the condition that they had not acquired a for-
eign nationality. This option had to be done within two years from 
the date of the order, by 31 July 1927.83 Despite British attempts 
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to keep its citizenship order in line with Lausanne, the discussions 
within the departments in London and Palestine led to the codifi ca-
tion of different terminologies. These differences impacted former 
Ottoman nationals who lived abroad and considered themselves 
to be natives of Palestine. Effectively, the difference in wording of 
Article 2 of the citizenship order from its sister Article 34 in the treaty 
denied citizenship to those individuals, for the reasons noted above 
on the post-war complexities of regulating nationality by descent. 
Article 34 of Lausanne used the phrase ‘native of’ to reference former 
Ottomans whereas the order-in-council used ‘born in Palestine’ in 
reference to the same individuals. The latter phrase was used due to 
the recommendation from the Home Offi ce that nationality by birth 
not be passed on indefi nitely for former Ottoman subjects residing 
outside of Palestine.84 This change meant certain descendants of 
Ottomans born in the territory that became Palestine were not to be 
ipso facto recognised as citizens. It also meant that the order did not 
conform with prior policy that gave laissez-passers to children born 
abroad to Palestinian parents. It contradicted standards based on 
Lausanne, British nationality law, the 1869 Ottoman law and also 
the nationality laws of the French mandates, all of which supported 
the acquisition of jus sanguinis nationality.85 
The non-Ottoman applicants, mainly Jewish immigrants, who 
wished to be naturalised or had received provisional certifi cates of 
nationality dated prior to October 1922 were required to have been 
resident in Palestine since that date. They were obliged to surrender 
any passport or laissez-passer on receipt of citizenship documenta-
tion. It must be remembered that the surrender of a passport was 
a different process from the renunciation of birth-nationality. The 
order required that applicants for naturalisation give a formal dec-
laration that they would permanently reside in Palestine, take an 
oath of allegiance to the government and show proof of an ability to 
converse in English, Arabic or Hebrew. Naturalised citizens received 
a certifi cate of citizenship that entitled them to (unlisted) political 
rights and privileges and subjected them to the obligations, duties 
and liabilities of a Palestinian citizen.86
Initially, the citizenship order had arguably positive implications 
for Jewish immigrants already resident in Palestine (who did not need 
to surrender passports and received citizenship automatically); while 
for new arrivals, naturalisation procedures were relatively straight-
forward. Many of the Arabs who emigrated from Palestine prior to 
1918 or even before 1925 found themselves in a diffi cult position if 
they wished to be citizens of Palestine due to the two-year time period 
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granted to them in the Treaty of Lausanne to return. That diffi culty 
became magnifi ed by the actions of High Commissioner Samuel who 
exercised sole power to amend the order: he did so drastically before 
he left offi ce. In November 1925, Samuel pushed forward the date 
for option of nationality for these non-habitual residents. Rather 
than give these individuals two years to choose Palestinian citizen-
ship beginning 1 August 1925, the two-year timeframe for option 
was put into effect retroactively, from 6 August 1924 – the date that 
the Treaty of Lausanne came into force. Samuel made the change to 
bring the order completely in line with the same timeframe given in 
the Treaty of Lausanne’s Article 34.87 Unintentionally, the change 
affected Arabs, Jews and any other former Ottoman native of Pales-
tine; however, Arab Christians and Muslims composed the majority 
of the estimated 20,000 to 25,000 Palestinian-born individuals who 
lived abroad by 1925. These natives, which included students and 
merchants who resided outside of Palestine in August 1924, had less 
than one year to opt for citizenship. 
Without any ipso facto nationality, Palestinians resident abroad 
on 1 August 1924 lost Ottoman nationality with the Treaty of 
Lausanne and were unaccounted for once the Citizenship Order-
in-Council came into effect in August 1925. The order’s provisions 
barred these individuals from citizenship unless they returned to 
Palestine by 1 August 1926. Emigrants usually needed a valid pro-
visional certifi cate of nationality or other proof to show that their 
father was an Ottoman subject, not only to opt for citizenship 
but to travel. Without this documentation, these individuals often 
could not travel to Palestine to comply with the six-month resi-
dency period before opting for citizenship. In places such as Latin 
America, Cuba and Haiti, Palestinian émigrés were hit particularly 
hard. They encountered diffi culties to even receive a travel visa to 
Palestine to visit family. Moreover, the order-in-council was not 
published broadly outside Palestine until at least November 1925.88 
In mid-1923, the Foreign Offi ce reported that in the region south 
of Peru alone, up to 600 Palestinians held a laissez-passer issued by 
Great Britain that identifi ed them as Ottoman nationals.89 
To return to the use of terminology, Bentwich and other colonial 
offi cials decided only in May 1925 to change the title of the nation-
ality legislation from the Palestine Nationality Law to the Pales-
tine Citizenship Order-in-Council. One month before the order’s 
ratifi cation, the term ‘nationality’ was crossed out and replaced 
with ‘citizenship’ throughout the text.90 After the ratifi cation of the 
Treaty of Lausanne, the provisions of nationality were fi rst applied 
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to Palestine, but citizenship remained a term and status in need 
of legal, diplomatic and political clarifi cation. This again demon-
strates the messy defi nitions of both terms proposed within Great 
Britain during the 1920s and as applied in indirectly ruled colo-
nies, the Dominions and the non-Arab mandates. With the rise of 
the nationalism posing a threat to British colonial rule overseas 
(as well as closer to home, in Ireland) and also creating debate in 
the League of Nations over self-government in various locales, poli-
cies and regulations linked citizenship and nationality to create a 
status that marked belonging in what would become the political 
formation of the nation-state.91
Conclusion
The 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council, once in effect, offered a local 
citizenship independent of British nationality for Palestinians under 
the administration. When outside of Palestine, the mandate’s provi-
sions placed these citizens (but not necessarily natives) in the position 
of British-protected persons. In an odd twist, they were recognised 
as citizens of the Palestine Mandate but in the absence of mandatory 
consulates, these inhabitants came under the same type of protec-
tion as did British colonial subjects. Citizenship in this sense was not 
equal to full nationality as far as international law was concerned 
since Palestinians became British-protected persons when outside of 
the mandated territory.92 The post-war situation was unique in that 
the Treaty of Lausanne created new principles of nationality that 
related to state succession in the Ottoman lands. It also attempted 
to defi ne sovereignty in these territories through internationally 
established nationality provisions. For the inhabitants of Palestine, 
the application of the latter principles turned nationals of territories 
detached from Turkey into nationals of the state to which the terri-
tory was transferred – an entirely new international regulation. 
Even so, the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council did not grant Pal-
estinian citizens the rights they agitated for as citizens. The following 
chapter offers a further analysis of how the Arabs saw themselves in 
relation to the British Empire and the local administration in Pales-
tine, and how Western European concepts of the rights-bearing citi-
zen, alongside the post-war idealism of self-determination of small 
nations, infl uenced these agitations. From the early days of the man-
date administration, Arab leaders appealed to the British for con-
trol over their own government, rights to their borders, educational 
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affairs, public works, election laws, taxation and tithe rates, and 
trade laws but Great Britain never intended to grant political citi-
zenship.93 To return to Bentwich’s differentiation between citizenship 
and nationality, the order in Palestine created and regulated a unique 
type of legal, and internationally accepted, nationality but it did so 
more for matters of administration and obligation as the mandate 
charter required – Palestine was certainly not a recognised nation-
state. The Permanent Mandates Commission viewed the order more 
idealistically when it reported in October 1925 that political agita-
tion had diminished in Palestine and that the enactment of the Pal-
estine Citizenship Order-in-Council ‘should do much to strengthen 
a sense of Palestinian nationality’ between the Arabs and the Jews 
who lived there.94 With the exception of Bentwich’s recollection fi f-
teen years after its approval, the British offi cials who advised on the 
order-in-council never considered or intended that the legislation 
would work to bring the two groups together – and it certainly did 
not. As will be shown, the Palestine Arab Executive leadership dis-
agreed with the citizenship legislation on the basis that through these 
measures the government continued to neglect what it felt to be the 
‘natural’ civil and political rights of the Arab population. What the 
order did show was that in contrast to the ways in which citizen-
ship legislation came about in the other Arab mandates through the 
approval of indigenous legislative bodies, in Palestine the ultimate 
power to decide on the legal status of the Palestinians was claimed by 
the British Government and the local administration and with infl u-
ences from the leadership of the Zionist Organisation. 
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The Notion of ‘Rights’ and the Practices 
of Nationality and Citizenship from the 
Palestinian Arab Perspective, 1918–1925
In early 1925 Lord Arthur Balfour, the former British Foreign Secretary and author of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, visited 
Palestine for the fi rst time. For the occasion of Balfour’s visit, 
the Palestinian Arab leadership of the Arab Executive Commit-
tee (al-lajna al-tanafīdhiyya al-‘arabiyya) declared a general strike 
throughout Palestine and emphasised optimistically that the strike 
would ‘instill this patriotism to the youngest of our Palestin-
ian Arab citizens’.1 The Arabic press ran several features on the 
visit. Referring to Balfour’s planned visit to Tel Aviv the editor of 
Sawt al-Sha‘b, a local Bethlehem politician named ‘Isa Bandak, 
addressed the nationality of the Jewish immigrants who settled in 
colonies such as Tel Aviv. He questioned whether they had ‘true’ 
Palestinian nationality – as he conceptualised other former Otto-
man citizens who were members of the specifi c Arabic-speaking 
Ottoman community to have – or if their nationality was simply 
‘on paper’ as granted by the British.2 Bandak’s editorial raises an 
obvious point: he saw the immigrants as having little more than 
a British-imposed status that did not require the active exercise 
of civic loyalty to Palestine as a political entity. Yet even in the 
late nineteenth century Ottoman world, nationality was not truly 
the political or legal status that it became in the early to middle 
decades of the twentieth century. By the interwar period, it took on 
civic, cultural and political meanings complete with a new (Arabic) 
vocabulary of reference. 
Politicians and nationalists like Bandak helped to develop the 
political and civic community in Palestine, and by extension advo-
cated particular civic practices that became the source of the Arabs’ 
political identity in the early years of the Mandate Government. 
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Their understandings of nationality, civic identity and citizenship 
are analysed in two ways here: the fi rst, in light of the transition 
of Palestine’s population into citizens within a new British imperial 
context and the accompanying expectations and idealistic visions 
that the Arabs imagined such imperial membership to convey. 
These understandings and discussions are also evaluated using the 
framework of the emergence of new types of spaces and institu-
tions in Palestine, especially that of the mandate as an institution 
and the growth of civil society. These new spaces and institutions, 
both legal and civic, challenged traditional ways of understand-
ing identity and community, which had previously been Ottoman 
in nature. Such a challenge, argues citizenship theorist Raymond 
Rocco, disrupts long-established political and civic boundaries of 
identity and transforms notions of identity and membership in the 
nation-state.3 Infl uenced in parts by Rocco’s work on communitar-
ian citizenship formulations, the following analysis demonstrates 
the ways in which the Palestinian Arab national movement devel-
oped and publicised notions of nationality and citizenship in the 
period of transition from 1918 through to 1925, and focuses on the 
symbols and slogans used to represent the new civic identity and 
formulations of civic and political belonging for the Arab popula-
tion of Palestine. 
This development of a particular political community by the 
Arab leadership sharply contrasted with the apolitical citizenship 
developed by British colonial and mandate offi cials. These offi cials 
did not recognise or grant the rights associated with membership 
in the metropole of a modern nation-state, and mandate legisla-
tion disassociated the concept of Arab nationality (jinsiyya) from 
Palestinian citizenship (muwātana) – certainly to be expected due 
to the nature of colonialism. As described previously, the British 
administration established different qualifi cations for Palestinian 
nationality and citizenship between Jewish immigrants and Palestin-
ian Arab natives. The statuses’ ethno-religious determinant refl ected 
the imperial duty of support for Jewish immigration and a Jewish 
national home in Palestine. In the immediate aftermath of the war 
Arab leaders and a number of politically aware middle-class intellec-
tuals hoped to gain autonomy and unity with Syria as they increas-
ingly feared future Zionist plans for Jewish immigration and land 
settlement throughout all of Palestine. To a large extent, the furor 
over the threat of British and Zionist colonialism and the prepara-
tions of the Allies to assume administrative control of the Levant 
fostered a greater awareness by Arab leaders and the middle-class 
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of their own membership in a post-Ottoman Arab political com-
munity that was specifi cally Palestinian. Still, the educated middle-
class, aware of the genesis of civil and political rights in France and 
Great Britain, tended to assume that the British would offer equal 
political rights to all inhabitants of Palestine in light of pledges made 
by American President Woodrow Wilson for self-government and 
because this class repeatedly argued that the Arabs were more mod-
ern than typical colonial subjects.4 
From this early stage, some educated leaders who identifi ed ideo-
logically as pan-Arab or Palestinian nationalists articulated the clear 
contradiction between liberal citizenship as legislated in the context 
of a democracy, and colonial citizenship enforced in Britain’s overseas 
possessions.5 It is necessary to differentiate between the traditional, 
notable (‘ayan) leadership and the middle-class populist (sha‘bī) lead-
ership. The latter group supported unity with Syria in the early years 
of the British Administration and emerged as an important political 
actor by the late 1920s. These populists used civic associations, vari-
ous symbols, slogans and arguments to represent their ideas of civic 
identity. It must be remembered that both the traditional and the 
more populist, younger leaderships came from the same elite socio-
economic group in Palestine. Their discourses on the appropriate 
action to achieve self-government were what characterised the differ-
ences in the political vision for Palestine: the younger group generally 
(but not exclusively) used a more grassroots or populist discourse 
that advocated action. 
In order to position the Arabs’ notions of nationality and citi-
zenship, the historical narrative of the two terms must begin ear-
lier than the mandate, in the Ottoman era. Each concept emerged 
within the political framework of the late nineteenth century. Both 
the ideology and implementation of provisions of nationality dur-
ing that period are connected to broader processes of political and 
social change, most notably the evolution of new power relation-
ships and a fl edgling civil society in Greater Syria. By 1920, the 
Arab leadership in Palestine strongly identifi ed with what Ray-
mond Rocco defi nes as a communitarian formulation of citizen-
ship, although the infl uence of liberal and republican citizenship 
conceptions was clearly expressed in these leaders’ words and 
actions vis-à-vis the local administration in Jerusalem and the 
imperial government in London. Importantly, as early as 1920 
Arabs’ discussions of nationality emphasised the idea that by virtue 
of membership in a primordial, Arab community, Palestine’s Arab 
inhabitants had rights to the state as its sovereigns. Ultimately, 
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this chapter introduces a new historicisation of Mandate Palestine, 
demonstrating how citizenship and nationality were forged and 
shaped through acts, understandings and notions of political par-
ticipation, political behaviour and civic engagement. It is necessary 
to stress that although these actions, notions and behaviours did 
not always constitute citizenship claims as understood today, they 
fostered the conditions under which such claims emerged after the 
mid-1920s.6
Nationalism is an ideology and a movement that cannot be 
entirely ignored here, both for historiographical purposes and 
because of the actual infl uence that the idea of nationalism had in 
the face of British colonialism and sovereignty over Palestine after 
1918. The ideology of Arab nationalism propagated by leading 
intellectuals in Greater Syria in the second half of the nineteenth 
century appeared alongside the new Ottoman provisions of nation-
ality. By the end of the First World War, Arab nationalism provided 
the ideological framework for the articulation of the political aim 
of national membership in a future nation-state. The ideology 
infl uenced the ways in which rights were advocated for by nation-
alists with a heavy emphasis on the notion of ‘primordial’ Arab 
nationality and long-standing membership in the Ottoman politi-
cal community. When the Allies proposed the imposition of the 
Palestine Mandate, a strong, largely secular and pan-Arab populist 
movement developed counter-discussions and actions from those 
politics of the more traditional leadership based in Jerusalem. A 
middle-class stratum of writers, educators, lawyers, civil servants 
and students assumed leadership of this subaltern movement in 
Palestine. The terms ‘populism’ and ‘populist politics’ are used to 
underscore a specifi c understanding as to how nationalist groups 
and individuals mobilised under the banner of ‘the nation’ or ‘the 
people’ to express their opposition to what they saw as the enemy, 
the mandate administration. They viewed the Zionist movement as 
the lesser problem and one that would be solved with the abroga-
tion of the mandate. As a fi nal note, while part of the new mid-
dle-class, the Palestinian Arab populist groups rarely endorsed the 
pro-British agenda of men such as Mufti of Palestine Mohammad 
Hajj Amin al-Husayni, members of the Jerusalem-based political 
factions of Husayni and Nashashibi family or the members of the 
Supreme Muslim Council.7 It must be stressed that a particular 
civic and political identity emerged from outside the realm of the 
traditional, factional nationalist politics.
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Ottoman Precedents: Imperial Citizenship 
and Arab Nationality
Histories on the development of the modern nation-state in the Arab 
world often posit the Tanzimat reforms introduced by the Ottoman 
Empire in the 1830s as the trigger for the ideological formation of a 
range of national and civic identities. A more complete history of the 
modernising reforms in the empire’s provinces has been explained 
in numerous sources.8 The 1839 Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber, 
issued by Sultan Abdulmecid, is generally noted as the start of the 
reform period; as a fi rst step, the edict stated the equality of all impe-
rial subjects. The more specifi c Ottoman Citizenship Law issued in 
1869 codifi ed a defi nition of Ottoman imperial citizenship (tabiiyet-i 
Osmaniye kanunnamesi) without reference to religion. Article 7 of 
the law stated that all subjects were to be Ottomans without reli-
gious distinction, and that this nationality could be gained (jus soli 
and jus sanguinis) or lost according to conditions in the law.9 As 
Karen Kern notes, this was a shift from subjecthood to citizenship 
and, at the same time, a unifying measure to cultivate the loyalty of 
all Ottomans to the state.10 According to Kemal Karpat, the wording 
of the law attempted ‘to reconcile the Ottoman concept of national-
ity stemming from the millet [religious community] experience with 
the European idea of citizenship’ by its creation of a direct relation-
ship between the individual and the state.11 In practical terms, the 
law simply concerned the means towards the acquisition of Ottoman 
nationality.
However, a rather different approach to what the 1869 law did 
and meant is perhaps more illuminating for the later study of com-
munitarian citizenship ideology in Palestine after 1918. Clearly, 
the political and civic dimensions of nationality and citizenship did 
not appear because of the Tanzimat law, although Kern is correct 
to point out the potentially unifying aspect of it. Instead, as Will 
Hanley more recently argues, in the Ottoman realms and in Egypt 
for ordinary Ottomans what had a practical impact was the applica-
tion of the 1869 law in the latter half of the century: through con-
trol of mobility, identity documents, the census, taxation, military 
service and access to law courts.12 The law did not grant political 
rights of citizenship nor did it totally transform the conception of 
Ottoman subjecthood. The Ottoman citizenship law of 1869 did, 
however, come into being at the same time as intellectuals in Greater 
Syria started to theorise about the meaning of concepts such as the 
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nation and patriotism. This confl uence, I argue, shapes the turn-of-
the-century and post-1918 discursive context of ‘citizenship’ and 
‘nationality’ in the Arab Levant. It put a conceptual foundation into 
place but the active behaviours of citizenship and nationality came 
through other civic practices and processes explained below.
Hanley has noted that, in 1798, an Egyptian chronicler of Napo-
leon transliterated citizenship into Arabic as sitwayan.13 Prior to 
that, the Ottomans used the word for genus (in reference to kind, 
type or category), jinsiyya in Arabic (or cisiyya in Ottoman Turkish) 
to refer to nationality.14 By the late nineteenth century, the Western 
European concept of nationality was in fact translated into Otto-
man Turkish and Arabic as jinsiyya, a translation that the British 
and French continued to use in legislation in the mandate period. 
This concept of jinsiyya did not correspond to the rights-bearing, 
liberal version of citizenship or to the term used more frequently for 
‘citizen’ after 1918, muwatin.15 Rather, subjecthood had a far more 
stable meaning in Ottoman and Arab vocabulary and in common 
usage: tabiiyet or ra’iya, translated as ‘fl ock’, in reference to the pop-
ulation’s collective status within the empire as subjects to the Otto-
man sultan, as a shepherd fi gure. Importantly, this relationship of 
subject to sultan was based on the traditional notions of protection 
in exchange for loyalty – not political sovereignty and allegiance.16 
Subjects paid taxes but the elements of political identity or rights 
to the state through subjecthood and, after 1869, nationality, was 
non-existent. Yet changes underway in Europe and in a number of 
colonial possessions before the outbreak of war in 1914 re-calibrated 
subjecthood as based on allegiance (by the collectivity of subjects) 
to a state or ruler, and subjects, territory and resources came under 
the sovereign control of that state or ruler. For the Arab inhabit-
ants of southern Syria, the creation of an entirely new geographical 
entity under foreign (British) sovereignty after 1918 meant that the 
traditional Ottoman concept of membership in a polity, conceived as 
membership through the exchange of loyalty for protection, could 
no longer be sustained.
The pre-1900 Tanzimat reforms triggered important changes 
in the territorial administration of southern Syria and, as a result, 
historians can trace the growth of the inhabitants’ multiple levels 
of belonging. The sanjaks of Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre all came 
under the control of the governor of Acre, an offi cial appointed 
by Istanbul until 1841.17 After that, Jerusalem became the admin-
istrative centre of southern Palestine. The empire reorganised its 
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vilayets (provinces) into larger units in the 1860s and introduced 
general provincial assemblies and administrative councils alongside 
appointed governors (valis). The reorganisation of territory and the 
new elected provincial councils fostered the distinct notion of a sep-
arate ‘Syria’ within a larger Ottoman system.18 The administrative 
changes were conducive to the development of territorial patrio-
tism by Ottoman and Egyptian intellectuals. Egyptian writer Rifa‘a 
Badawi al-Tahtawi fi rst used the word ‘watan’ to refer to the father-
land or homeland (infl uenced by French ideas of patrie) as the focus 
of identity, belonging and duties.19 The concept of watan in its civic 
sense can be understood as a signifi er of patriotic identity that laid 
the groundwork for actions and behaviours in cultural and social 
spheres that forged new notions of political identity and participa-
tion in the nation. Although Nawaf Salam argues that citizenship 
in the Islamic world emerged out of ideas on the nation and was 
modelled on the liberal idea of individual membership in the Otto-
man political community, this argument in favour of Arabs’ mim-
icking the European concept of citizenship does not entirely hold 
up to scrutiny.20 The concept of citizenship to emerge in the Levant 
during the interwar period had little to do with individual claims to 
rights from the state. Instead, and as the book traces for the case of 
Palestine, claims to citizenship rights came out of the interpretation 
that membership in the Arab community on the basis of national-
ity and culture granted that particular community the rights to the 
nation-state. 
The genesis of the post-1918 intellectual discussions of Arab 
nationality and communitarian citizenship can be traced in large 
part to the writings of the Syrian scholar and educator Boutrus al-
Bustani starting in the year 1860. Ussama Makdisi concludes that 
local debates, such as those initiated by al-Bustani on the place of 
secular politics in the Empire immediately following the 1860 vio-
lence through Syria, helped foster modern concepts of civic iden-
tity.21 This is particularly evident in a series of pamphlets written 
and distributed by al-Bustani in support of Ottoman nationalism 
and Syrian Arab patriotism. Bustani urged his fellow patriots (abna’ 
al-watan), primarily other Ottoman intellectuals, to actively work 
toward a secular citizenship that could be ‘developed, taught, and 
embraced simultaneously at an imperial and local level’. Impor-
tantly, he wrote that Syrians were bound together as one national-
ity (jinsiyya) within the larger Ottoman state. He stressed that all 
Syrian nationals as part of a specifi c community and as Ottoman 
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citizens must ‘sacrifi ce for the nation’ so that the empire could pro-
tect their rights in exchange.22 In his pamphlets al-Bustani referred 
to civil rights such as the freedoms of thought and speech but he did 
not advocate political rights for members of the Arab and Ottoman 
polities.23 
Representation and participatory government in a very limited 
measure began with the introduction of administrative and provin-
cial councils in the Tanzimat era. Al-Bustani’s writings combined 
with Ottoman reforms are evidence that early steps towards active 
civic engagement developed alongside structures of participatory 
government and those civil rights listed in the Ottoman constitu-
tion. Promulgated in 1876, the constitution listed the further rights 
of Ottoman nationals, including a reaffi rmation that all Ottomans 
had personal liberties and freedoms.24 It is at this point that we can 
fi nd the infl uence of European liberal citizenship: at the time of 
the promulgation of the constitution, a pamphlet translated from 
French appeared in Istanbul. Titled Le Droit des gens (The Law of 
Nations), the tract popularised the idea of the ‘natural rights’ of men, 
which included elected representative democracy. The appearance of 
the pamphlet is evidence of the spread of Western European liberal 
thought on citizenship rights, natural rights and constitutional gov-
ernment in the Ottoman Empire.25 However, Arab intellectuals in 
Greater Syria continued to understand the concept of natural rights 
as stemming from primordial membership in the Arab cultural and 
social nation. 
In the years before the First World War Ottoman Arab intellectu-
als in the provinces promoted the transition from passive to active 
imperial subjecthood. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 ushered 
in changes to the meaning of citizenship, framed by the nation-
building project of the second constitutional era. As Erol Ülker sug-
gests, the policy of Turkifi cation was meant to construct a national, 
Turkish core to the empire and the Ottomanism that stemmed from 
the 1869 citizenship law and other reforms was reinterpreted in line 
with the ideology of a dominant Turkish nationality.26 As a result, 
the conceptualisation of rights as a function of membership in the 
Arab cultural and social community became more important for 
Syria’s politically aware intellectuals and Arab nationalists. Thus, 
nationality came to be linguistically synthesised with muwātana (a 
member of the nation) in the Arabic context. Muwātana took on a 
more political connotation when used in written pamphlets and the 
press and it often appeared in in reference to the term for regional or 
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Arab nationalism, ‘qawmiyya’. At the same time in Syria, as Waten-
paugh showed in his study of constructions of modernity at the end 
of the Ottoman era, the new middle-class often ambiguously started 
to lay claim to ‘rights’ (huquq) voiced in the press, civic associations 
and in the Ottoman representative councils.27 Meanwhile, public 
and civic gatherings and social clubs created spaces for the lower 
classes to join an emerging political community that exposed them 
to debates surrounding key events like the 1908 revolution, parlia-
ment and the constitution and the dissolution of the empire after the 
First World War.28 
These processes and the emergence of new institutions and spaces 
that accompanied them in Syria and what became Palestine took 
place on a global scale in the early twentieth century. The formula-
tion of a communitarian concept of citizenship in the Arab Levant is 
also not unique: Rocco argues that alongside such new institutions, 
spaces and civic behaviours, rights are conceptualised as a function 
of membership in a historically specifi c society or community. He 
emphasises the formative role that cultural context plays in defi ning 
the nature and signifi cance of claims to rights. It is only within the 
context of specifi c confi gurations of social relations, institutions and 
culture – such as that just before the First World War in the Ottoman 
Arab provinces and once the British and French assumed sovereignty 
over the provinces after 1918 – that the idea of rights can be under-
stood and realised.29 In Palestine, the changing nature of civic and 
political belonging within the territorial space itself, alongside the 
mandate’s institutions that prevented self-government after the war 
ended and the mandate charter’s provision for Jewish immigration 
contributed to a new understanding by nationalists of a specifi cally 
Arab communitarian identity and certain natural, civil and political 
rights for the Arab inhabitants. The following sections of the chapter 
continue to use Rocco’s theory of communitarian citizenship: I argue 
that in the years immediately after the end of the Ottoman regime, 
civic associations that strengthened a Palestinian Arab solidarity and 
sense of community did not necessarily constitute citizenship claims 
in and of themselves but these associations and the civic engagement 
of their members were a ‘vital factor’ that led to activities and behav-
iours that did constitute citizenship claims. This is because the civic 
associations that supported a strong Palestinian Arab identity pro-
moted ‘a stronger sense of participatory rights and responsibilities’ in 
traditionally non-political arenas, which allow conditions for citizen-
ship claims to emerge.30
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Post-war Palestine and the Development of 
a Political Community, 1918–1921
The rise of mass politics in the fi nal years of the Ottoman adminis-
tration reshaped the relationships of power within the Arab politi-
cal community and inched them slowly towards a more horizontal 
rather than vertical structure. James Gelvin has shown that after 
1918 civil society in Syria became separate from the realm of the 
state and was prominent over the state.31 It is undeniable that the 
press, alongside civic associations, played a crucial part in the politi-
cal development of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces. In the 
territory that became Palestine after 1918, the political and civic 
community that emerged articulated a mixture of new and old defi -
nitions and notions of nationality and citizenship rights, and both 
included the fundamental component of primordial membership 
within the Arab community. Of equal importance, the development 
of this political community from 1918 to 1920 depended upon the 
role played by the middle-class leaders in spoiling dominant, tradi-
tional politics. 
Newspaper editors and journalists, educated in Western-style 
national schools, were situated fi rmly in the new middle-class and 
presented themselves and their work as at the vanguard of national 
modernity. For example, Mustafa Kabha cites in his illumina-
tive study of the press and public opinion that periodicals such as 
Haifa’s al-Karmil claimed in 1909 that newspapers were dedicated 
to the service of the people and ‘inform[ed] citizens of their rights 
and obligations in this country’.32 Similarly in 1913 the editor of 
Filastīn delivered free copies of his newspaper to many of the villages 
in the Jaffa district with the aim to ‘teach the peasants their rights’.33 
The importance of the press cannot be understated: it helped to cre-
ate public opinion and familiarised readers with political discus-
sions, legislation, voting regulations, nationalist ideologies and other 
affairs. It also cultivated public opinion. Palestinian periodicals had a 
considerable circulation: newspapers made their way into the villages 
where the literate men would read aloud the week’s international, 
regional and local news during public gatherings. Chris Bayly has 
called late colonial north India a ‘literacy aware society’. The same 
condition existed in Palestine before and throughout the interwar 
years.34 As a result, few inhabitants were left completely unaware of 
the most signifi cant political issues and events and most could take 
on for themselves the ready-made opinions of a particular newspaper 
on any given subject.35 
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The press also used a colourful, often alarming, rhetorical style 
to describe events at the end of the war and their implications for 
Palestine – the language forced newspaper readers to pay atten-
tion. After the British occupation of Palestine in late 1917 the press 
liberally printed article after article defi ning the military occupa-
tion as British ‘colonialism’ (āsta’mār). Members of the emerging 
Palestinian Arab national movement and civic organisations used 
a similar language in written demands presented to Great Britain 
and the League of Nations that were replete with references to anti-
colonialism and ‘natural’, national and civil rights. This language 
shaped a new ‘national’ discursive fi eld that incorporated symbols 
and often-ambiguous rhetoric of nationality and citizenship. Thus 
began the language of demands for Arab national rights on the basis 
that Ottoman nationality warranted such rights to be granted to the 
‘native’ (usually in reference to the Arabic-speaking former Otto-
man subjects) population who would then assume administrative 
and political control over the territory.36 
One of the fi rst and most signifi cant associations to form after the 
war with specifi cally Palestinian nationalist as well as political incli-
nations was the Muslim–Christian Association, or MCA (al-jam‘iyya 
al-islamiyya al-massihiyya), established in 1918 in both Jaffa and 
Jerusalem. The popularity of the MCA was evident in the fact that 
branches were soon opened by its leaders in every major town in Pal-
estine. With slogans that endorsed civic ideals of Muslim–Christian 
unity, the MCA attracted a large following as a secular and inclusive 
association that also advocated that the Arabs have the political right 
to govern Palestine. The MCA touted itself in petitions and letters 
to the British authorities as representative of all Palestinian Arabs, 
and used stamps and a fl ag that combined ‘Palestinian’ images such 
as the Holy Sepulcher and the Dome of the Rock.37 The association 
was instrumental in organising the fi rst Palestinian Arab Congress in 
early 1919 and continued to convene it in the following years. Mem-
bers of the congress went on to form the Arab Executive Committee 
(al-lajna al-tanafīdhiyya al-‘arabiyya), or the Executive, of the Pales-
tinian Arab Congress in 1920. This committee grew in importance 
and assumed the MCA’s role as the political and civic representative 
body of the Palestinian people. 
From 1918, nationalists in Palestine identifi ed as members of 
the wider community (umma) and national movement (al-haraka 
al-wataniyya) but political allegiances and ideologies often shifted. 
One large bloc of self-professed nationalists included those who 
adhered to the ideology of pan-Arab nationalism. The ideology 
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of pan-Arabism did not infl uence the politics of the traditional 
leadership to the great extent that it did in the case of the middle-
class and younger nationalists. These pan-Arab populist leaders, 
such as intellectuals, writers, lawyers and teachers, mobilised and 
attempted to reach out to the population at large. For example, 
a number of urban intellectuals publicised the perceived threat to 
the peasants (fellahin) posed by the Zionist project and land issues 
became topics of discussion in national conferences and associa-
tions. Editorials in the early 1920s likened all Palestinians to the 
symbol of the peasant farmer as the embodiment of the nation. The 
appeal to certain symbols in order to cultivate civic and national 
unity, while not always genuine (as in the case of some notables 
who actively sold land to Zionist groups) nonetheless obscured the 
more conciliatory activities of the notables in favour of a presenta-
tion of national unity as the means to resist British Administration 
over all of Palestine. As Gelvin has shown in the case of Syria, 
protests, slogans and public demonstrations expressed unity and 
instilled a civic model of the nation based on the bonds of a com-
mon Arab nationality and citizenship.38 
Integral to the growth of the nationalist political community in 
Palestine was the transformation of the traditional public sphere and 
its institutions, which occurred alongside the imposition of the man-
date administration. Nationalist leaders and associations such as the 
MCA and the Executive used the public sphere, including the press, 
schools, religious institutions and other public areas, as a site of civic 
expression and to show opposition to the mandate and Zionism. As 
early as 1918, signifi cant demonstrations and marches took place in 
the urban centres of Jerusalem and Jaffa. The several written pro-
tests addressed to the military administration in 1919 can also be 
understood as active political practices as well as civic engagement – 
in particular, groups gave written protests to British offi cials dur-
ing demonstrations.39 Local popular committees in Palestine’s large 
towns staged demonstrations and claimed to represent the ‘will of 
the nation’. Similarly, the MCA organised one of the fi rst political 
gatherings in the name of the nation in January and February 1919, 
the First Palestinian Arab Congress. Delegates attended from all 
regions of Palestine, and the congress claimed to speak on behalf of 
all Palestinians when it passed resolutions in support of independent 
representative democracy and unity with Syria.40 The congress was 
not united politically, however: a defi nite separation existed between 
the pro-British and the pan-Arab blocs of delegates especially in 
terms of tactics necessary to achieve independence.41 Soon after, the 
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British appointment in 1921 of the young Hajj Mohammed Amin al-
Husayni as both the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the head of the 
newly created Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) formed by the British 
to manage Muslim religious affairs represented the willingness of 
some elite Arabs to work alongside the mandatory government. 
During the years immediately after the war, other Palestinians 
continued a number of Committee of Union and Progress-era tradi-
tions of direct political participation. The MCA and the Arab Execu-
tive of the congresses voiced new demands for rights in petitions, 
strikes and boycotts – actions that had been performed in Ottoman 
times as civic, although not expressly citizenship, behaviours. In the 
words of Michelle Campos, boycotts were ‘an echo of a republi-
can understanding of citizenship, where every individual has to con-
tribute to the public good’ and an example of popular participation 
in politics. She cites the example of an empire-wide boycott led by 
Palestine’s port cities in 1908 against Austrian and German products 
to protest the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.42 The act of boy-
cott in support of the Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
however, can also be characterised as indicative of a more social, 
communal and cultural, rather than an explicitly republican, under-
standing of identity belonging. 
Similarly, petitions had long been used by the Arab population to 
address the local Ottoman administration and the central govern-
ment in Istanbul. While Gelvin notes that by virtue of their signa-
tures the masses held a stake in their own political affairs and defi ned 
their power of negotiation with the authorities, the subject–sultan 
relationship of protection and loyalty did not traditionally involve 
demands of a political nature.43 The language of the written petitions, 
newspaper editorials and protest demonstrations refl ected the chang-
ing concepts of national belonging to a polity as well as the newer 
concept of the relationship between the sovereign and the Arabs in 
the Levantine mandates. In Palestine, the early public activities of the 
pan-Arab nationalists helped to create a link between the identity of 
the Arab population as ‘nationals’ and the need for these nationals 
to demand their ‘natural rights’. Gelvin has shown that in this atmo-
sphere ‘a new political public was both created and mobilized’.44 For 
example, on the fi rst anniversary of the British occupation of Jaffa, 
that city’s MCA wrote a letter that stressed the relationship between 
the status of the Arabs and their rights in British-administered Pales-
tine and reminded the British that the nationality of the country and 
its people was Arab.45 The idea of a relationship between ‘the Arab 
nation’ and an Arab commonwealth nationality (qawmiyya) with 
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the concept of rights cropped up frequently in newspaper editorials 
and in letters by local politicians and members of the Executive to 
the British Administration and to the League. 
In the years before the offi cial ratifi cation of the mandates system, 
Palestinian writers and MCA leaders offered explanations and defi -
nitions of nationality in light of the phrase coined by Great Britain, 
that of a ‘Jewish national home’ (al-watan al-qawmī al-yahudiyya). 
An editorial published in November 1918 by the newspaper Filastīn 
surmised that the application of nationality in Palestine meant that 
the national status of the Arabs and Jews who lived in the territory 
surely must be equal before the law. The editorial stressed that this 
concept of nationality dated back to the Ottoman period as impe-
rial legislation had conferred the same ‘rights’ to all of the empire’s 
inhabitants. The writer feared that this meaning of nationality could 
not be reconciled with the intentions set out for Palestine in the Bal-
four Declaration and he warned British offi cials that the Arab citizens 
would not accept a Palestinian nationality that privileged the political 
standing of the Jewish immigrants within the wider ‘Arab nation’.46 
In fact, a number of newspaper articles published in 1919 voiced the 
complaint that the then-military administration gave certain rights to 
the immigrants as if these immigrants were ‘nationals of Palestine’. 
‘National’ (watanī or qawmī) became equated with ‘native’ (ibn al-
balad). Certain ‘rights’ were thus equated with the Arab population’s 
native origin in the territory. Importantly, both nationalist writers 
and members of the Executive understood the Arabs as the natives 
of Palestine either by birth or descent. As part of this understanding, 
both birth and descent entitled them to nationality and national, civil 
and political rights (huquq midaniyya and huquq siyāsiya).47 
The confl ation of terminology for the native, the national and the 
citizen used in editorials and in statements by the middle-class lead-
ers in the Executive is an important element in the analysis of the 
evolution of citizenship in Mandate Palestine. During the early man-
date period the word ‘jinsiyya’ referred to nationality in the context 
of a territorial nation-state. In the late Ottoman era the word that 
later came to refer to the citizen, ‘muwātin’, was based on the Arabic 
word ‘watan’ (homeland) and denoted a native as opposed to a for-
eigner. Both terms came into more frequent use in the interwar years 
as nationality evolved to connote membership in the Arab nation as 
political and civil rights became attached to the status of belonging.48 
The plural for citizens, ‘muwātinīn’, was rarely used within Pales-
tine in documents or articles in the early 1920s. However, the term 
is not entirely absent: for example, leaders in the cities of Nablus 
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and Tulkarm signed petitions to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference ‘on 
behalf of our citizens’ (nīāba ‘an muwātinīnā).49 The national leader-
ship explained terms like ‘nationality’ and civil and political rights in 
a language that the Arab public identifi ed with. 
The use of symbols accompanied the civic language and featured 
in Arab nationalist and local leaders’ discussions and writings that 
urged the creation of a greater civic identifi cation between differ-
ent social groups in Palestinian society. In particular, the symbol of 
the Arab peasant (fellah) continued to have a prominent role in the 
burgeoning Palestinian Arab political community as a link to the 
traditional past and a reminder of the threats posed by the Jewish 
national home policy of Britain. Local and populist (or otherwise 
non-traditionally elite) Arab nationalists challenged the British 
Administration’s failure to protect what they explicitly called the citi-
zenship rights of Arab cultivators and peasants. Leaders stressed the 
importance of what they depicted as the civil rights to land owner-
ship and use. For example, when the 1920 Land Transfer Ordinance 
amended the 1910 Ottoman law that had restricted land ownership 
to Ottoman national corporate entities, editorials decried the new 
threat posed to the civil rights of the peasants with regard to land 
ownership and agricultural tenancy on land acquired by foreign 
Jews.50 The amendment meant that Jewish immigrants and Zionist 
entrepreneurs could purchase land in Palestine without holding pro-
visional Palestinian nationality. The implication of the Land Transfer 
Ordinance was that the British no longer upheld the customary law 
that protected and favoured the practice of communal land owner-
ship. As a result, peasants were evicted from the land they farmed 
when they could not produce titles of ownership.51 In one particular 
case in which residents of Beisan faced eviction, the Arab lawyer W. 
F. Boustany pointed out to the government in 1922 that the residents 
were ‘bona fi de citizens’ whose ‘civil rights’ must be maintained as 
part of mandate policy.52 Palestinian peasants and villagers alike 
formed their own elected associations that started out as apolitical 
and often for mutual aid, and soon after became institutions meant 
to protect the interests of rural Arabs who were increasingly drawn 
into the new political community.53 
Since its founding in late 1920, the Executive stressed the concept 
of civil rights in the new language of internationalism when render-
ing appeals against the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish national 
home to the League, Great Britain and the Palestine Administra-
tion. The Executive argued the incompatibility of British policy with 
the principles of international rights and the ‘natural rights’ of the 
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Palestinian people, and noted that such policy ‘violated the sanc-
tity of civil laws’.54 The Third Palestinian Arab Congress of 1920 
stated its goal to achieve ‘international human rights, civil rights, 
historical, and social rights’, including representative government 
in Palestine.55 Thus, the Executive seized upon the growing aware-
ness of rhetoric of political nationality that stemmed from historical 
membership in the Arab community, and the body also increasingly 
illustrated this rhetoric with examples of national, political and civil 
rights that were applicable to both urban and rural Palestinians. 
The Concept of Palestinian Nationality and 
the Evolution of Citizenship Practices
Several months after the appointment of Herbert Samuel as high 
commissioner in mid-1920, the Arab Executive elected the recently 
deposed mayor of Jerusalem Musa Kazim al-Husayni as its presi-
dent. Musa Kazim, who was then in his late sixties, came from the 
prominent al-Husayni family of Jerusalem. He opposed the British 
administration and his politics came to be respected by all sectors of 
Palestinian society. Until his death in 1934, Musa Kazim supported 
equal civil and political rights for all former Ottoman citizens and he 
was the fi rst Executive leader to question the nationality legislation 
of 1925 after emigrants in the Americas sent him numerous letters 
asking his help to induce the British authorities to offer Palestinian 
citizenship to the emigrants. This section traces how various lead-
ers including Musa Kazim discussed concepts and behaviours of a 
uniquely Palestinian nationality and citizenship prior to 1925. The 
populist leaders and the traditional politicians formulated an under-
standing that civil and political rights for the population came out 
of membership and participation in the Arab and Ottoman com-
munity prior to the end of the war. The Arabic press acknowledged 
this understanding as civic associations at the local and national level 
discussed it in the public sphere. 
Musa Kazim, as Executive president, addressed a letter to Colo-
nial Secretary Winston Churchill in 1921 and pointed out that before 
the war the Jews of Palestine enjoyed what he referred to as the privi-
leges and rights of citizenship in the Ottoman Empire. Musa Kazim 
expressed the belief that ‘countries with their civil and other rights 
and privileges are the property of their inhabitants and constitute an 
heirloom of the nation’. He emphasised that the Jewish, Christian 
and Muslim natives of Palestine (abnā’ fi lastīn) had ultimate control 
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over their country, and their affi liation with Arab qawmiyya (nation-
alism) meant that they must be granted certain rights and duties. In 
the letter, Musa Kazim also questioned the status of the British Jews 
who served in the Palestine Administration, such as High Commis-
sioner Herbert Samuel. He asked Churchill whether they were Jewish 
or British nationals, arguing that ‘it is obvious they cannot be both 
at the same time’. Musa Kazim wondered if ‘Jew-ism’ was in fact 
a nationality, and, if so, he pondered the ‘English-ism’ of men like 
Samuel while in Palestine. It was clear to him that ‘one -ism must 
be sacrifi ced for the other, but which for which?’56 The idea that the 
Jewish immigrants constituted their own nationality group in Pal-
estine posed a clear problem to Arab nationalists like Musa Kazim 
who understood nationality along ethnic lines. This confl ation of 
ethnicity and nationality confused Arab nationalists who could not 
fathom how the British could confer the same Palestinian nationality 
on Jewish immigrants as they did on the Arabs. At the same time, 
press reports of Musa Kazim’s letter infl uenced Arab public opinion 
that European Jews had an ethnic nationality directly linked to their 
religious identity. 
In reference to the Balfour Declaration’s promise to maintain the 
civil and religious rights of the Arab population, Musa Kazim argued 
that the idea of civil rights ‘mean nothing more than equality and 
justice before the law and obviously no privilege is contained in this’. 
According to him, the civil rights of the Palestinians as Ottoman sub-
jects unquestionably included representation in a parliament, pro-
vincial government and native councils, as well as Arab employment 
in the highest judicial and civil servant positions, and all the civic 
freedoms associated with it.57 Kazim’s statements are illustrative of 
a particular understanding of civil and political rights by some Arab 
national leaders very early in the British administration of Palestine. 
Kazim stressed to the Colonial Offi ce that such rights were inalien-
able for all citizens and could not be granted or taken away by the 
mandate administration. He suggested that the inherent nature of 
these rights made their mention in the Balfour Declaration unneces-
sary. With the text of the Balfour Declaration in mind, he and his 
colleagues accused the British of confl ating civil rights with religious 
rights.58 The development of this language normalised a link between 
nationality (jinsiyya) based on birth and descent in a territory and 
various types of rights (huquq) to that territory. 
Local Arab leaders and intellectuals in villages and urban areas 
alike contributed to this discussion. They wrote editorials or letters 
for newspapers and held meetings under the auspices of a number 
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of civic associations, and offered support to the Arab Executive. For 
example, an editorial in the Jerusalem newspaper Mir’at al-Sharq 
posed the question of ‘what [would be] left of our political or civil 
rights’ if the Jews established a homeland in Palestine for Jewish 
nationals.59 The dialogue on primordial political and civil rights 
both to and fully within the territory and its government resonated 
with the Arab public when linked in practical terms with threats 
posed by Zionism and the Balfour Declaration. In this period, the 
Palestinian Arab population came to understand civil rights as unre-
stricted access to land ownership, livelihood, the control of immigra-
tion and the local and national economy. Press reports and the MCA 
increasingly demanded of the British administration that every Arab 
in Palestine be granted civil rights to equal employment in all pri-
vate and public spheres following the Zionist Organisation’s foun-
dational policy of the conquest of labour (kibosh avoda).60 By the 
early 1920s, a number of active local leaders focused their attention 
on the appeal for a proportional representative government and an 
elected parliament. These nationalists pointedly noted that a par-
liamentary system with a French or North American-style bill of 
rights would ensure the protection of the nation’s minorities (huquq 
aqaliyyāt) as well as other political and civil rights for the entire 
population of Palestine.61 
In 1921 the fi rst Palestinian Arab Delegation (wafd) composed of 
Arab Executive Committee members, including Musa Kazim, trav-
elled to London to meet with Winston Churchill at the Colonial 
Offi ce. The delegation raised the issue of the national status of the 
Jewish immigrants. This was the fi rst time that the Arab leadership 
directly addressed Great Britain on issues of nationality. In a conver-
sation between members of the wafd, Churchill and Hubert Young 
of the Middle East Department in London, the delegation’s secre-
tary Shibli Jamal questioned Churchill over the plan to establish a 
national home for the Jews in Palestine. The meaning of ‘national’ 
in the Balfour Declaration concerned the delegation. Jamal asked 
if those he called ‘the Hebrews [sic]’ became nationals of Palestine 
by virtue of the Balfour Declaration. At the time of the meeting 
the draft nationality order was already circulating among mandate 
administrators and Zionist leaders such as Weizmann. Churchill 
answered that the Jewish immigrants would become Palestinians. 
The delegation expressed anxiety over the seemingly unconditional 
nature of nationality for any immigrant, and sought assurance that 
certain provisions and greater residency requirements would be nec-
essary for naturalisation.62 This exchange is telling, and crucial to 
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the understanding of the Arabs’ concept of nationality in the early 
1920s. The delegation feared the loss of future sovereignty to immi-
grants on the basis of their perceived ethnic (qawm) nationality. In 
turn, immigrants would become political equals with the Arabs and 
thus threaten Arab control over an independent Palestine. 
At the time of the delegation’s visit, the Foreign and Colonial 
offi ces and members of the League held ongoing debates over the 
appropriate body able to grant the nationality of inhabitants of an 
international mandate. Aware of these wider debates, Jamal ques-
tioned what authority would grant Palestinian nationality. Young 
surmised that the British as the mandatory would do so, but did not 
mention provisions for state succession or succession of nationality 
as detailed in the Treaty of Sèvres. The offi cials offered very little 
information on nationality despite the queries of the Palestinian del-
egation. In fact, the Palestinian Arabs heard of (but did not read) the 
draft nationality law for the fi rst time in London. Colonial offi cials 
evaded the direct question of whether a legislative body in Palestine 
could have a say in the draft nationality law.63 At no point did the 
British Government offer to involve the Arab leadership in the offi -
cial discussions of nationality regulations as they had done for the 
Zionist Organisation. The Arabs expected a measure of involvement 
as part of the obligation that the mandatory foster self-government. 
Shortly after this meeting the delegation sent a report to the presi-
dent of the League of Nations Commission in Geneva. The report 
expressed regret that the British did not grant the delegation, rep-
resentatives of the Palestinian Arabs, the opportunity to scrutinise 
the provisions to regulate nationality. The report lamented that 
the mandate administration would deprive the Palestinians of self-
government and noted that Great Britain did not have the authority 
to prepare a nationality law. Instead, the delegation argued that ‘this 
legislative capacity lies within the sphere of the national government 
set up by the people’.64 
After the delegation’s trip to London, the Arab members of Sam-
uel’s Advisory Council gained some knowledge of the draft nation-
ality order. After hearing an illustration of the proposed constitution 
and nationality laws, council spokesman Turkan Bey declared to the 
British members of the council that it was obvious the nationality 
law benefi ted the Zionist immigrants. He voiced the Arab opposi-
tion to the two-year residency period required before an individual 
could be naturalised as a citizen. He argued (not entirely accurately) 
that in every other country the residency requirement for naturali-
sation was at least fi ve years. After consultation with the council’s 
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other Arab members, Turkan suggested the swift enactment of the 
nationality law to help Palestinian Arabs who lived abroad and had 
lost Ottoman nationality.65 He was the fi rst to express concern for 
these stateless emigrants. 
The Arabic press reports on the activities of the delegation reached 
a wide audience. They were instrumental in fashioning and popular-
ising a terminology of civil, political and national rights and nation-
ality.66 Editorials and articles put forward alternative interpretations 
of Palestinian nationality, giving it further meaning and form. The 
English section of the newspaper Mir’at al-Sharq stated in 1921 that 
the question of a ‘unity of citizenship between the countries of the 
Arabic world is one of paramount importance’. The editor asked if 
the mandates’ classifi cation of the Arab world under different colo-
nial administrations inherently clashed with such a ‘unity of citizen-
ship’. In answering, ‘[W]e think not,’ he went on to stress that the 
mandates had ‘absolutely nothing to do with questions of national-
ity or citizenship’ and should not attempt to deal ‘with [these] fun-
damental questions of race, nationality, or citizenship’. The ideology 
of a common citizenship in the Arab world was presented as a ben-
efi t for all Arabs and a necessity for the Palestinians.67 This ideol-
ogy appeared in opposition to the Palestinian nationality provisions 
proposed by the British Administration as the Palestinian Arabs for-
mulated their own defi nition of nationality. Writers, alongside the 
Arab delegation to London, were quick to point out that the draft 
nationality provisions did not mirror those in place in the Ottoman 
provinces since 1869. Criticism of the provisions swiftly emanated 
from Arab political circles even before the Arab leadership could 
read the text of the draft law. After the delegation failed to gain any 
concessions from colonial offi cials in London and once it returned 
to Palestine, the ideological clash between the more subaltern, non-
traditional and the dominant political movements deepened. 
A group of younger nationalists, along with the well-respected 
Musa Kazim al-Husayni, began to articulate more forcefully the 
position that if the mandate authorities would not leave the adminis-
tration of Palestine to its Arab inhabitants the former needed to fulfi l 
various duties as provisional sovereigns. These Palestinians requested 
a type of colonial paternalism that the French practiced in Syria and 
Lebanon. As Elizabeth Thompson has argued, the French adminis-
trations justifi ed their control of Syria and Lebanon by their use of 
an ideology of social relief, not unlike a welfare state.68 In the 1920s, 
the French signifi cantly expanded benefi ts to their colonial citizens, 
supported by a hierarchy of citizenship based on class, religion and 
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location. In Palestine, the dual system of administration limited the 
role of the British as paternal guardians.69 Even so, the British con-
structed an image of democracy in their colonial territories that infl u-
enced the younger nationalists’ call for protection, aid and assistance 
for the population. In a study on the development of citizenship in 
colonial Hong Kong, Agnes Shuk-mei Ku criticises the British prac-
tice of ‘governance without democracy’ through the facade of politi-
cal rights given to Hong Kong colonial subjects. In Palestine, the 
proposal for the non-direct election by the religious community for 
members of a legislative council that would have no power to pass 
laws illustrates such a practice. The British used democracy ‘as a 
means to achieve political legitimacy and state goals’, rather than 
to foster civic participation and state-building.70 In Palestine, for 
instance, younger members of the Arab Executive in 1921 pressed 
for local communities to support or open their own national schools 
since the administration had failed in its ‘duty’ to expand the educa-
tional system to teach young people ‘how to grow up good citizens 
of Palestine’.71 In the early 1920s newspapers published editorials 
that expanded upon these duties, and writers asked that the Arabs 
themselves undertake to provide assistance and welfare for the wider 
population.72 These suggested actions were referred to as sacred and 
exemplary civic duties and civic activism.73 
The administration’s refusal to acknowledge the Arab Execu-
tive, Musa Kazim, or groups like the MCA as representative of the 
Palestinian Arabs triggered an increase in public displays of dissat-
isfaction in the early 1920s. The Executive along with civil society 
groups launched campaigns to demonstrate the people’s endorsement 
of the Executive as the offi cial representative body of the Palestin-
ian Arabs.74 Organisations such as the MCA as well as young people 
handed notes of protest to British colonial offi cials whenever they vis-
ited cities and towns in Palestine. Yet, in large part, these organisation 
and their members represented local interests and concerns although 
they worked for causes with broad national appeal. While the urban-
based Jaffa MCA protested the police action taken against unarmed 
demonstrators or press censorship, nationalists in the rural Galilee 
demanded that the government protect the villages and peasants of 
Nazareth from land dispossession and establish an agricultural bank. 
At the same time, the MCA in 1921 sent a letter to the Colonial Offi ce 
to report that all classes in ‘town, village, factory and farm’ com-
prised the nation and had the same demands.75 In the early 1920s, 
the accuracy of such a statement is rather in doubt. Yet the canvass-
ing and propaganda of the MCA and younger activists in rural areas 
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was evident. For example, the Haycraft Commission, which was sent 
to Palestine in 1921 to investigate disturbances between Arab and 
Jewish communities, reported that the villagers of Tulkarm were 
‘more politically minded than a small English country town’.76 The 
use of civic activism became more evident in 1922 during the boycott 
of the elections for the legislative council, which featured widespread 
involvement by urban and rural Palestinians and marked an impor-
tant step in the politicisation of the Arab citizens of Palestine. 
After the mandate administration published the Electoral Order-
in-Council in 1922 and made known High Commissioner Samuel’s 
plans for a partially elected legislative body, the Arab Executive 
decided to focus on an Arab boycott of the elections. The practice 
of boycotting government-convened committees was not new but it 
grew in importance once presented in the press explicitly as a tactic of 
civil disobedience (al-‘asīyan al-madaniyya). One year earlier, Musa 
Kazim al-Husayni had convinced the Arab members of Samuel’s 
consultative committee in Jerusalem to boycott its meetings on the 
basis that the Arab Executive alone could discuss constitutional and 
other matters with the British Government.77 The Fifth Palestinian 
Arab Congress held in the summer of 1922 resolved to support the 
boycott of the Legislative Council elections. This decision received 
widespread endorsement by nationalist associations who touted 
the boycott as a civic duty. In a statement to the chief secretary in 
Palestine immediately after the congress, the Nablus MCA argued 
that the 1922 Electoral Order was based on the terms of the man-
date and therefore harmful to the nation’s interests especially since 
members could not pass any ordinance deemed inconsistent with the 
terms of the charter.78 
The MCA’s claims (published in the press) that the legislative 
council would threaten the civil and political rights of Arab Palestin-
ians prompted a wide, general boycott. The boycott was a testament 
of the Arab leadership’s displeasure over the lack of political rights 
and their ability to mobilise their communities. Palestinians were 
informed of the boycott not only by statements of the MCA and Arab 
Executive in the press but also by village mukhtars at large demon-
strations and in mosques and churches. However, neither the Mufti 
nor the Supreme Muslim Council supported the boycott – a stance 
that fi rmly separated these traditional religious leaders from their 
middle-class and more secular counterparts. In Jaffa and Jerusalem, 
the crowds that demonstrated in support of the boycott numbered 
in the thousands. The elections took place, but out of a planned 809 
secondary electors, only 134 Arabs were actually elected – mainly 
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by Jewish voters. Wasserstein refers to the attempt by the govern-
ment to hold elections as ‘a fi asco, and . . . a humiliating setback for 
Samuel’s policy’.79 The British could not create a legislative council 
in 1922, and soon after the boycott, seven of ten nominated Arab 
members of the High Commissioner’s Advisory Council withdrew 
their candidacy. 
After 1922, the middle-class activists began to praise non-violent 
tactics of disobedience against the mandate administration and 
referred to such acts as national duties. This cultivated the ideology 
that the population had participatory responsibilities vis-à-vis the 
nation. Non-cooperation in the early 1920s demonstrated the effec-
tive agency of popular leaders to urge fellow Palestinian Arabs to 
confront the mandatory in order for the nation ‘to achieve its legiti-
mate rights’ in association with citizenship.80 At the ever-growing 
public demonstrations, nationalist leaders and associations explicitly 
stated their intent to exercise what they termed as the civil rights 
of free speech and assembly. The MCA branches held meetings and 
encouraged the involvement of other groups to explain and publicise 
such tactics throughout Palestine. As early as 1921, activists touted 
strikes as an individual civic activism in working-class, urban areas. 
Upon the return of the Palestinian Arab delegation in 1922, national 
groups held the fi rst two-day strike in support of an independent 
Palestine. Nationalist leader Omar Bittar wrote that all classes of 
people in Palestine went on strike to demand their ‘natural right’ 
(al-haqq al-tabī‘ayyī) of independence.81 The deliberations of the 
Sixth Palestinian Arab Congress in 1923 included a plan to study 
the effectiveness of a boycott of land and property taxes. The con-
gress also decided to encourage citizens not to associate or work 
with any Arab who accepted membership to British-managed coun-
cils.82 Activists depicted such behaviours as duties that would force 
Great Britain to rescind the Balfour Declaration and give control of 
Palestine to the Arabs.83 
The Immediate Reactions to the 1925 Palestine 
Citizenship Order-in-Council
In mid-1925, H. E. Field Marshal Lord Plumer replaced Herbert 
Samuel as Palestine’s high commissioner. Arabic newspapers were 
quick to address the issue of nationality since changes to the citizen-
ship order came after his term of offi ce began. One open letter pub-
lished in August 1925 in Sawt al-Sha‘b lamented that a number of 
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Jewish immigrants ‘should never be allowed to become [Palestinian] 
nationals and citizens’. The letter pointed out that under a national 
parliament in Palestine, the Arabs would declare that Jewish citi-
zens would enjoy equal political rights with the Arabs.84 The focus 
on nationality legislation was a new one for the press: in the year 
before the British Government ratifi ed the 1925 Palestine Citizenship 
Order-in-Council, leaders within Palestine offered few comments on 
nationality legislation but instead focused on national rights. 
When the administration announced changes to the citizenship 
order in November 1925, to bring it in line with the Treaty of Lau-
sanne, newspapers prominently featured articles on the meaning 
of Palestinian nationality. The negative impact of these changes on 
Palestinian Arab emigrants brought the issue of citizenship and 
nationality to the front pages of newspapers. The changes, which 
gave emigrants less than nine months to return permanently to Pal-
estine to opt for their nationality, caused an outcry fi rst from several 
emigrant groups in Latin America. The order itself confi rmed what 
leaders like Musa Kazim had earlier opposed: new Jewish immigrants 
would receive Palestinian citizenship with few restrictions apart from 
residence in the country for two years prior to their naturalisation. 
The Arabic press seized on this point of contention and portrayed 
it as a glaring example of the unfairness of the British colonial pol-
icy of privileging a foreign group over the Arab population of the 
region. Newspaper articles noted the ease with which immigrants 
could become full citizens, and writers predicted this as the fi nal 
blow to hope for the cancellation of the Jewish national home policy. 
Meanwhile, Palestinian (provisional) nationality, according to one 
journalist, ‘can be obtained by every Jew who sets foot in Palestine 
and this is not an apparent assault on the highest of our civil rights?’ 
Harking back to the 1921 delegation to London, articles concluded 
that the denial of the Palestinian voice in nationality legislation stood 
as another example that the British refused to take the rights of the 
Arabs into account.85 
In the summer of 1925, Mir’at al-Sharq published two articles 
that questioned the meaning of nationality in the context of the 
mandate and the Jewish national home policy. In the light of the 
high commissioner’s announcement of the impending publication of 
the citizenship order, the paper argued that contradictions existed 
between the nationality legislation and the meaning of national in 
the Balfour Declaration and in accordance with the Jewish national 
home policy. The articles refl ected the long-standing confusion 
among the Arab nationalists and national bodies over the term 
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‘national’ (qawmī) in the Declaration.86 As previously noted, the 
Arabs understood ‘national’ in ethnic terms and envisioned them-
selves as part of an ethnic group separate from immigrant Jews. 
Their confusion was framed around a clash of interest, namely 
how the citizenship order could grant equal nationality for separate 
ethnicities. Similarly themed articles published through the end of 
1925 pointed out that the Arabic term for nationality (‘jinsiyya’) 
began to take on a more territorial and legal – and less cultural and 
communitarian – meaning, akin to wantaniyya (territorial nation-
alism). The territorial aspect added to the confusion over its expla-
nation in the press. One writer questioned what nationality meant 
for Jewish communities in Eastern Europe, the birthplace of the 
majority of the immigrants. He claimed that thousands of Jewish 
people scattered over the world did not all have the same national-
ity in the sense of ethnic affi liation in their different countries. If 
these immigrant (mainly Orthodox) Jews were to be given a sepa-
rate Palestinian nationality not on par with the Arabs but rather 
as members of a Jewish national home, then the Arab Palestin-
ians would have an unequal status vis-à-vis the Jewish community. 
The article also discussed the term ‘national’ and its translation 
into Western European languages as ‘subject’ (‘ra‘iyya’, from the 
term ‘fl ock’).87 For the Arabs, the meaning of ‘subject’ took on the 
same meaning as ‘citizen’ in terms of being under the jurisdiction 
of a particular state. Herein was the difference between national 
and citizen for the Palestinian Arab writers. While nationality was 
nearly the same as ethnicity, citizenship denoted a status of being 
under the jurisdiction of a state or administration. 
The previous article also made an important point about the text 
of the Balfour Declaration. The implementation of the Declaration’s 
terms specifi cally could not alter the rights and status enjoyed by 
Jews in other countries, and so the status of immigrant Jews who 
became Palestinian nationals would not be affected. They would 
remain nationals of their country of origin and become nationals of 
Palestine. The writer asked ‘whether this text [Balfour Declaration] 
is inconsistent with the phrase “Jewish national homeland” ’ in terms 
of national status. Would nationals of Britain, France or America 
who were Jewish and settled in Palestine as members of the Jewish 
national home be forced to become Palestinians to the exclusion of 
their original nationality?88 Ironically, the query mirrored questions 
posed by British statesmen only two years prior to this. The Palestinian 
Arabs wondered whether all Jewish immigrants could hold more 
than one nationality. Such questions demonstrate that the notions 
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of nationality and nation-state citizenship differed. Only at the 
end of July 1925 did a brief Arabic article clarify to readers that 
the existence of a Jewish national home in Palestine did not mean 
that ‘Jewish nationality’ would be imposed upon the inhabitants of 
Palestine.89 
With the publication of the Citizenship Order-in-Council in the 
Arabic press and the Palestine Gazette (the administration’s offi -
cial periodical) in September 1925 some Palestinian Arabs had the 
opportunity to become familiar with the order’s provisions. Newspa-
pers published the full text of the order but some, such as Tulkarm’s 
al-Ittihad al-‘Arabī, relegated it to the last page. Every Arabic news-
paper titled the legislation as the ‘Nationality Law’ (al-qanun al-jin-
siyya or al-haqq al-jinsiyya) rather than as the Citizenship Order. The 
offi cial Arabic translation of the order in the Palestine Gazette used 
the term ‘jinsiyya’.90 Two months after the administration published 
the citizenship order the editor of Sawt al-Sha‘b, ‘Isa Bandak, took 
on the task of explaining on a civic level the dangers posed by the 
law. Bandak had established and edited the newspaper as a weekly 
since 1922 and he served as a popular politician in Bethlehem, where 
he founded the city’s Literary Club and another pan-Arab periodical 
(Bayt Laham). The Literary Club and the press in Bethlehem under 
Bandak’s supervision devoted attention to the Palestinian diaspora 
since a large number of emigrants came from Bethlehem and its 
environs.91 Bandak’s immediate reactions to the citizenship order, 
as apparent from the pages of Sawt al-Sha‘b, were in fact the fi rst 
ones to address the emigrants’ political status – a shift from previ-
ous social commentary on the diaspora. In an article titled ‘The law 
prejudices the rights of the Arabs’ he expressed anger at the harm 
done by the order to the interests of the nation since the legislation 
did not grant any rights for the Arabs on the basis of Palestinian 
nationality. First and foremost, he critiqued the reason for the law: 
Great Britain enacted it to facilitate Zionist immigration and meet 
the terms of the Balfour Declaration within the mandate. The cri-
tique fi tted in well with the nationalist, anti-Zionist discourse and for 
good reason. Indeed, the British worked with the Zionist leaders to 
draft the favourable provisions of the order concerning the acquisi-
tion of nationality by Jewish immigrants.92 
Bandak compared the Palestinian order with citizenship legisla-
tion in the United States and found that immigrants to America had 
to meet several provisions, including fi ve years of permanent resi-
dence, in order to be granted a certifi cate of legal residency. He also 
explained to the readers the residency laws throughout Europe and 
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reported – as the Arab delegation alluded to in 1921 – that all coun-
tries required no less than fi ve years of residency before an immigrant 
could apply for citizenship. Bandak was the fi rst editor to accuse the 
administration of unfairly placing no restrictions on whether Jewish 
immigrants could live full- or part-time in Palestine in order to retain 
their nationality. The situation, Bandak surmised, created ‘a wide 
crater in the roof of Palestinian nationality’ as it allowed any Jew in 
the world to acquire Palestinian citizenship rights. His main points 
all related back to the favouritism of Great Britain for the Zionist 
Organisation’s aims.93 Bandak’s arguments echoed those of the Pal-
estinian delegation but the publication of the 1925 order led to the 
re-emergence of vocal opposition to British legislation in Palestine. 
This opposition to citizenship provisions was symptomatic of the 
wider anger over the lack of consultation between the Arabs and the 
administration. 
A number of other reasons for the Arab opposition to the citi-
zenship provisions can be gleaned from editorials by Bandak and 
others. One reason is the claim that the order was detrimental to the 
country, which was not economically sound, and that unemployed 
foreign arrivals to Palestine would not be obliged to contribute to 
the welfare of the country. Rather, their loyalties would be to the 
Jewish national home project. Furthermore, the supposed illegality 
of the order – since a parliament of elected representatives did not 
create it – was another theme constantly stressed in 1925. Bandak 
concluded that the establishment of a Jewish national home sup-
ported by the nationality order would obstruct Arab national con-
trol over the country’s resources, allow land to be requisitioned and 
deplete Arab fi nancial wealth by taking over businesses. These early 
reactions to the citizenship order are also important because of the 
readership of Arabic periodicals such as Sawt al-Sha‘b. This reader-
ship included those most impacted by the citizenship order, families 
of the Palestinian Arab diaspora.
Conclusion
Although the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council was published 
in Arabic in Palestinian periodicals and in the offi cial gazette, the 
change made to put its timeframe for option for citizenship in line 
with the Treaty of Lausanne in November was not immediately noted 
by the press. In December, Palestine’s Department of Immigration 
and Passports issued an offi cial statement to the effect that due to 
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diffi culties, the department could not accept requests from Palestin-
ians abroad for passports and documentary certifi cates of national-
ity.94 The publication of the provisions of the order that effectively 
denied access to legally recognised citizenship to thousands of native 
born Palestinians who lived abroad galvanised the popular leaders. 
‘Isa Bandak and others poured their energy into lobbying the admin-
istration for the repeal of the order and the implementation of new 
legislation by a national assembly.
The concept of citizenship and the practices, behaviours, rights 
and the political identity assumed to be connected to it diverged 
widely between the British colonial offi cials and the Palestinian 
nationalist leaders and associations. Members of the latter group 
clearly understood elements of this divergence as early as 1921 when 
the Arab Executive delegation travelled to London and addressed 
the topic of nationality. The development of a political identity, out 
of a civic and cultural community in Palestine did not happen over-
night or only through the activities of the Executive, the press and 
the late Ottoman era initiative of civic organisation. However, the 
early years of the mandate era and the new institutions that came 
along with the change in government, territorial space, demograph-
ics and Arab politics, combined with the public perception that 
Great Britain would promote democratic ideas and self-government 
made conditions ripe for claims to political rights of a communitar-
ian formulation of Palestinian citizenship. On the discursive side 
of this history, the term ‘jinsiyya’ was used in writings and discus-
sions by Arab nationalists during the time period under study in 
the current chapter and continued to be favoured over ‘muwātana’. 
The Arabic translation of the citizenship order in the press and in 
Palestine’s offi cial gazette further standardised the use of the term 
‘nationality’ to refer to the legislation on citizenship. However, ‘citi-
zen’ (‘muwatin’) was used in petitions and letters signed by Arab 
communities and forwarded to the administration, Great Britain 
and the League of Nations. Editorials and printed requests to the 
Arab population by the Arab Executive and other national bodies 
referred to the collective Palestinian Arab population in more rhe-
torical and nationalist language as abna’ or ahl Filastīn, natives or 
people of Palestine, respectively. 
At the same time, because the Arabs only had unoffi cial rep-
resentation and delegations to Great Britain and to the Palestine 
Administration, nationalist leaders were given very little informa-
tion on the draft nationality legislation. Thus, the reaction to the 
1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council was one of confusion 
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and uncertainty on the part of the Arab elite and middle-class lead-
ership, and Arab emigrants. In this climate, rumours spread that 
the Mandate administration deliberately made citizenship provi-
sions favourable for Jewish immigrants to the detriment of the Arab 
natives. However, the Executive was limited in its opposition tactics 
to the proposed nationality provisions. In the fi rst place, colonial 
offi cials denied permission to the Arabs to scrutinise the law. In 
the interim period from 1921 to the order’s publication in 1925, 
the Executive as a body devoted very little attention to nationality 
legislation as the issue seemed less pressing. Second, the growth of 
civic associations with localised claims and concerns rendered the 
national movement unable to offer a united front against legislation 
that changed Ottoman nationality precedents. The development of 
civic activism and the discussion of rights and duties played a major 
role in this alternative defi nition of Palestinian citizenship. Although 
the activities of the Executive body had slowed down considerably 
by 1925, ordinary Palestinians continued to express their ‘national 
rights’ with tactics that were meant to draw the attention of the 
British. The successful boycott of the 1922 elections, public dem-
onstrations and petitions were important means through which the 
population expressed a sense of civic activism and duty. That sense 
of activism and duty can also be attributed to a historical legacy of 
citizenship that went back to the late Ottoman Empire. In 1922, 
Mir’at al-Sharq published an editorial that posed the question of 
what would become of the former traditions of the country and 
whether the British wanted the Palestinians ‘to forget the honor of 
their Arab nationality?’95 That anxiety did not disappear by 1925, 
when the citizenship order-in-council provided the mandate admin-
istration with the legal instrument to defi ne Palestinian citizenship 
as different from Arab nationality. This differentiation had the most 
spectacular impact on Palestinian emigrants, particularly those who 
had maintained Ottoman nationality but were unable to return to 
Palestine immediately in order to claim their new citizenship. 
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The Diaspora and the Meanings of 
Palestinian Citizenship, 1925–1931
In 1927, the British Legation at La Paz, Bolivia rejected the cases of Palestinian Arab Sari Ismael and others who applied for recognition 
of their Palestinian citizenship under Article 2 of the 1925 Citizenship 
Order-in-Council. The rejection was based on the legation’s assessment 
that they did not intend to return to Palestine because their lengthy 
absence (seven years in Ismael’s case) supposedly indicated that con-
nections with their native homeland were severed. In an attempt to 
prove his case, Ismael even produced a laissez-passer from the Military 
Governor of Jerusalem that proved he was in Palestine as recently as 
1920. The legation assumed that the applicants were former Ottoman 
citizens and held Turkish nationality by default given that they were 
not resident in Palestine. Without a Turkish representative to confi rm 
or deny this, the British authorities in Bolivia could not grant visas 
to these Arabs to return to Palestine.1 As a result of the provisions 
of the citizenship legislation in Mandate Palestine, they remained in 
Bolivia as stateless individuals. Without any identity documentation 
they could not (and many emigrants did not wish to) naturalise as 
citizens of their host country. 
In the fi rst half of the 1920s, Great Britain’s administration of 
Palestine combined precedents of colonial citizenship with British 
legislation and international regulations to produce a set of provi-
sions that effectively created an entirely new Palestinian citizenship. 
As a response to legal realities on the ground, Palestinian Arabs 
articulated different ideas of what it meant to be a citizen in a local 
context. Only after the enforcement of the 1925 Palestine Citizen-
ship Order-in-Council did clearer notions of citizenship emerge out 
of the discursive fi eld of ‘the nation’. The primary factor that helped 
local Arabs to clarify the meaning of nationality, citizenship and 
rights for the wider public was the situation of Palestinian Arab 
emigrants. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the question 
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of the status of the emigrants (al-muhajarīn) actively created a space 
for the discussion of citizenship. It argues that emigrants acted out 
civic and political behaviours that linked citizenship with the con-
cept of nationality as the Arabs of the former Ottoman provinces 
understood it.2 This chapter sheds light on the new role taken by 
the Palestinian diaspora, or mahjar, after 1925 in the development 
of Palestinian civic identity. Despite this new civic identity and the 
subsequent increased grievances of emigrants who opposed the citi-
zenship legislation, internal and external factors hindered the ability 
of the mandate administration to resolve these grievances.
Two months before the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-
Council was published, a Foreign Offi ce offi cial noticed a ‘possibly 
incorrect part of Article 2’ of the order. The article gave Ottoman 
subjects born in Palestine and resident abroad just two years to 
exercise the right to claim Palestinian citizenship once the order-in-
council came into force in August 1925. The problem, as the offi cial 
noted, was that Article 34 of the internationally recognised Lausanne 
Treaty confl icted with Article 2 of the mandate’s citizenship order. 
Article 34 gave Ottoman nationals (who resided abroad) the right to 
take on the nationality of their successor state within two years after 
the treaty came into effect in August 1924. The Lausanne Treaty 
gave these former Ottomans until August 1926 to return to Palestine 
and take on citizenship, while the citizenship order-in-council gave 
the same individuals until August 1927 to do so. Former Ottoman 
natives living abroad who wished to acquire Palestinian nationality 
on the basis of their birth were required to return to Palestine six 
months prior to claiming their status with the intention to reside 
in the territory permanently. If they did not do so, they automati-
cally received Turkish nationality – although the means through 
which this took place were not elaborated upon – and were required 
to reside within the boundaries of the new Turkish republic. The 
Foreign Offi ce ultimately took no policy decision on the confl icting 
time limits before the ratifi cation of the citizenship order-in-council. 
Members doubted the necessity for an amendment, believing it was 
‘unlikely that there will be many applicants falling under Article 2 
of the Order’.3 Article 2 actually caused many years of controversy, 
problems and constant protests by the Palestinian Arab mahjar and 
their supporters at home. The history of this controversy, from the 
beginning of the British administration to 1931, is the subject of the 
current chapter.
First, it must be recalled that the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-
Council was indeed modifi ed by the high commissioner four months 
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after its announcement in order to bring Article 2 in line with Arti-
cle 34 of the Lausanne Treaty. The time period given to Ottoman 
nationals living abroad to opt for Palestinian nationality was short-
ened from two years to one. Furthermore, because these nationals 
were required to return to Palestine and reside there for six months 
before they could apply, and had to remain in Palestine as perma-
nent residents, they had less than a year to put their affairs in order 
and return from abroad. Despite the implications of the amendment, 
the immediate reactions among the mahjar communities were quite 
limited since British consuls failed to publicise the change. Most of 
the Arab population in Palestine was also initially unaware of the 
consequences of the order since Arabs born and resident in Palestine 
were granted citizenship automatically. The earliest reactions to the 
order can be found in the Arabic press in 1925 when a small number 
of articles started to call attention to some of its provisions. 
The Arab diaspora maintained a connection to Bilād al-Shām 
(Greater Syria) through the press. In the years before 1914, the Syr-
ian diaspora consisted of Arabs from the territories that later became 
Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Transjordan. Those emigrants from 
Palestine who lived in the United States and Latin America received 
copies of periodicals published in Palestine and printed their own 
newspapers. Akram Khater has shown that from 1892 to 1907, a 
total of twenty-one new Syrian Arab dailies, weeklies and month-
lies appeared in the US. The Arabic press grew in importance for 
emigrants, who themselves were exposed to at least one newspaper 
by the outbreak of the First World War. The mahjar press published 
commentary on the political, social and economic situation in the 
Levant, and shaped the self-perception as well as more worldly per-
ceptions of Arab emigrant communities in North America.4 The same 
can be presumed for Central and South American Turcos, or Arabic-
speaking émigré communities. Through discussions and editorials in 
newspapers, the diaspora localised ideas of liberal or republican citi-
zenship as related to Ottoman identity and nationality. At the same 
time, editors and journalists within Palestine who belonged to the 
educated middle-class nationalist stratum of society corresponded 
with relatives, colleagues and friends in the diaspora and encour-
aged the emigrants to write letters to newspapers. By 1919, these 
letters included stories about Palestinian communities abroad as well 
as commentaries on the mandate system and Zionism.
The connection between these communities and nationalist leaders 
in Palestine assisted the diaspora in crafting its own defi nition of Pal-
estinian citizenship. The present chapter draws on the argument made 
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by Engin Isin that citizens are actively ‘made’ through certain prac-
tices and expressions of belonging that mark individuals as part of the 
political, social, civic and cultural make-up of a nation.5 Citizenship, 
then, is transformed from an abstract concept to an active and negoti-
ated behaviour. The men and women born in Palestine who moved 
outside of the territory in the years before and during the fi rst decade 
of British administration were ‘made’ into Palestinian émigré citizens 
in the years before and after the 1925 order-in-council through social, 
political, cultural and symbolic associations shared between the mah-
jar and the Arab population of Palestine. Still even before the dissolu-
tion of the Ottoman Empire Palestinians abroad retained a sense of 
identifi cation with their homeland not only through the Arabic press 
but also as their communities formed mutual aid societies and chari-
ties, elected leaders for community associations and supported the 
national movement in Palestine.
The narrative of the Palestinian Arab diaspora is often lumped 
together with the general migration movements from the Levant 
that began in earnest in the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century.6 Arabs from the Ottoman province of Greater Syria and 
the Mutasarrifi yya of Mount Lebanon began to emigrate in large 
numbers in those decades. From 1860 to 1914, between 600,000 
and one million, as estimates vary, Arabic-speaking Ottomans born 
in Greater Syria left for the Americas. Despite this large number, 
about one-third returned home and did not permanently settle 
abroad. According to Kemal Karpat, the Ottoman Government 
often fi nanced the return and re-settlement of emigrants and only 
those who acquired a foreign nationality lost their Ottoman nation-
ality.7 The Americas attracted Arab migrants from southern Syria 
in the late nineteenth century and a large majority of these travel-
lers came from the environs of Bethlehem and Jerusalem. By the 
turn of the century, records show that Palestinian communities in 
the diaspora created clubs and associations for cultural exchange 
and mutual support and to govern their affairs. Immigration to 
the Americas intensifi ed at the turn of the twentieth century. Latin 
America was particularly attractive due to lenient immigration pol-
icies of states such as Argentina, Brazil and Honduras.8 Emigrants 
from both urban and rural areas of Syria took up work in business 
and commerce and some arrived to the Americas with enough capi-
tal to set up their own businesses. 
However, the situation in South and Central America, as well as 
Mexico, Cuba and Haiti, was often fraught with tension for immi-
grants. Like the Ottoman Empire’s provinces, a number of former 
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colonial territories of Latin America had recently achieved inde-
pendence and were often sites of both nationalist movements and 
confl ict. Tensions between socialist reformers and military-based dic-
tatorships turned violent in certain republics in the 1910s and 1920s. 
Some governments, including that of Haiti, did not maintain relations 
with the Ottoman Empire and anti-Arab sentiment was common.9 
The situation also meant that in Central and South America emi-
grants were more exposed to anti-colonial ideologies given the recent 
history of these countries. In the Americas, upheavals and changes 
in leadership did not always bode well with the Arabs’ own chang-
ing international statuses. With the end of the First World War and 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Arabs lost consular and 
diplomatic protection since their documentary identity as Ottoman 
nationals ceased to be internationally acceptable. The British were 
reluctant to offer diplomatic protection to Palestinian Arabs or other 
Syrians who resided abroad. It is in this international context and in 
the political system of newly created nation-states across the globe 
that the discussions and defi nitions of Palestinian nationality and 
citizenship can be situated. 
The Palestinian Arab Mahjar and Civic Identity, 1918–1925
From the onset of the Palestine Administration, a large number of 
Arabs who had emigrated in the years prior to 1920 but who wished 
to travel elsewhere or return to either reside or visit their homeland 
confronted practical problems. Their loss of Ottoman nationality, 
since they were not physically present in the Ottoman realms, meant 
that they did not have valid passports after 1918 and thus they could 
not claim consular protection. Signifi cantly, they were also denied 
entry to Palestine as members of its indigenous population. As a 
result, despite birth in Palestine and the fact that many emigrants paid 
taxes upon land and property they held in the territory’s urban and 
rural districts, they could not take part in elections. From the start of 
the British military occupation in 1918 these Arabs identifi ed them-
selves as ‘Palestinians’ and former Ottoman subjects in letters of pro-
test sent to the military government and to newspapers in Palestine. 
This section explores when and how the emigrants acquired aware-
ness as Palestinian citizens. Constant networks and links with Syria 
allowed emigrants to hold on to, or in some cases enhance, national 
and nationalist identities with their place of birth. These links and the 
discussions and notions of identity that allowed Palestinian Arabs to 
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maintain their connections to the territory of Palestine did not stay 
static but rather shifted and changed in response to the political situa-
tions both in the diaspora and within the mandate borders.
A clear theme in the earliest correspondence between the dias-
pora communities and individuals and nationalist organisations in 
Palestine, such as the Muslim–Christian Association (MCA) and the 
Arab Executive was the idea that the Palestinians formed part of a 
larger Arab nation. The basis for the ideological Arab nation was an 
awareness of a common ethnicity. With the formation of national 
associations that advocated the abrogation of the Jewish national 
home policy immediately after the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, 
groups and individuals in Palestine began to refer to themselves as 
sons or natives of Palestine (abnā’ Filastīn). The émigré associa-
tions, often formed as religious or mutual aid societies, developed 
a marked nationalist outlook. Intellectuals, journalists and political 
activists, and also ordinary men and women in the diaspora who 
embraced Arab nationalism prior to 1914 contributed to the forma-
tion of national clubs and associations.10 Once the alarming news of 
the terms of the war settlement and the threat posed by the Jewish 
national home policy reached these communities, their organisations 
became increasingly political in nature. Despite a growing social and 
economic stratifi cation within Arab emigrant communities in places 
such as Brazil, Maria del Mar Logrono Narbona argues quite rightly 
that the migrant Arab intellectuals in such dynamic transnational 
communities mobilised political support from afar when needed 
during the early post-war years of British and French colonialism in 
the Levant.11 
In the years after the war, the evolution of the new international 
world system created a stark separation between imperial and post-
colonial nation-states. The Arab emigrants in the United States would 
certainly have been exposed to the rhetoric of President Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points for self-determination and they possibly experienced 
the practical application of concepts like democracy, political repre-
sentation, and sovereignty of government. Throughout 1918, numer-
ous clubs sent letters and signed petitions to the MCA in Palestine, 
Emir Faisal in Damascus, King George V, the military administra-
tion in Palestine and the League of Nations that expressed their sup-
port for an independent Syrian nation and their opposition to the 
Balfour Declaration. Petition-writers usually identifi ed themselves as 
part of ‘the Palestinian Colony’ of their host country. For example, in 
November 1918, the Palestinian community of San Salvador signed 
a protest addressed to King George that stated its opposition to the 
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Zionist ambitions in Palestine. Signifi cantly, they signed the protest 
as ‘the Palestinians’ suggesting that in only a short period of time the 
community’s awareness changed from that of Syrian Arab to specifi -
cally Palestinian. Alongside the assertion of their growing recognition 
of a political identity as a group, emigrants expressed new concerns 
for their status vis-à-vis Great Britain. In 1919 the signatories of a 
letter to Prime Minister Lloyd George asked if the Palestinian Arabs 
came under the diplomatic protection of Great Britain.12 The shift in 
identity that was partly prompted by the British occupation of the ter-
ritory that became the Palestine Mandate led diaspora communities 
to question their national, as well as diplomatic, allegiances. 
By the early 1920s, the émigré organisations had started to voice 
the concept of national ‘duties’ as an important element in the defi -
nition of modern civic identity. These duties referred to actions of 
other members of the community that would benefi t the community 
as a whole. Traditionally, mutual aid and welfare societies existed in 
the Arab diaspora and offered support and assistance to emigrants 
from the same regions of Palestine. Members also often supported 
Arabs at home: a number of clubs in places like San Salvador and 
Monterrey sent money to help refugees, the poor and the needy of 
or in certain Palestinian towns and villages. After the end of the 
war, the emigrant members of mutual aid societies increasingly dis-
cussed and emphasised that the organisations and their members had 
political duties as well: they elected representatives in their own 
societies and gave support to candidates for local urban and village 
government in Palestine and for particular nationalist politicians.13 
Palestinians in El Salto, Mexico publicised elections for their local 
society by stating that the society was committed to continuing the 
defence of Palestinian rights from abroad.14 Candidates portrayed 
themselves as supportive of the anti-Zionist actions undertaken by 
notable nationalist leaders in Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jaffa. The 
groups advocated that their members support other types of active 
duties. For instance, the Palestine Renaissance Society in New York 
appealed in 1923 for continued support of the jihad (struggle) against 
colonialism in Palestine. The use of the term ‘jihad’ mirrored the 
rhetoric used in Palestine by the MCA and the Arab Executive and 
in newspaper articles, and it contributed to the horizontal accultura-
tion of a specifi cally Palestinian civic identity, and the notion that all 
social classes struggled towards the greater good of ending British 
colonialism and Zionism.15 
Prior to the publication of the Palestine Citizenship Order-in-
Council in 1925, newspapers, national congresses and delegations to 
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London paid little attention to potential troubles for the emigrants. 
The middle-class Arab nationalists initially viewed this varied and 
large group as a branch of the national movement similarly opposed 
to Britain’s support for Zionism. In the years before the ratifi cation of 
the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924, the Mandate administration had not 
yet differentiated between residents abroad and permanent residents, 
and thus emigrants who kept Ottoman nationality faced no explicit 
threat to their status as Palestinian Arabs. Rather, the Palestinian 
press published letters and commentary from the general public that 
described the nationalism of their brothers in the diaspora and their 
continued service to the nation. Even so, some of these same pieces 
of commentary stressed that the emigrants return home to Palestine, 
noting with alarm the increasing number of Jewish immigrants in 
the country.16 Only with the offi cial implementation of the Lausanne 
Treaty and the subsequent citizenship order did the legal status of the 
emigrants become more tenuous and ambiguous. 
By the mid-1920s the emigrants’ diffi culties with regard to travel 
and identifi cation became clear to their families in Palestine. Individ-
uals who wished to return to Palestine or to travel outside their host 
country needed a passport or laissez-passer as verifi cation of their 
identity. In order to receive temporary travel documents, they needed 
to prove that they were born in Palestine and had been Ottoman 
nationals. The frequent inability of emigrants to produce such docu-
mentation is evidenced in letters sent to newspapers in Palestine. In 
September 1920 an editorial in Jerusalem’s Arabic newspaper Mir’at 
al-Sharq criticised the hesitation of the immigration department of 
the civil administration to assist travellers or to approve their appli-
cations for travel documents. It also condemned the failure of the 
authorities to provide necessary facilities for Palestinians in transit.17 
At that time, British consuls lacked experience or standard advice 
on the treatment of Palestinians who lived abroad but retained Otto-
man nationality and identity documents. By the latter half of 1922 
the Colonial Offi ce reported several cases that attested to the confu-
sion of consuls. The District Offi cer in Bethlehem received a letter 
from a native of that town describing how a British consul refused his 
application for a passport in order to leave South America to return 
to Palestine. The author explained that he was forced to apply for 
a French passport as an Ottoman national born in Syria, and trav-
elled to Palestine with it. Shortly after, a Palestinian in Chile wrote a 
letter to his mother and explained that he, too, was unable to leave 
Chile for Palestine on British travel documents and instead received 
a passport from the French consul. In a third case, the British consul 
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in Mexico stated that he had no instructions to issue passports to 
Palestinians.18 
Although Palestinian emigrants and travellers voiced their griev-
ances to the Mandate authorities and to newspapers they received 
little assistance as the international position of Palestine before 1922 
remained ambiguous. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
in 1918, many emigrants expressed their desire to be under Brit-
ish protection but not necessarily to return home. The question of 
diplomatic protection came to the fore in 1924 when revolutionary 
violence broke out in Honduras, a country then home to a large 
Palestinian community. A number of military-backed coups and 
uprisings took place against the government after the 1919 civil war. 
The country’s second civil war that broke out in 1924 led to more 
than 5,000 deaths and the destruction of millions of dollars’ worth 
of property. The Palestinian community in La Ceiba was directly 
affected. Its members reported that all of their shops and homes were 
damaged or destroyed in ‘the guerilla insurgency of the country’. 
The threat to the Palestinian Arabs combined with the assumption 
of the community as constituted of Palestinian citizens led inhabit-
ants to appeal to British consular offi cials in Honduras. However, 
the community received no fi nancial or political assistance from the 
consuls and found that Great Britain expressed no interest in pro-
viding diplomatic protection to the native Palestinians. Community 
members addressed the British Government through letters sent to 
the press in Palestine, arguing that the ‘international and humanitar-
ian duty of the English state [was] to defend the rights of the natives 
of Palestine who have no one to defend them’.19 They wrote to the 
Palestine Administration and the League of Nations that the duty of 
the British Government was to protect and assist individuals from 
the territories it administered. As a result, the Palestinians asked the 
League to put pressure on Great Britain to extend its protection to 
the Palestinians living abroad. 
Back in Palestine, Bethlehem’s newspaper Sawt al-Sha‘b, comment-
ing on the events in Honduras, stated that Great Britain had a major 
role to protect all Palestinian citizens.20 The Arabic press in Palestine 
claimed the emigrants to be British subjects, which further reinforced 
the way the emigrants viewed themselves as citizens of the mandate. 
On that basis, it came as a surprise to Arab observers when Great 
Britain did not offer to support the Palestinians who demanded com-
pensation from the Honduran Government.21 When a similar situa-
tion took place in Brazil after uprisings in August 1924, Sawt al-Sha‘b 
stressed again the British responsibility to protect Palestinian lives and 
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property, and to safeguard the rights of ‘the citizens’ in the diaspora. 
The threats faced by emigrants in Latin America led to the placement 
of discussions on the meaning of Palestinian nationality squarely on 
the front pages of newspapers, which stressed the citizenship of these 
emigrant Palestinian Arabs with increasing frequency.22
The problems the emigrants faced in terms of both consular pro-
tection and re-entry to Palestine remained unsolved by the end of 
1924. Members of the diaspora, the press in Palestine and national 
leaders juxtaposed the rights of Arab emigrants with those of their 
Jewish counterparts. Journalists and local leaders found it diffi cult to 
accept the denial by the administration to allow emigrants to return 
to Palestine. Press reports explained to readers that elsewhere in the 
world individuals were not forbidden to return to their homelands 
simply because they temporarily resided elsewhere. One writer, argu-
ing that the purpose of the newspaper is to enlighten and guide the 
people to their rights, instructed Palestinian emigrants to report to 
their nearest British consul to prove their Ottoman nationality in 
order to receive travel papers. The author added the advice that if 
an emigrant found that the consul was not satisfi ed with the docu-
ments he or she possessed, relatives in Palestine could request that 
the administration allow that emigrant to enter mandated territory.23 
Great Britain, on the other hand, fi rst and foremost lacked the facili-
ties to grant diplomatic protection to individual Arabs who did not 
carry any passport, or carried an expired Ottoman identity docu-
ment and little else. The mandate administration could only address 
certain issues with consular protection since the task to actually pro-
vide regulations and guidelines on British protection fell upon the 
Foreign Offi ce. The Foreign Offi ce did not necessarily have consular 
offi ces or staff in certain parts of Latin America and neither it nor the 
administration held records of resident Palestinians. 
Despite this, Palestinians placed the blame for the emigrants’ situ-
ation squarely upon the Mandate Government. In late 1924 before 
the fi nal drafts of the nationality order became known to Palestin-
ian leaders, some writers published articles detailing what they knew 
about the situation of the emigrants in terms of consular protection 
and documentary identity. A common theme in Jerusalem’s newspa-
pers was the contrast between the refusal by the administration to 
recognise the nationality of the Arab emigrants as Palestinian and the 
facilities available for every Jewish immigrant to obtain provisional 
Palestinian nationality. One Arab writer asked if such provisions 
were ‘not an apparent assault on the highest of our rights’.24 Prior 
to the issuance of the citizenship order, nationalist journalists and 
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activists viewed the emigrants not as former Ottomans (the British 
classifi cation of these individuals) but as Palestinian natives entitled 
to the same status as any other Arab born in Palestine. Writers con-
tinued to blame British offi cials in the absence of any offi cial attempt 
to address the problems caused by immigration and provisional citi-
zenship legislation prior to the late 1920s.
In 1925, British consuls received instructions from the mandate 
administration in connection with the Honduras affair: the admin-
istration asked that nationality certifi cates not be granted to non-
permanent residents of Palestine.25 The impact of the instruction was 
limited. The Foreign Offi ce failed to apply the policy in a uniform 
manner as even its permanent offi cials disagreed on the diplomatic 
approach towards the Palestinian diaspora. The case of Palestinian 
textile merchants normally resident in Port-au-Prince, Haiti serves 
to illustrate the failure to standardise policy on former Ottoman 
nationals who resided in the newly mandated territories granted by 
the League of Nations to Great Britain. In the early summer of 1925 
a group of merchants requested certifi cates to enable them to travel 
as Palestinians to Great Britain and the US for business purposes. 
Initially, the Foreign Offi ce allowed for travel on the basis of their 
Ottoman nationality but warned that no further protection could 
be given by British consulates until the merchants could prove that 
they held Palestinian citizenship as opposed to only expired Otto-
man identity papers. One Palestinian merchant in Port-au-Prince 
expressed the feeling of the victimisation of Palestinians who worked 
abroad with no acceptable identity documents, arguing that the Jew-
ish national home policy was ‘an attempt . . . to force [Arabs] to 
surrender their Palestinian citizenship’. He added, in a letter to the 
Foreign Offi ce, that provisional certifi cates of nationality held by 
some former Ottomans posed practical problems in that they did not 
guarantee diplomatic protection by Britain or France.26 In response 
to the merchants, the mandate administration continued to stress 
its opposition, and that of the Foreign Offi ce, to granting Palestin-
ian provisional nationality to individuals deemed to want that status 
only in order to receive the protection of Great Britain. The specifi cs 
of the merchants’ situation and request to travel on valid passports 
did not receive further attention by the authorities.
The claims by Palestinians in Honduras remained unresolved by 
the end of 1925. The British Foreign Offi ce stood by their own pol-
icy that did not permit Arabs to claim British protection unless they 
had proof of Palestinian citizenship. Natives in consular districts 
could only obtain Palestinian citizenship if they proved their birth 
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in Palestine rather than elsewhere in the Ottoman provinces and if 
they had not given up Ottoman nationality during their residence 
abroad. As the citizenship order required, these individuals could 
only claim their right to Palestinian citizenship if they complied with 
the residency provision, meaning permanent residence in that ter-
ritory. To enter Palestine, emigrants had to possess emergency cer-
tifi cates approved by the Chief Secretary of the Permit Section of 
the Palestine Government. Upon arrival to Palestine’s shores, these 
natives were often treated as immigrants rather than as indigenous 
to the territory.27 Meanwhile in Great Britain, the Foreign Offi ce offi -
cially decided that every applicant must demonstrate that it would 
be ‘reasonable and proper for him to be under British rather than 
Turkish protection’.28 Such a subjective policy placed yet another 
obstacle before the emigrants.
The impact of British policies concerning the nationality of 
native Palestinians living outside of Palestine was as negative as 
it was unclear. From 1918 to 1925, the confusion grew as to the 
proper international status of the emigrants, to whom these Arabs 
could turn to for consular assistance, and how to travel with invalid 
Ottoman documents. As British offi cials drafted nationality legis-
lation for Palestine, the practical impact of their legislation upon 
the émigré communities was not thoroughly considered. Mandate 
offi cials were also somewhat oblivious of that fact that the members 
of diaspora communities believed themselves to be citizens of Pales-
tine. In the years before 1925 in spite of the distance that separated 
the mahjar from the mashriq, the émigré communities grasped the 
awareness of a specifi cally Palestinian national and civic identity. 
Nationality as Citizenship: Ideological Concepts and 
Active Practices in the Diaspora and at Home, 1925–1931
Once the provisions of the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council 
became known, the denial of jus sanguinis and jus soli citizenship to 
Arab emigrants became a story reported in Palestine’s Arabic news-
papers. In published letters to friends, family, newspaper editors and 
the mandate administration, emigrants criticised what they argued 
to be the administration’s failure to grant them ipso facto citizen-
ship. Importantly, émigré Palestinian Arabs depicted nationality as 
a right connected to birth in Palestine and Arab ethnicity. In often 
strong language, some emigrants argued that the citizenship order 
was tantamount to the removal of Arab ethnicity from Palestine, a 
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notion that newspapers picked up fairly quickly. The debates over 
the situation of the emigrants led to a particular discussion on, and 
demand for, what the emigrants and their supporters termed ‘the 
right to return’ (haqq al-‘awda). 
Only a few months before the Treaty of Lausanne timeframe 
passed for the former Ottoman subjects to opt for the nationality of 
their new territories in the middle of 1926, ‘Isa Bandak, the populist, 
anti-colonial editor of Bethlehem’s Sawt al-Sha‘b, wrote that no less 
than 20,000 Palestinian Arabs living or travelling abroad had no 
one to defend their interests. Since they did not have valid national-
ity documents, these Arabs could not obtain consular protection.29 
Bandak, like others such as Arab Executive President Musa Kazim 
al-Husayni, a number of middle-class nationalists and members of 
diaspora associations, were baffl ed by the situation. They found it 
diffi cult to reconcile their idea of citizenship as based on an under-
standing of nationality as rooted in both Arab ethnicity and Ottoman 
imperial subjecthood with the defi nition of citizenship provided by 
the 1925 Order-in-Council. To Bandak and Musa Kazim, it seemed 
natural that the thousands of emigrants could do nothing but keep 
their Ottoman nationality after the end of the First World War. On 
the basis of that former nationality, it further seemed reasonable and 
proper that Arabs born under the Ottoman Empire would automati-
cally receive the citizenship of their new mandate administrations. 
The pages of Sawt al-Sha‘b by early 1926 contained numerous 
explanations for the restrictions created by the citizenship order. 
Prominently, the newspaper’s articles expressed the growing fear 
that the order constituted a ploy to increase Jewish immigration at 
the expense of the citizenship of Arabs born in Palestine. With the 
expiration of the citizenship order’s retroactive two-year timeframe 
in August 1926, Bandak confronted the administration in his editori-
als over the limited measures taken to facilitate the naturalisation of 
Ottoman subjects absent from their homes in August 1924, and of 
those whose applications had been refused. He wondered if orders 
had been uniformly distributed to all British consuls and whether the 
orders were intended to deprive emigrants from ‘the right to return 
to their country and enjoy [British] political and consular protec-
tion’. Bandak urged action: he implored the emigrants ‘to rush off to 
the [British] consul to review the means for understanding national-
ity’ and to write back to families detailing the obstacles they faced.30 
He stressed that emigrants should not lose their ‘right’ to citizenship 
(haqq al-jinsiyya) and reported that many emigrants failed to register 
as Ottoman nationals in British consulates. He urged them to notify 
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consuls that they were Palestinian natives.31 Thus, Bandak’s newspa-
per set in motion a discourse that came to circulate in Palestine and 
the diaspora, which blamed Great Britain for deliberate discrimina-
tion against the Arabs in favour of their support for the aims of the 
Zionist Organisation in Palestine.
Bandak’s efforts to bring attention to the citizenship order’s pro-
visions made headway among Arab communities in Latin America. 
This is probably due to Bandak’s outspoken presence in Bethlehem, a 
town that had been a historical centre of migration and that retained 
a strong connection with émigré communities. New social organisa-
tions such as youth, sport and local patriotic clubs played a role 
as well in that members explained the situation of the emigrants to 
interested individuals. Local leaders and residents lobbied the govern-
ment to extend the August 1926 deadline set to apply for citizenship. 
Like Bandak, these lobbyists came primarily from the area around 
Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Ramallah, and they used their position 
as middle-class nationalists – newspaper editors, municipal council 
leaders, lawyers and members of prominent families – to publicise 
the situation of the diaspora in public meetings. These local leaders 
closely scrutinised citizenship legislation in both Great Britain and 
in Palestine and they appealed to the rest of the population through 
manifestos and open letters. 
Among the Arabic periodicals, it was Sawt al-Sha‘b that solicited 
the largest number of letters from Palestinians in the Republic of 
El Salvador, Honduras and Brazil throughout 1926. The Palestin-
ian community in El Salvador had especially strong ties to Bethle-
hem. The author of one of these letters noted that emigrants from 
Bethlehem did not want to go through the process of naturalisation 
in other countries. Instead, they wanted what he termed automatic 
‘rightful nationality’. He added that the British consul refused to give 
citizenship documents to the children of Palestinian residents of El 
Salvador on the pretext that they were natives of their country of 
birth – El Salvador.32 Another letter stressed that ‘[one] does not lose 
nationality’ as the Ottoman nationality law provided for the trans-
mission of nationality through descent.33 This letter demonstrates 
the expectation that mandate citizenship legislation would be in line 
with familiar Ottoman precedents. 
Other newspapers took the lead from Bandak and referred 
to his editorials on the citizenship order and also printed letters 
from the diaspora. Articles, often on the front pages of newspa-
pers, urged citizens to hold meetings to study the citizenship law 
and its implications for emigrants, and to review those orders that 
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the Foreign Offi ce circulated to consuls. In mid-May 1926, the 
Bethlehem Nationalist Society planned to hold a meeting with the 
notables and village leaders of Jerusalem municipality in order to 
discuss the status and treatment of children born outside of Pales-
tine.34 Bandak and other local leaders then wrote open letters to 
High Commissioner Plumer. This dialogue between the press, the 
emigrants and nationalists in Palestine reinforced ideas of ethno-
nationality as it developed in relation to jus sanguinis acquisition 
of citizenship and in opposition to the colonial-style citizenship 
imposed by the mandate administration. 
As the press and political and social organisations received letters 
from emigrants, a number of assumptions associated with provisions 
of the citizenship order came to the fore. The most common to emerge 
was, as noted previously, the British favouritism for Jewish immigra-
tion to Palestine. One journalist wrote that the Palestine Government 
realised the Jews were not applying in large numbers for Palestinian 
nationality because of their lack of confi dence in the national home-
land. He claimed that in response, ‘the English put in place a deliber-
ately strange plan which is more evidence of favouritism toward the 
Jews and their interests’. As part of that strange plan, he continued, 
the administration allowed for immigrants to unoffi cially hold dual 
nationality.35 The accusation of favouritism had a profound impact 
on Arab society, which had been inundated with anti-Zionist propa-
ganda. The citizenship legislation was touted as hard proof of a future 
takeover of the mandate government by the Zionist leaders. The press 
noted the irony of the policy that restricted any stateless former Otto-
man national from Palestinian citizenship if he held another national-
ity, whereas Jewish immigrants could hold dual nationality. 
Another theme stressed in light of the emigrants’ situation was 
that of colonial ‘injustice’ embodied by the citizenship order. One 
writer asked whether justice meant that ‘the government [can] 
deprive the Arab natives of Palestine the entitlement to their native 
nationality . . . [of] parents and grandparents while [the govern-
ment makes] it easy for outsiders to obtain Palestinian nationality?’ 
The sensational and outraged tone of many letters sometimes war-
ranted responses from offi cials in Palestine and Great Britain. Sawt 
al-Sha‘b printed these replies as well. In one response, the colonial 
secretary expressed confi dence that a large segment of the diaspora 
undoubtedly applied for nationality in the time allotted to do so. 
As the press pointed out, and as records demonstrate, the mandate 
did not publish estimates of the number of emigrants who returned 
to Palestine to claim citizenship.36 
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The public assertion that Ottoman nationality translated into 
Palestinian citizenship struck a chord with members of the Arab 
Executive. Musa Kazim met with Colonial Secretary Leopold Amery 
in the summer of 1926 to discuss the issues of consular protection 
and the status of Palestinians abroad. During the meeting, Musa 
Kazim pointedly told Amery that the public held the British responsi-
ble for having transformed Palestinian emigrants into ‘orphans from 
the government’.37 At the same time, Bandak and other local leaders 
in Bethlehem arranged a meeting with the secretary of the Executive, 
Jamal al-Husayni, to discuss the situation of the Palestinians during 
the Honduras crisis as they were threatened with anti-Arab sentiment 
and expulsion as a result of Honduran immigration legislation.38 
At the end of August 1926, Bandak joined Musa Kazim and oth-
ers in another meeting with colonial offi cials in Jerusalem to discuss 
the obligations of the mandatory to the emigrants and to ask for an 
extension of the deadline for natives to claim citizenship. Secretary 
Amery refused to discuss changes to the order or increase assistance 
for the emigrants. Musa Kazim then drafted an open letter to the 
administration to ask that the timeframe of the citizenship order 
be extended one year and to stress that some emigrants were not 
informed of the order as many had never received notice of it. In 
addition, he pointed out that these individuals faced the diffi cult task 
of arranging to leave their countries of residence permanently in the 
short time span envisaged by the legislation. The law itself, Musa 
Kazim added, was diffi cult to understand for even competent legal 
authorities.39 
The émigré communities in Latin America followed reports of the 
meetings on citizenship legislation between national leaders and colo-
nial offi cials. They noted the lobbyist efforts on their behalf, as these 
efforts elicited important debates on the so-called right to return. In 
1926, the United Palestinian Society in Honduras submitted a peti-
tion to the Executive asking that its members hold the government 
to their ‘duty to protect’ the emigrants’ property and lives.40 Several 
months later as debates continued over the refusal by immigration 
authorities in Palestine to allow natives to enter the territory without 
recognised citizenship, Jerusalem’s al-Jamiyya al-‘Arabiyya included 
an article that equated the denial of travel facilities to a negation 
of the Palestinians’ right to return to their original homeland.41 By 
early 1927, the emigrants’ supporters in Palestine had appropriated 
the phrase. In fact, as the Palestine immigration authorities routinely 
denied visas and entry to returning emigrants, the ‘right to return’ 
became a loaded phrase. It brought to light the key argument in 
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support of the emigrants’ rights to citizenship, namely that the order’s 
provisions should account for both jus sanguinis and jus soli national-
ity. Conversations on the right to return emphasised a birth-right to 
not only nationality but of belonging to a particular nation. 
As the country began to experience economic problems in the 
latter 1920s, local leaders appealed to the mandate administration 
using economic arguments in an attempt to convince offi cials of the 
fi nancial benefi ts offered by the return of emigrants. These lead-
ers tried to convince the administration that Palestine could only 
achieve independence if the Arab community had the same eco-
nomic opportunities as the Jewish immigrant community. The local 
Arab leadership explained that the future economic independence 
of the Palestinian Arab community would be hampered if the Brit-
ish government denied the emigrants’ right to return to Palestine as 
citizens. These emigrants, they noted, would return with expertise 
in business and commerce. A group of local leaders in Bethlehem 
wrote to the high commissioner that the town’s emigrants, who had 
long been a source of prosperity, faced not only the deprivation of 
their ‘civil, political and social rights through no fault of their own’ 
but that their lack of citizenship potentially meant a future of ‘urban 
decay’ for Bethlehem and other towns in the country.42 Letters urged 
the government to be aware that ‘Arab emigrants in all corners of 
the globe’ will protest to Great Britain and the League of Nations 
against the citizenship order-in-council on economic and political 
grounds.43 Musa Kazim advocated action, telling Palestinians that 
each had the duty to ‘stand up in order to defend [the emigrants’] 
rights, which are our rights’.44 In the two years after the citizenship 
order-in-council, the slogan ‘the right to nationality’ became syn-
onymous with the ‘right to return’. Lawyers, writers and other lead-
ers urged concerned citizens to begin grassroots, civil-society-based 
initiatives to organise delegations to lobby certain offi cials and the 
British public, and to begin a letter-writing campaign.
In parallel to events within Palestine, emigrants started simi-
lar grassroots-style campaigns to protest the citizenship order-in-
council. In the summer of 1927 ‘Isa al-‘Isa, the editor of Jaffa’s 
Filastīn, published a communiqué from Mexico’s Society for Pal-
estinian Unity. After protests sent to the mandate government and 
to Great Britain by Mexico’s Palestinian community went unan-
swered, the Society sent a delegation to Mexico City to meet with 
the British ambassador and discuss citizenship issues. The delega-
tion included members of other Arab groups throughout Mexico.45 
D. V. Kelly, the ambassador, promised to do all he possibly could 
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but complained to the delegation that his own government denied 
his request to print the notice of the amendment of the citizen-
ship order issued in November 1925 because it was too expensive.46 
The Society for Palestinian Unity succeeded in attracting greater 
attention in Mexico to the problems posed by the citizenship order. 
Its members used rhetorical tones, for instance stating that ‘every 
one of us is willing to sacrifi ce ourselves to raise this injustice and 
to receive our legitimate rights given to us by nature itself and 
approved by our birth . . . [it is] this nationality which the English 
are trying to remove from us to implement Zionism’.47 Ambassador 
Kelly forwarded Palestinian grievances to the Foreign Offi ce, and 
explained that the delegation represented 3,000 to 4,000 Palestin-
ians in Mexico alone – not an insignifi cant number.48 
The tone of the emigrants’ complaints became more angry and 
anxious. Al-Jamiyya al-‘Arabiyya published a letter from the same 
group, which accused the British authorities of creating the law 
on citizenship in order to ‘lessen the Arab race and strengthen the 
Jewish race’. The writers’ citation of the administration’s immigra-
tion policy bolstered this claim of ethnic discrimination. The letter 
of protest added that ‘there is not a force in this world which can 
remove our rights . . . for us, it is the blood in our veins and we have 
the right to nationality and naturalisation in the beloved homeland’. 
Its tone alone drew attention, and informed the views of Palestinian 
national leaders and activists on nationality as an ancestral right.49 
It was indeed powerful rhetoric: sensational, political and easily 
understood on a popular level. 
The tone of the petitions, however, varied. Reading through these 
petitions, the writing of some demonstrates the willingness of mem-
bers of the diaspora to negotiate with Jewish land brokers in the 
case of denials to return to Palestine. For instance, in the summer 
of 1927, the Permanent Mandates Commission received a petition 
from Palestinian Arabs in Honduras signed by men who owned land 
in Palestine. The signatories, all Palestinian by birth, protested col-
lectively ‘as a result of the High Commissioner’s refusal to recognise 
us as citizens of Palestine’. Yet, as they owned thousands of acres in 
their homeland, they asked to be informed of Jewish bankers and 
fi nanciers who were willing to buy land from Palestinians who lived 
abroad. The signatories requested that they be told of their citizen-
ship status, when they would receive permission to return to their 
‘beloved homeland’ and to which fl ag they owed their allegiance.50 
From these statements it is clear that two years after the publication 
of the citizenship order-in-council, emigrant communities remained 
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unsure of their nationality and their status in relation to Great 
Britain.
Finally, the actions of Palestinians in the Americas inspired pro-
tests by the diaspora in other areas such as in Egypt. In early 1928, 
twenty Palestinian students at Cairo’s al-Azhar University wrote to 
High Commissioner Plumer to explain that the situation of Palestin-
ians in Egypt resembled that of those in Latin America. Many stu-
dents had been unable to give up their studies and return to reside 
permanently in Palestine at the time of the citizenship order. They 
could not renew their passports or receive new passports to return to 
Palestine. The students asked the high commissioner if they should 
change their nationality ‘so that the Jews replace us in our home-
land?’51 The students, like the Arab emigrants in Latin America, 
argued that the citizenship order discriminated against them on the 
basis of their Arab nationality. By the end of the 1920s the lack of a 
concrete response from British offi cials over problems posed by the 
citizenship order did little to dispel the claims by the emigrants and 
their supporters that the mandate laws favoured Jewish immigrants. 
The lack of a resolution helped refi ne the meaning of the ‘right’ to 
citizenship in the Palestinian Arab context. Ottoman nationality and 
the jus sanguinis and jus soli means of its acquisition set the obvious 
precedent for Palestine’s leaders in their conceptualisation of the two 
statuses. In the mid-1920s, this particular rhetorical language aided 
the emigrants’ sense of identifi cation as Palestinians, as suggested by 
their writings to family and supporters at home. The links between 
associations and the Arabic press in Palestine with the diaspora gal-
vanised concerned nationalists into action. Alongside these requests 
by emigrants to meet with consular offi cials were telegrams and let-
ters of protest and appeals to the mandate administration. By 1927, 
administrators in Palestine and in London had little choice but to 
address the citizenship order’s restrictions. 
The Committee for the Defence of Arab Emigrant 
Rights to Palestinian Citizenship
The work of ‘Isa Bandak, the most active lobbyist for the emi-
grants, was not only confi ned to writing editorials and present-
ing grievances to colonial offi cials. Bandak’s other contribution to 
resolve the emigrant situation was the formation of an association 
of citizens in Bethlehem that aimed to educate Palestinian Arabs 
about the citizenship order. The fi rst mention of the Committee 
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for the Defence of Arab Emigrant Rights to Palestinian Nationality 
(al-lajna li-ladifā‘ ‘an huquq al-muhājarīn al-‘arab ala al-jinsiyya 
al-fi lastīniyya), or the DAER, appears in Sawt al-Sha‘b just after 
the formation of the committee in 1927. The committee’s role in 
shaping concepts of nationality and citizenship is the focus of this 
section. The DAER committee was instrumental for three reasons. 
First, DAER emerged as the central organisation through which the 
opinions, protests and demands of the emigrants could be voiced. 
As embodied in this role, the committee aimed to become the lead-
ing representative of the Palestinians on nationality issues and a 
mediator between the emigrants and both the London and Palestine 
administrations. It lobbied for changes to the citizenship legislation 
to benefi t all native-born Palestinians. Second, the DAER commit-
tee made a point to address the British public in its appeals, using a 
grassroots approach to lobbyist efforts. Finally, aside from appeal-
ing to Great Britain, the committee crafted an internationalist rhet-
oric on the right to nationality and the larger problems posed by 
the administration’s legislation in Palestine. 
The DAER committee members saw their organisation as the 
‘expert’ on Palestinian nationality legislation. The secretary, Khalil 
‘Isa Muqas, explained the duty of the committee as to provide the 
necessary facilities and guidance on the subject of nationality.52 
Although the committee billed itself as the voice of the emigrants, 
its leaders initially did not represent a wide variety of Palestinians as 
they were elected by the inhabitants of Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit 
Sahour. Soon after its formation, however, the committee proposed 
to hold a conference of Palestinian intellectuals who would discuss 
the seriousness of the emigrant question and lobby the government 
in a representative capacity. The DAER committee recruited its 
members in municipalities from which large numbers of emigrants 
originally came. The membership seems to have been mostly repre-
sentative of the nationalist middle-class and included local political 
and religious leaders, writers and lawyers.53 The committee relied on 
reports of émigré associations in order to compile its fi gures of the 
total numbers of Palestinians living abroad. Since none of DAER’s 
listed members held an offi cial position in the administration or in 
the Department of Migration and Statistics, these fi gures do not 
match the British totals of emigrants or even the totals printed in 
Arab newspapers. Despite the discrepancies, the sizeable fi gures 
reported made an impression upon the Palestinian Arab public. 
By mid-1927, DAER claimed to represent the (over-estimated) fi gure 
of 50,000 Palestinian natives who were denied their nationality.54 
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After its formation, the committee fi rst lobbied High Commis-
sioner Plumer and other offi cials in the Mandate administration. 
Claiming to speak for all emigrant Arabs, its leaders offered aims 
and demands in a memorandum sent to the high commissioner in 
early 1928. The document was not anti-British: it condemned citi-
zenship legislation, but hinted that the committee believed that the 
British did not intend to deprive the majority of emigrants from 
‘their natural civil rights’. The lobbyists stressed the economic com-
ponent of the emigrant situation as they reminded Plumer that most 
emigrants owned immovable property and real estate in Palestine 
that was subject to taxation.55 The committee started out with cau-
tious appeals to the economic necessity of granting citizenship to the 
emigrants in its fi rst memorandum, and its leaders became increas-
ingly vocal.
The initial response by the Colonial Offi ce to DAER’s claims was 
not an encouraging one. Colonial Secretary Amery stated his belief 
that the Palestinian communities in South America had no connection 
with Palestine and no intention to return to settle. On these grounds 
he thought that the principles to decide on nationality applications 
were ‘quite fair and equitable’.56 Other colonial offi cials responded 
to the committee differently and in contrast to Amery some took 
note of the economic aspect of the demands. One offi cial wrote to 
Under-Secretary Ormsby-Gore that the committee’s memorandum 
brought up very important questions that affected the nationality of 
those Arabs abroad who had ‘very considerable material interests in 
Palestine’. He suggested that a general grant of citizenship would not 
merely be an act of fairness in order to solve the problem of Palestin-
ian Arab statelessness, but the favourable extension of citizenship 
meant ‘considerable advantage to British interests’. These responses 
show the differences of opinion within the British Government over 
the impact of DAER activities. In fact, the Colonial Offi ce admitted 
that Arab sentiment had been stirred by the committee to protest 
over what was an arbitrary denial of rights.57 
In February 1928, the committee accused the Palestine Adminis-
tration of obstructing what it referred to as the right to enjoy nation-
ality by descent. That right had been removed by the mandatory, 
DAER claimed, in order to facilitate Jewish immigration. It produced 
a document stating that approximately 9,000 Palestinian emigrants, 
out of a total of approximately 30,000 in the Americas and Europe, 
requested citizenship by the end of 1927.58 The small number of appli-
cants offered the proof, according to the committee, that the blame 
for the emigrants’ situation was to be placed squarely on the British 
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support for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Prior to the accusa-
tion, Sir Steward Symes, the government’s Chief Secretary, voiced his 
satisfaction in the summer of 1927 ‘that fairly regular connection is 
maintained between the individuals of “colonies” . . . in the Americas 
and their country of origin’. In contrast to the Foreign Offi ce stance, 
Symes recommended that the Palestine Administration reconsider 
applications for citizenship made by Palestinian Arabs from abroad. 
Although many of these applicants intended to continue to live out-
side Palestine, his recommendation indicates the willingness of the 
administration to acknowledge the situation. Symes even asked for a 
Foreign Offi ce enquiry into Palestinian diaspora communities, espe-
cially those in Chile and Mexico, to discover whether it would be pos-
sible to grant them fi nancial and diplomatic protection.59 Indeed, the 
DAER committee by early 1928 succeeded in shifting the discourse 
on the emigrants in offi cial government circles. 
In early 1928, the DAER preparatory committee printed a 
forty-page entreaty titled ‘Appeal to the Noble British People’ that 
was widely publicised in the Arab press. With this, the commit-
tee attempted to address the public in Great Britain rather than 
the government. The signifi cance of this document was that it was 
evidence of the grassroots civic activism that informed the activi-
ties of DAER. None of the noted Arab political leaders in Palestine 
– the Mufti, the various political factions or the Arab Executive – 
contributed to it. The appeal catered to the emotions of people of 
Great Britain and called upon them to pressure the Parliament to 
consider the demands of the Palestinian Arab emigrants.60 In forty 
pages, the committee endeavoured to offer its defi nition of Pales-
tinian nationality. It asked that nationality be granted through jus 
sanguinis and jus soli provisions. It also advocated a general exten-
sion of citizenship to all Palestinian natives based on Great Britain’s 
own citizenship legislation.61 
The committee sought to incorporate internationalist rhetoric of 
nationality in its appeals. Importantly, it outlined an understanding 
of the place of nationality in the international system. It noted that 
nationality laws connected an individual with his or her nation of ori-
gin and that certain nationality principles were recognised by every 
‘modern and civilised’ nation. The committee envisioned an interna-
tional right to nationality that mandated that individuals had diplo-
matic protection from their nation’s government; thus, the alienation 
of emigrants from their nationality could not be internationally sanc-
tioned. Ideas of nationality as linked to citizenship were expressed 
not only by Palestinian Arabs but they were part of a larger debate 
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on the place of citizenship in the context of the post-1918 dominance 
of the nation-state. The DAER appeal to the British people evoked 
the text of Article 34 of the Treaty of Lausanne to demonstrate the 
need to conform Mandate legislation to international regulations.62 
It can be assumed that the appeal did not achieve the aims that the 
committee had hoped for. 
It is unclear how many emigrants wrote to the defence committee 
with specifi c queries. Even so, it can be surmised that families near 
Bethlehem and Jerusalem knew of its raison d’être and its agency 
in connection with local nationalist associations. Certainly the liter-
ate Arab population with family in the diaspora read its frequent 
reports published in the newspapers. One cannot deny, however, that 
a certain anti-Zionist rhetoric can be drawn out of these reports and 
appeals; however, this rhetoric is not at all new. Rather, it helped 
DAER to link the mandatory’s support for a Jewish national home in 
Palestine with the denial of the Arab emigrants’ rights to citizenship 
and to return to their homeland. 
Consuls, Emigrants and the British Government: 
Miscommunication and Divergent Practices
The work of the emigrants and their lobbyists, as detailed in the 
preceding section, meant that the wider Palestinian Arab population 
could more easily understand the reasons for opposition to the 1925 
citizenship legislation. However, the confl ict of opinion within the 
Foreign Offi ce over the treatment of Arabs who lived outside of man-
date territory hindered any immediate resolution of the Arabs’ griev-
ances. In October 1927, the British Foreign Offi ce sent to its consul 
in San Salvador a draft copy of instructions regarding an amendment 
to the Palestine Immigration Ordinance. The document explained 
that ordinary British emergency certifi cates for travel to the mandate 
territory could be issued only to individuals who possessed Palestin-
ian nationality. The draft instructions also contained a clause stating 
that if applicants for travel visas to Palestine were unable to obtain a 
Turkish passport or Turkish travel documents from their state of res-
idence, they could apply for an emergency certifi cate valid for three 
months that allowed holders to undertake a single journey to Pales-
tine in order to naturalise.63 The draft contradicted Foreign Offi ce 
policy detailed in earlier circulars that allowed for emergency travel 
certifi cates to be given to stateless Palestinian Arabs. This portrait of 
confl icting correspondence and governmental circulars demonstrates 
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the general confusion and miscommunication between the British 
consulates and the Foreign Offi ce. 
Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain continued to hold the For-
eign Offi ce line that it was not desirable to issue travel certifi cates 
to ‘former Turkish nationals’ to visit Palestine if those individuals 
had not acquired Palestinian nationality. In fact, he maintained that 
non-citizen Palestinian Arabs who arrived at Palestinian ports with 
single-journey visas were liable to be ‘[suspected of] an attempt to 
evade the law and the Immigration authorities are . . . justifi ed, in 
refusing permission to land’. Emigrants born in Palestine but without 
Palestinian citizenship by 1927 were treated as suspect by the immi-
gration authorities upon arrival to Palestine.64 However, Jewish immi-
grants to Palestine were granted permission by the same immigration 
authorities to settle and take provisional nationality, on the advice of 
the Zionist Organisation. British consuls, however, did not interpret 
the instructions consistently in all cases. Palestinian natives through-
out Latin America, for instance, experienced different treatments by 
British consuls. The Palestine Administration had the option to refuse 
entry of emigrants on arbitrary grounds, such as the doubt that emi-
grants would remain in Palestine as permanent residents and instead 
use their citizenship to claim British protection.65 According to British 
Secretary Chamberlain, consular offi cers could not issue any travel 
documents endorsed by Great Britain except for Arab individuals 
to return to reside permanently in Palestine, since such individuals 
abroad were neither British subjects nor British-protected persons. As 
for those Arabs whose applications for citizenship had been rejected, 
some consuls believed that they acquired Turkish nationality by 
default. Yet the emigrants did not hold Turkish passports nor pledge 
allegiance to Turkey. The default acquisition of Turkish nationality 
had no basis in international law. Therefore, it is diffi cult to explain 
how Great Britain could assign Turkish citizenship to individuals 
without their consent and without the agreement of Turkey, simply 
on the basis that these individuals’ Palestinian citizenship applications 
had been rejected.66 
The Palestine Administration and the British Cabinet in London 
attempted in 1927 to address the growing number of grievances 
by Palestinian Arabs against the citizenship legislation. In the fi rst 
place, the Colonial Offi ce insisted that the British Government could 
not extend the order-in-council’s stated timeframe (within which 
natives could claim nationality) without the consent of the Turkish 
Government. Evidence of British correspondence with the Turkish 
Government on this issue does not exist in the archives. In fact, the 
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Colonial Offi ce advised against contact with Turkey, believing the 
latter would be reluctant to become involved.67 Meanwhile, High 
Commissioner Plumer wrote in mid-1927 that Palestinian natives 
must show ‘genuine desire to resume their connection with Pales-
tine’ to travel to the territory to naturalise. This did not guarantee 
that their naturalisation would be approved.68 Plumer’s statement 
side-stepped the issue at the heart of the Palestinian grievances: 
namely, that the Arabs found naturalisation to be unacceptable as a 
negation of their right to nationality. 
Palestine’s attorney-general, Norman Bentwich, addressed the 
situation as well. He stated his intent to reconsider applications from 
people ‘who by birth, race and sentiment are genuinely attached to 
Palestine’ despite their likelihood to be resident abroad for an indefi -
nite period. However, the Foreign Offi ce disagreed and one offi cial 
recommended that grants for citizenship be done on the basis of 
merit. If individuals were not judged to want citizenship enough to 
return to Palestine in the time allotted for them to do so, the offi cial 
deemed them to ‘never have been Palestinian, [and] . . . remain Otto-
man subjects’.69 The offi ce failed to explain the existence of Ottoman 
subjects in the absence of an Ottoman Empire. It also offered little 
understanding of the principles of state succession introduced by the 
Treaty of Sevres in 1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The 
League of Nations had long worked to eliminate instances of state-
lessness in the post-war period, but the British Foreign and Colonial 
Offi ces neglected these ongoing debates on nationality.
The Foreign and Colonial Offi ces discussed complaints together, 
including those addressed to the League of Nations. One such let-
ter from the Sociedad Fraternidad Palestina of San Salvador, writ-
ten in September 1927, claimed to speak on behalf of more than 
a thousand Palestinian natives employed in trade who professed 
that they had ‘no subversive aims’ and accepted the international 
mandate assigned to Palestine. But, it continued, the natives were 
bound to Palestine ‘by the strongest moral, social and political ties 
. . . like every human being who has . . . a feeling of attachment to 
his native land’. The Society felt the mandatory power seemed deter-
mined to destroy what it termed as fundamental rights to national-
ity by preventing natives from returning to their own country while 
it allowed foreign elements to enter.70 After viewing other strongly 
worded complaints, William Ormsby-Gore suggested reconsidera-
tion of claims to citizenship made in due time by individuals who 
returned to Palestine at some point after they left the territory prior to 
1920. These claims had initially been rejected by the administration. 
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His suggestion meant that any Palestinian by birth and resident 
abroad with Turkish nationalitywould ‘be freely granted permis-
sion to visit or settle in Palestine with his family’ but would need 
to naturalise to become an offi cial citizen. Ormsby-Gore wrote that 
the extent to which the communities in the diaspora took advan-
tage of the concession, if the administration put it into place, would 
be regarded as a measure of their genuine attachment to their 
homeland.71 
In early 1929, the DAER committee reminded the colonial sec-
retary that the false belief that emigrants severed their connections 
with their homeland ‘paralysed to an unimaginable degree’ an esti-
mated 30,000 natives who had no recognised nationality.72 One ray 
of hope for emigrants came in April 1929 with the news that an 
Arab native of Ramleh fi led a lawsuit against the Palestine’s high 
commissioner and director of immigration after authorities refused 
him citizenship upon return to Palestine. The legal proceedings had 
a favourable outcome for the complainant, who aimed for the rec-
ognition of his citizenship. The High Court of Justice in Palestine 
also required the government to pay the expenses of the lawsuit.73 
Despite this outcome of the challenge to the citizenship order, many 
Arabs resident in the diaspora who did not intend to immediately 
return to Palestine began to face increasingly hostile and anti-Arab 
host governments. The El Salvador Palestinian Unity Committee 
wrote a letter in 1929 detailing the expulsion of Arabs from El Sal-
vador as a ‘painful catastrophe [nakba]’ and broadcast an appeal 
to Palestinians at home to help. ‘Isa Bandak wrote a lengthy memo 
to Plumer’s replacement, High Commissioner John Chancellor, to 
urge the Palestine Government to repeal the ‘unjust aggression’ in 
El Salvador against the country’s approximately 2,000 Palestinian 
residents.74 Other countries also refused to readmit any resident 
without nationality who had left the country’s borders.75 By the late 
1920s, the all-important offi cial nationality documents meant that 
emigrants had a chance to maintain their livelihoods. 
This paralysis noted by DAER was as much economic as it was 
political. The committee continued to lobby High Commissioner 
Chancellor, with evidence that the emigrants kept their relations 
with Palestine through ownership of property and land and through 
the payment of taxes.76 On the point of the fi nancial situation of 
a number of emigrants, the mandate administration maintained 
an interesting position. Although it denied return and ipso facto 
citizenship to emigrants from all social classes, the administration 
continued to collect the tax revenues on the immoveable property 
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and land owned by these individuals. By 1929, the tide of Jewish 
immigration to Palestine had again risen, while bankruptcy threat-
ened the administration. Yet, even appeals to the economic benefi ts 
of a blanket grant of citizenship to all natives living abroad fell on 
deaf – or otherwise uninterested – ears.77 Complicating matters, the 
Wailing Wall riots of 1929 forced the administration to focus on the 
perceived religious strife rather than economic tensions between the 
Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine. Although commissions 
of inquiry in the aftermath focused on Jewish immigration, they did 
not recognise demands of the Palestinian emigrants. 
Conclusion
Despite the controversy over the changes to the 1925 Citizenship 
Order-in-Council, the British Government did not ratify an amended 
order until July 1931. The amendment had a very limited effect and 
did not refl ect the demands of the emigrants and their lobbyists. 
Rather, it was aimed at Palestinians resident abroad between 1924 
and 1925 only, and provided them with ‘treaty nationality’ ipso 
facto. Meanwhile, the Home Offi ce debated the inclusion of a clause 
in the amended order stating that periodic visits made to Palestine 
by natives were not enough to signify maintenance of a ‘substantial 
connection’ with the country. The issue of substantial connections 
between the diaspora and the mandate territory continued to be a 
point of confl ict. In early 1933, Sawt al-Sha‘b reported that a very 
large number of Palestinian natives went to Turkish consuls to take 
Turkish citizenship in order to have consular protection and to travel 
to Palestine on a recognised passport.78 It is important to note that 
from 1927 to 1937, the stated number of Palestinians registered as 
resident abroad rose by approximately 10,000 persons, up to in the 
region of 40,000.79 
The Palestinian Arabs crafted their own – often multiple – mean-
ings of citizenship in the 1920s in response to the situation in Pal-
estine after the implementation of legislation. As the chapter has 
shown, these meanings were expressed most prominently by the emi-
grants once they returned to Palestine and once their hope to acquire 
citizenship came under threat. They defi ned rights and protections 
associated with citizenship in letters sent home and reprinted by indi-
viduals in Palestine who knew of their situation. These emigrants 
always connected their arguments in support of citizenship with their 
understanding of Palestine as an Arab nation (al-umma al-‘arabiyya) 
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creating a link between Ottoman nationality and Palestinian citizen-
ship rights.
The reactions in Palestine to the situation of the emigrants can 
be used to chart the changing terminology of nationality and citi-
zenship as well as the changing expressions of citizenship. Until the 
issue of the citizenship order the use of the term ‘jinsiyya’ in the 
sense of citizenship was reinforced by a number of factors. The fi rst 
was the Ottoman legislative precedent that termed the population 
of the Arab provinces as Ottoman nationals. The middle-class Arab 
nationalists focused upon the language used in the Ottoman law as 
they became increasingly alarmed by rumours and reports of the new 
Palestine citizenship order. Another factor was that citizenship was 
translated as jinsiyya in the Arabic publication of the Citizenship 
Order-in-Council in the mandate’s offi cial gazette, in the order-in-
council itself and in the press reports written shortly after its provi-
sions were made known.
The Palestinian Arab mahjar also factored in as a driving force 
for the changing discourse of nationality and citizenship after 1925. 
Discussions of citizenship and contentions over it were activated by 
the emigrants’ situation as affected by legislation. The outcry over 
the denial of the ‘right of return’ and ipso facto citizenship for native 
Palestinians who resided outside of Palestine shaped the vocabulary 
and language associated with citizenship and the rights to that citi-
zenship. The main impact of mandate law upon this changing termi-
nology was that nationality and citizenship began to be perceived as 
separate statuses as the emigrants argued that their Ottoman Arab 
nationality entitled them to Palestinian citizenship. In conclusion, the 
Palestinian Arab emigrant featured prominently in Arab demands to 
the administration after the mid-1920s. The situation of the diaspora 
was constantly re-assessed in the Arabic press and by lobbyists such 
as ‘Isa Bandak.
The arguments developed by the emigrants and DAER lobbyists 
in the mid- to late 1920s greatly impacted the Arab population’s 
general conceptualisation of their nationality and identity as Pales-
tinian. In the absence of a right to return to Palestine as citizens, the 
emigrants nonetheless practised citizenship through the formation 
of émigré civil societies, elections for national leaders and aid for 
Palestinians at home. This in turn forced the local authorities and 
the government in London to reconsider citizenship legislation as 
a response to the anger over the order’s perceived injustices. This 
reconsideration was a long time coming, as offi cials in London and 
Jerusalem were not in agreement over the proper resolution for 
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Arab natives who resided abroad and wished to return to Palestine 
as citizens. The Jewish national home policy continued to guide the 
administration in legislation, including legislation that impacted 
only the Arab population. The advocacy of the DAER committee 
did not stop. Rather, the late 1920s and early 1930s witnessed a 
rise in the tactics of the populist leaders to protest against British 
policy. 
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Institutionalising Citizenship: Creating 
Distinctions between Arab and Jewish 
Palestinian Citizens, 1926–1934
[The Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council] termed as an 
‘Instruction’ is just the sort of enterprise from the mind of Bentwich 
who loves the loose generalities of International Law.
Sir J. Risley, Colonial Offi ce memo (May 1929)
In 1930 the Colonial Offi ce in London received a notice of the ‘borderline case’ of a Jewish Palestinian citizen who faced 
the revocation of his naturalisation due to his residence outside 
Palestine. Certifi cates of naturalisation could be annulled if their 
holders were absent from Palestine for three years and could not 
offer an explanation for their residence elsewhere. In large part 
the Colonial and Foreign Offi ces followed this policy because they 
feared that Palestinian citizenship could be used by individuals to 
claim ‘un-entitled’ British imperial protection. The two offi ces also 
stressed that any citizen absent for more than three years could not 
possibly maintain a ‘connection’ – or indeed loyalty – to Palestine 
and that they thus forfeited their rights of residence, citizenship, 
British protection and passport facilities. Since the mid-1920s, both 
offi ces knew of these risks even as each continually emphasised 
that ‘Palestinian citizenship [carried] with it the right to British 
protection in foreign countries’. As to the case at hand, which had 
been passed to the Colonial Offi ce for further advice, the offi cials 
who scrutinised the Jewish citizen’s claims focused on the accusa-
tion that the individual retained his Palestinian citizenship sim-
ply to enjoy British protection while resident abroad. In the end, 
Colonial Offi ce Under-Secretary John Shuckerberg decided that 
‘it would be better, at this juncture, not to risk a further squab-
ble with the Jewish Agency’ over the revocation of citizenship.1 
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Had his naturalisation certifi cate and passport been revoked, the 
Jewish man would likely have become stateless, and the blame for 
that position would have been heaped on to the Foreign Offi ce. 
The individual remained a Palestine citizen despite his residence 
outside of the mandate’s borders. 
The incident was not unusual and it also represents one way in 
which various administrators involved in the Mandate bureaucracy 
applied the provisions of Palestinian citizenship differently for Jews 
as opposed to Arabs. The Arabs frequently suspected and accused 
the administration of favouritism for Jewish immigrants in the appli-
cation of citizenship provisions but the historical reality was not so 
clear cut. Individual offi cials in the Palestine Administration did not 
always apply provisions in the ways set out by the government in 
London, nor did the local immigration and administration depart-
ments display consistent favouritism towards the immigrants in mat-
ters of naturalisation, passport control or entry to Palestine. Instead, 
local actions were often done to manage relations between Jews and 
Arabs in a way favourable to the conduct of British administration. 
As detailed in the previous chapter, the mandate’s immigration offi -
cials did not accept as valid most claims by émigré Palestinian Arabs 
of their loyalty and wishes to return to Palestine as citizens at a future 
date. The Mandate archives contain handfuls of cases of Jewish cit-
izens absent from Palestine for three or more years who received 
warning notices about the potential revocation of their citizenship 
and passports. Even so, the mandate immigration department was 
obliged to offer these addressees the chance to refute claims that they 
lost their connection with Palestine before the offi cial revocation of 
their citizenship. In contrast with most Arab emigrants, almost all of 
the Jewish citizens who left Palestine possessed Palestine passports. 
In many cases these passports were renewed for periods of time if 
the warning letters were answered with promises of return from the 
Palestinian Jewish émigré.2 As the following chapter addresses, the 
British Foreign Offi ce instructed consuls to classify Arab Palestin-
ian emigrants as (defunct) Ottoman citizens even by the 1930s since 
these emigrants did not possess Palestine passports.3 At other times, 
detailed below, the British Government seemed largely disinterested 
in the ways in which citizenship policy exacerbated volatile commu-
nal relations. 
The procedures used by the local government in Palestine and 
the government in Great Britain to change and approve provisions 
for further citizenship and nationality legislation depended not only 
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upon the local situation for Jewish and Arab citizens and émigrés, 
but also on the obligation that legislation stay in-line with wider 
imperial legislation. Legislation needed to accommodate the ever-
increasing number of citizenship certifi cates given to immigrants to 
Palestine. At the same time, by the early 1930s, Great Britain began 
to tightly regulate the movement of people into its imperial domains, 
including Palestine, as both the fear of communist agitation and 
the entrance of ‘undesirables’ into these territories heightened social 
and political tensions. In Palestine the British controlled the pro-
cess of naturalisation in order to effi ciently uphold the terms of the 
mandate and the obligations to the Jewish national home policy. 
In other words, the control of citizenship legislation by a number 
of local and imperial departments became a bureaucratic technique 
to enforce mandate policy – a policy that simply had to pay par-
ticular attention to Jewish immigration and naturalisation. Differ-
ent departments of the administration and the Colonial Offi ce in 
London established procedures to deal with the implementation of 
legislation and to arbitrate over applications for both naturalisation 
and citizenship. In reality, the division of control over legislation 
refl ects the complex and blurred natures of citizenship and nation-
ality, and precedents of indirect rule elsewhere within the British 
Empire. This blurring of lines between the nature of citizenship and 
nationality in Palestine by governmental departments resulted in a 
non-standardised and uneven application of certain provisions of 
citizenship legislation. 
The present chapter analyses the ways Palestinian citizenship 
became bureaucratised after the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-Council 
through the early 1930s. This process of bureaucratisation allowed 
local and imperial offi cials to use nationality and citizenship as tools 
to classify, categorise and discipline the citizenry, immigrants and 
non-habitual residents. These tools served different purposes for the 
British offi cials in London, for those in Jerusalem and for the leader-
ship of the Zionist Organisation in relation to its activities in Pal-
estine. The division of control between Whitehall and the Palestine 
Administration meant that, overall, the creation of legislation was 
de-centralised in nature. The division of control was not always bal-
anced, however: within Whitehall the Foreign and Colonial Offi ces 
disagreed over the application of policy and so too did local admin-
istrators in Palestine. As part of citizenship legislation the differences 
between administrators’ policies toward Jewish immigration, includ-
ing the fear of subversives, communists and Bolsheviks, resulted in a 
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variety of opinions regarding revocation and grants of citizenship to 
Jews and Arabs. At the same time, because offi cials in Jerusalem and 
London voiced fears of potential confl icts of interest with the Jewish 
Agency and Zionist Organisation, these policies ultimately favoured 
a smooth and swift naturalisation process for Jewish immigrants. 
As time went by, colonial offi cials noted a desire for a specifi c type 
of Jewish immigrant: one Europeanised, white, entrepreneurial and 
self-suffi cient, and with the potential to be loyal to Palestine and, 
by extension, Great Britain.4 The classifi cation and categorisation of 
individuals served to create a ‘politics of distinction’ between Arab 
and Jewish Palestinians in the application of nationality and citizen-
ship. The Department for Migration and Statistics did not classify 
the Jewish immigrants as one monolithic group and, indeed, the 
immigrants were far from uniform. Palestine was unique as a quasi-
colonial possession in the 1920s and 1930s in the internationalisa-
tion of the citizenship question: the Jewish national home policy 
meant that immigrants and potential citizens arrived to Palestine 
from a range of countries and colonies and frequently travelled back 
and forth between them. 
The British and French based their legislation of colonial citizen-
ship and nationality, not only in the Levantine mandates but also in 
India and African mandates and colonies, upon ideas of ‘whiteness’, 
‘the native’, communalism, perceptions of minority and an absence 
of the political, social and civil rights of citizenship that became 
more widespread in the metropole during the interwar period. As 
Emma Hunter has shown for the case of British-mandated Tangan-
yika, colonial offi cials supported a model of ‘good’ civic citizenship 
based on involvement in the public sphere in social and cultural con-
texts and as opposed to political citizenship. Elsewhere in East and 
Central Africa British colonial offi cials debated through the 1920s 
and 1930s whether the ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ should be partly 
defi ned by cultural standards that supposedly determined assimila-
tion into the realm of good citizenship. Hunter terms the British 
conceptualisation of the relationship between the mandate inhabit-
ants and the British as a ‘liberalism without liberties’ founded on 
‘an understanding of citizenship based on duties rather than rights’.5 
The notion of apolitical ‘good citizens’ fi t into interwar thinking in 
Palestine as well, as will be shown below. With the inauguration 
of the Mandate, colonial offi cials based the Jewish national home 
policy on a racial hierarchy between Jews and Arabs, and looked 
toward the Jewish immigrants as the non-native, civilising infl uence 
in Palestine.6 
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These distinctions enhanced by the citizenship legislation were 
very much a part of the wider colonial experience and colonial 
perceptions of the ‘character’ of whites, natives and settlers. As 
Ann Stoler has aptly shown, this categorisation by colonial admin-
istrators was a method of control based on privileging the identi-
ties of certain inhabitants as that of ‘citizens’.7 Thus, in matters of 
naturalisation, immigrants received separate treatment from that 
applied to natives. Birth in a territory (jus soli) did not always 
automatically confer citizenship, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter. Social and cultural practices also came to signify that an 
individual was modern or European and thus able to become a 
citizen. Indeed, the language used by colonial offi cials in reference 
to the population of Palestine refl ected this ideology. For example, 
Palestinian Arabs and Palestinian Jews were viewed as separate 
races in the colonial vocabulary of cultural and national identity.8 
The need to adhere to policy to facilitate a Jewish national home 
while at the same time preventing immigrants of a certain unsa-
voury character from acquiring citizenship convinced the impe-
rial and the local governments of the importance of colonial-style 
nationality legislation. Along with the 1925 Citizenship Order-in-
Council, the 1922 Electoral Order-in-Council and the text of the 
mandate underlined a differential treatment of the two communi-
ties implying that the application of citizenship would discriminate 
between both in order to uphold the mandate charter. Out of these 
imperial perceptions of matters such as race, culture and a certain 
European-ness came the treatment of Jewish Palestinian citizens as 
more akin to British subjects in matters of immigration and docu-
mentary identity. 
The bureaucratisation (and categorisation) of citizenship in Pal-
estine from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s as offi cials interpreted 
the Citizenship Order-in-Council and its amendments can be stud-
ied in light of the concept of citizenship in the British Empire. The 
case study of Mandate Palestine demonstrates the different admin-
istrative tiers for colonial statuses in British territories. The tiers 
represented those inhabitants restricted from travel, or those with 
the privilege to enter the United Kingdom and its overseas posses-
sions. During the interwar period, many states experienced confu-
sion over boundaries, the sovereignty of territorial possessions, the 
classifi cation of nationals and legal provisions affecting increased 
immigration and travel. All of these factors played an important 
role in the interpretation of Palestinian citizenship and the issue of 
further legislation that regulated it. 
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The Politics of Distinction: Palestinian 
Jewish and Arab Citizenships
Distinctive practices in the application of citizenship provisions for 
the Jewish, as opposed to Arab, population emerged before the pas-
sage of the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council. The pri-
mary difference can be traced back to the method by which Jewish 
immigrants to Palestine acquired provisional nationality in accor-
dance with the 1922 Legislative Council Election Order. Prior to the 
1922 order, offi cials were aware that they would need to implement 
Article 7 of the Palestine Mandate, which required Great Britain to 
issue a law that regulated the acquisition of Palestinian nationality 
for Jewish immigrants. The article, which did not mention the Arab 
population, foreshadowed the future separate routes to the acquisi-
tion of citizenship and naturalisation in Palestine. The distinctions 
can perhaps be traced further back, to the British colonial experi-
ence of creating legislation to delineate the statuses of the native, the 
European and the settler in other imperial possessions. 
Administrators in territories of the British Empire, similar to 
Dutch, French and other colonial offi cials, included a number of 
assumptions about the cultural aptitude of ‘the native’ in colonial 
legislation that marked national status prior to the outbreak of the 
First World War. Distinguishing between the subject statuses of the 
indigenous populations in imperial realms also allowed colonial 
powers to ‘order’ colonial societies in order to preserve the hege-
mony of the local British administrators even in the era of indirect 
rule.9 It can be argued that in the case of the Palestine Mandate after 
1920, the local and imperial governments selectively applied these 
colonial precedents to create order and manage the Arab indigenous 
and Jewish immigrant populations through delineating identity sta-
tuses and bureaucratising citizenship and nationality. Drawing on 
the historical anthropology of Stoler, historians can view colonial 
discussions and ideas on citizenship, nationality and sovereignty 
during the interwar period as sites of production of European power 
as well as refl ections of new developments of nation-state national-
ity and citizenship in the imperial metropole.10 A number of imperial 
debates on race and culture within Europe and Great Britain prior 
to the outbreak of the First World War were translated into par-
ticular socio-cultural practices in the colonies and possessions that 
remained after the war.11 The immigration regulations in support of 
the Jewish national home plan specifi cally stated that potential citi-
zens had to be of a good character. The markers of character and the 
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nativist ideologies behind them permeated debates over immigra-
tion restrictions and the restrictions themselves.12 To again reference 
Stoler’s argument, character did not derive from abstract or univer-
sal values but rather it centred on the concept of being European, 
which indicated a particular standard of living, a set of cultural 
competencies and social practices.13 France provides one example 
for multi-layered subjecthoods that Great Britain mimicked. In the 
one hundred years before the end of the Second World War, French 
political theory rationalised that French citizenship was a status for 
inhabitants of metropolitan France. Inhabitants of French colonies 
or overseas territories were French nationals or French subjects but 
not French citizens – the difference was often blurred but the latter 
referred to individuals with an inherent set of educational, social, 
cultural and political criteria for ‘being French’.14 
To fast-forward to the immediate post-war years, the 1922 Leg-
islative Council Election Order defi ned the Palestinian citizenry for 
the purpose of enfranchisement for elections to a proposed (and 
ultimately un-realised) legislative council. The order codifi ed a dis-
tinction between two types of citizens in Palestine: former Ottoman 
nationals resident in Palestine, and non-Ottoman habitual residents 
of Palestine. Jewish immigrants in the latter group received provi-
sional certifi cates of nationality upon arrival to Palestine. Habitual 
residence in Palestine remained undefi ned and essentially any Jewish 
arrivals were considered immediately as citizens for electoral pur-
poses. Signifi cantly, the order did not stipulate that these immigrants 
had to give up their birth-nationalities or passports. This omission 
mainly benefi ted immigrants, since the Ottoman administration had 
prohibited the possession of dual nationality and mandate immi-
gration offi cials and British consuls treated Palestinian Arabs who 
acquired other passports strictly as nationals of the territory indi-
cated by their passport. These Arabs – likely very few in number – 
could not immigrate back to Palestine. The 1925 Citizenship Order 
required that all applicants for naturalisation prove they met the two-
year residence in Palestine requirement. In order for native but non-
resident Ottoman nationals to claim Palestinian citizenship, Article 
2 of the 1925 order required they return to Palestine and reside in 
that territory for a period of six months. These former Ottomans 
had to prove that their return would be permanent.15 The return and 
period of residency had to be prior to 1 August 1926, the deadline 
given to so-called natives to claim their citizenship. Since Jewish pro-
visional citizens came from a variety of backgrounds, administrative 
and legal advisors placed emphasis on the need to accommodate for 
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the entire world-wide Jewish community in Palestine especially in 
immigration regulations. 
The nature of the provisions for Jewish immigrants faced increas-
ing challenges by the end of the 1920s. After the August 1929 Wail-
ing Wall riots and amidst Arab demands to suspend immigration 
to Palestine, the British Government and Colonial Secretary Lord 
Passfi eld sent to Palestine the Shaw Commission headed by Judge 
Walter Shaw and composed of four Members of Parliament to 
investigate the causes of the riots. Sir John Chancellor, the high 
commissioner at the time, was notably less enthusiastic than his 
predecessors about the Zionist Organisation and the commission 
refl ected his attitude, and increasingly that of other local offi cials 
immediately after the riots. It recommended suspension of Jewish 
land purchases and the imposition of a quota on Jewish immigra-
tion. These recommendations were then examined by John Hope-
Simpson, whose report stated that the capacity for absorption of 
more immigrants had been reached in Palestine and that further 
immigration would severely impact the fellahin through the further 
dispossession of their land. Unfortunately for the Arabs, the home 
government had a different attitude. In February 1931 British Prime 
Minister Ramsey MacDonald wrote a letter to Chaim Weizmann in 
which MacDonald retracted the recommendations and reaffi rmed 
the Balfour Declaration as the guide to British policy in Palestine. 
Consequently, the administration made no drastic changes to immi-
gration or naturalisation policies.16 
The tense political situation after 1929, along with the MacDon-
ald letter, suggests that Great Britain had rightly been fearful that 
numerous revocations of Palestinian citizenship held by Jews could 
lead to disagreement with international Zionist and Jewish Agency 
leaders. The Zionist Organisation and its representative to Great 
Britain, the Jewish Agency, signifi cantly infl uenced the application, 
or non-application, of citizenship requirements and practices for 
Jewish immigrants. Zionist involvement in citizenship legislation 
dated back to 1919 when Chaim Weizmann’s suggestions on the 
proposals were sent to the Colonial Offi ce in the form of ‘offi cial 
observations’.17 More than a decade later in correspondence between 
the Colonial Offi ce and the Palestine Government in 1933, offi cials 
noted the infl uence of the Zionist Organisation on immigration and 
citizenship and stated that it had become ‘diffi cult for the Palestine 
Government to treat one set of Palestinian citizens differently from 
the rest and to subject them to immigration restrictions which at 
present apply solely to persons who are not Palestinian citizens’.18 
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The memo referred to those new arrivals that had not naturalised as 
citizens – a not uncommon situation for Jewish immigrants habitu-
ally resident in Palestine.
Also in the early 1930s the Palestine Administration noted the 
introduction in Parliament of a bill to extend Palestinian citizenship 
to any and all Jews without nationality. The Member of Parliament 
who submitted the bill surely had been unaware of the practical 
problems its approval would pose. The mandatory government 
opposed the measure and reacted by declaring that the MP in ques-
tion did not realise ‘the obvious’: that if the estimated 200,000 Jews 
around the globe who had lost their nationality thus acquired Pales-
tinian citizenship, they could automatically enter Palestine by right. 
Offi cials in Palestine added that this was not what the bill intended. 
One colonial offi cial wrote: 
If the bill was to confer upon a certain class of aliens Palestinian 
citizenship in a way which did not carry with it the rights to be 
enjoyed in Palestine . . . attached to that status, they would neverthe-
less appear to have a claim to be treated as British-protected persons 
outside Palestine. 
It appears that the local government realised that it needed to main-
tain a balance between offering Palestinian citizenship in the legal 
and political sense to immigrants who resided in Palestine with 
downplaying its resistance to allowing unrestricted immigration and 
a place of safe haven for European stateless Jews who had not yet 
immigrated to Palestine. The Arab press criticised the MP’s proposal 
and mentioned that neither the mandate government nor the League 
of Nations charters contained any provision to allow for such an 
action. The Colonial Offi ce, on the same footing as the Palestine 
Administration, wrote to High Commissioner Wauchope that if the 
bill meant anything ‘presumably it seems that the whole of German 
Jewry should be granted Palestinian citizenship!’19 As tensions over 
Germany’s Adolf Hitler grew, the bill did not advance in Parliament 
but it did popularise the idea in offi cial circles that Palestinian citi-
zenship could simply be given to Jews as a ‘natural’ right without 
preconditions such as residency. 
Despite its nullifi cation, the bill demonstrates the differing attitudes 
and proposals within Whitehall from those of the local administra-
tion with respect to the application of citizenship for Jewish immi-
grants. Parliament was far more conciliatory towards privileges at an 
imperial-level for Jewish immigrants than the local administration. 
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The proposed bill further demonstrates the growing opinion in Great 
Britain that Jewish citizens could be accorded separate treatment from 
their Arab counterparts in Palestine on the basis of not only culture 
and socio-economic standing – hardly a new approach imperially – 
but also in accordance with international concerns. Just before the 
proposal of an extension of citizenship to a large number of European 
Jews, Colonial Offi ce Secretary William Ormsby-Gore expressed the 
view that it was the ‘quality’ of Jews who entered Palestine that mat-
tered. Offi cials in both the Palestine and London administrations per-
ceived the immigrants as not only potential citizens but as a civilising 
infl uence.20 Despite this view, no quotas were set on the type of Jewish 
immigrants deemed of the right quality for entrance to Palestine but 
offi cials continued to unoffi cially endorse the imperial practice of cul-
tivating good citizenship through allowing Europeanised non-natives 
to naturalise with relative ease. On a similar note, prior to Ormsby-
Gore’s expression of opinion, a confi dante of Colonial Secretary 
Leopold Amery reported that Blanche Dugdale, the niece of Arthur 
Balfour and a close friend of Weizmann, expressed hope that Jewish 
immigrants would become more English and despaired that despite 
possession of Palestine passports that entitled British protection these 
Jews were treated as foreigners in England. She urged Amery, without 
success, to simply change this legislative status.21
Internationalising Citizenship in the Palestinian Context: 
Enforcing Passports and Visas
The increased need for documentary identity between the two 
world wars meant that governments were increasingly forced to 
classify inhabitants as nationals, subjects or citizens, and offer 
them identifi cation papers. The Palestine Mandate was remarkable 
in the internationalisation of citizenship, meaning that it brought 
together numerous ethno-national groups living throughout the 
world as Palestinian citizens. This placed it in a unique position 
in the wider British Empire. Although only briefl y mentioned here, 
Palestine also presents an excellent case study on transnational 
migrations of both Jews and Arabs in the early twentieth century 
across numerous – and new – borders. The Jewish national home 
policy allowed for the acquisition of citizenship by Jews who came 
from a wide range of countries and colonies. This range of ethno-
nationalities held by Palestine’s Jewish population did not com-
pare to any other single colonial population in the British Empire 
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except for similarities with the composition (although not religion) 
of migrants to South Africa. 
By the late 1920s mandate offi cials and numerous other actors 
involved in crafting entry, immigration and citizenship policies had 
not standardised the provisions that were to regulate the applica-
tion for, or the issuing of, passports. Great Britain’s 1920 Aliens 
Restriction Order – one of the amendments to the 1914 and 1919 
British Nationality and Status of Aliens Acts upon which the Pal-
estine’s nationality and immigration legislation was modelled – 
required anyone who entered or left the United Kingdom to have a 
passport with a photo. With this act, the passport became the most 
important document to verify and legitimise identity and it allowed 
for registration and monitoring of the movements of aliens in the 
United Kingdom and the empire.22 However, the same order did not 
immediately or readily translate to British colonies, possessions and 
mandates. 
In 1926 the Colonial Offi ce noted that both Jewish and Arab Pal-
estinian citizens ‘may be placed in an awkward position if they want 
to travel’ to or from Palestine. The offi ce proposed to issue emer-
gency travel documents to individuals without passports. Palestin-
ian passports were largely unavailable at the time of the citizenship 
order-in-council. Although Great Britain initially printed temporary 
passports in 1920, only offi cial persons used them and they did not 
resemble the Palestine passport issued from 1924 onwards. The reg-
ular printing of passports did not begin until 1926.23 Instead, emer-
gency certifi cates were used for one-way travel for mainly Jewish 
provisional citizens and some residents of Palestine, but these were 
susceptible to abuse since their holders were under no obligation 
to live in Palestine. British consuls monitored their use by ensuring 
that holders only presented them once and did so only for one-way 
journeys. Despite not fulfi lling the residency obligation required for 
Palestinian citizenship, theoretically holders could be treated, even 
in their countries of birth, as British-protected persons. The laissez-
passer helped make up for the lack of passports, since it was treated 
like an emergency travel certifi cate until after 1926 when the Pales-
tine passport became more common. The passport looked similar to 
its British counterpart: it was brown with the words ‘British Pass-
port’ on the cover above the seal of the Palestine Government but 
‘Palestine’ appeared under the seal.24 
By the time of the citizenship order, the passport translated into 
documentary proof of nationality, citizenship and diplomatic protec-
tion.25 Statelessness was measured by the lack of a passport. As the 
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nation-state in the early twentieth century became a more intense 
network of institutions, passport and immigration controls aided 
the widespread institutionalisation of nationality and citizenship.26 
A passport proved not only national belonging but according to his-
torian John Torpey, it was also part of a profusion of bureaucratic 
techniques in order to administer the boundaries of a nation. Its 
importance after the First World War forced the League of Nations 
to pay attention to the plight of individuals who did not hold a pass-
port or identity documents, including Arabs and some minority eth-
nic groups left outside of any recognised nation-state after 1918. In 
the light of the Russian refugee crisis the League’s High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, instituted the Nansen Passport 
after 1922. Governments could accept the Nansen Passport as proof 
of identity without the need to grant citizenship rights to its bearer.27
With the widespread imperial usage of passports came the 
increased need for effi cient travel facilities for emigrants, immigrants 
and travellers from and to Palestine. The responsibility for this ini-
tially fell to the British Foreign and Home Offi ces in the metropole, 
in charge of consular and diplomatic facilities, and immigration and 
passport controls, respectively. Before the standard issue of Pales-
tine passports, Jewish and Arab inhabitants could travel and prove 
their identity but, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, Brit-
ish consuls and local immigration authorities did not always follow 
or even have centralised procedures with respect to these travellers’ 
identities. Prior to 1925, the category of ‘provisional’ Palestinian 
citizenship confused consuls who were unsure of its international 
acceptance and whether both Arabs and Jews could declare it as their 
non-documentary national identity. Mandate offi cials and consuls 
generally granted laissez-passer to Palestinian Arabs on the basis of 
their Ottoman passport. Jewish immigrants could travel on their cer-
tifi cates of provisional Palestinian nationality but, as the chapter will 
demonstrate later, faced diffi culties returning to their home countries 
if the British revoked their certifi cates or their eventual passports 
once residents’ absences came to be recorded and monitored. The 
Arabs faced a disadvantage if they carried Ottoman identity docu-
ments: they could be refused laissez-passer by British consuls. Fur-
thermore, many former Ottoman subjects including Sephardic Jews 
were still regarded as enemies before ratifi cation of the 1924 Treaty 
of Lausanne. European Jewish residents with provisional certifi cates 
of Palestinian nationality did not face the same problems but Jews 
who had been Ottoman subjects often did.28 
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At the end of 1925 the Colonial Offi ce requested that for the 
case of Palestine, certain procedures for travellers be clarifi ed 
including the standard treatment given by British foreign consuls 
to applicants for entry into Palestine. Disagreements between the 
Colonial and Foreign Offi ces over how to treat native Palestinians 
who lived abroad hindered any type of joint resolution as the For-
eign Offi ce continued to argue that these Palestinians had no right 
to claim British diplomatic protection. The history of this bureau-
cratisation of immigration and nationality documentation must 
account for an analysis of the differences of opinion and tensions 
between and within government departments as well as with local 
authorities in Palestine. For example, High Commissioner Plumer in 
1927 believed that a more inclusive permission to settle in Palestine 
could be offered to individuals born in there but without citizen-
ship, against the opinion of the Foreign Offi ce. At the same time, 
the local government faced the on-the-ground implications of these 
differences of opinion. Palestine’s Attorney-General, Norman Bent-
wich, announced that he would reconsider sympathetically appli-
cants from people ‘who by birth, race and sentiment are genuinely 
attached to Palestine’ despite residence abroad and the unlikelihood 
of their return for an indefi nite period. J. H. Lloyd in the Colo-
nial Offi ce came out against this announcement. He argued that 
the offi ce had little doubt that many of these people wanted British 
protection in order to make claims against the governments in their 
states of residence – in line with the long-standing objection of the 
Foreign Offi ce to the same issue.29 
The Colonial Offi ce’s offi cial stance found the reconsideration of 
applicants contrary ‘to the general rule’ set by the Foreign Offi ce to 
avoid the creation of a class of people entitled to British protection 
although they did not live in a British-administered territory. Such 
groups of people were ‘a nuisance to the Consuls and no credit to 
the Empire’. The present system that did not support the grant of 
citizenship or travel facilities to natives of Palestine who resided 
abroad prior to the 1925 order-in-council, or who had not lived 
in the territory for the minimum three years avoided creating this 
nuisance, and colonial offi cials in London deemed it ‘absolutely 
fair and equitable’. Little emigration had taken place in 1919 or 
before 1920, the Colonial Offi ce claimed, and people not resident 
in Palestine since 1920 had no legitimate claim to be considered as 
Palestinian nationals. Furthermore, the Colonial Secretary argued 
that people who could not afford to take the time to qualify for 
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naturalisation (which meant returning to Palestine to reside) had 
no reason to be granted citizenship status.30 Natives who applied 
to travel to Palestine could not always obtain a Turkish passport or 
travel documents – despite British opinion these individuals were 
considered to be Turkish citizens by the government in Ankara. 
Emigrants who resided in countries without a Turkish consulate 
found it impossible to attempt to request Turkish travel documents 
before and after 1925.31 Their naturalisation as Turkish citizens, 
however, was grounds for refusal of Palestinian citizenship since 
mandate practice prohibited Arabs from holding dual Palestinian 
and any other nationality.
Another problem that plagued attempts to enforce passport and 
travel document policies was the expiration of the provisional certifi -
cates of Palestinian nationality. This affected both Arab natives who 
lived abroad and Jewish immigrants who were granted provisional 
nationality but who did not permanently live in Palestine. Certifi -
cates given to Jewish immigrants from 1920 to 1925 as proof of pro-
visional nationality had been issued on the understanding that these 
immigrants would acquire Palestinian citizenship and settle within 
the boundaries of the mandate territory. Because many Jews contin-
ued to use provisional certifi cates rather than claim citizenship, the 
Palestine Government was forced to extend the validity of the provi-
sional certifi cates until the end of 1926. The Foreign Offi ce decided 
to stop endorsing laissez-passer after March 1927 in another attempt 
to force Jewish immigrants to apply for a passport to prove their 
citizenship. Those who could not prove that they were Palestinian 
citizens under the residency provisions of the citizenship order would 
theoretically be unable to travel on British-issued documents.32 
The passport linked Palestinian citizenship to variations of 
British consular and diplomatic protection. Once the Palestine 
passport came into regular circulation in 1926, High Commis-
sioner Plumer noted that it did not entitle bearers the right to 
enter the United Kingdom or any British protectorate, dominion, 
colony or mandate.33 In October 1925, the Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs confi rmed that Palestinian passports would offer 
no privileges for travel throughout the Empire or exemption from 
immigration and visa regulations.34 Despite the Home Offi ce state-
ment, Palestinian Arabs and Jews, as well as individual offi cials in 
Whitehall, referred to Palestinians as imperial subjects. Of course, 
Great Britain did not treat Palestinian citizens as British imperial 
subjects but the hierarchy of administration meant that approval 
of all legislation had to come directly from Whitehall since Great 
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Britain ruled Palestine directly. The application of immigration 
and citizenship legislation in Palestine, the import of English law 
and the system of education led to confusion over whether the 
mandate’s inhabitants could be treated in a similar fashion to the 
inhabitants of outright colonies or of the directly administered 
mandates in Africa. In practice the mandate government was not 
in the legal position of providing travel and consular facilities to 
its own citizens: Palestinian consular offi cers or embassies did not 
exist. The duty of protection instead fell upon the government that 
held the mandate – Great Britain. 
Naturalised citizens (mainly Jews, other non-Ottoman nationals 
and those Arabs who chose to naturalise) absent from Palestine for 
three years prior to applying for passport renewal would be required 
to state the reason for the absence to the Controller of Permits in 
Jerusalem.35 A fi ve-year validity of Palestine passports was fi rst pro-
posed by the administration but the Colonial Offi ce suggested two 
years in order to ensure that naturalised citizens could not evade 
the residency obligation for more than two years without renewing 
their passports.36 If they attempted to do so, their citizenship status 
and diplomatic and consular protection could be called into question 
when the passport was due for renewal. In November 1926, High 
Commissioner Plumer authorised the Chief Immigration Offi cer to 
limit to two years the validity of Palestinian passports held by natu-
ralised citizens in order to prevent ‘a considerable number’ of such 
people from obtaining a passport and then settling abroad while they 
still came under imperial protection. Plumer, not entirely favourable 
towards the Zionist movement, referred to the practice of Jewish 
individuals who acquired citizenship and left Palestine as ‘the exploi-
tation of Palestinian nationality’.37 It can be deduced that debates 
on passport renewals primarily focused on Jewish citizens since they 
freely travelled in and out of Palestine, whereas Arab emigrants were 
frequently denied entry back into Palestine in the fi rst place. Indeed 
immigration offi cers mainly processed passport applications and 
renewals for Jewish residents. 
As neither the 1925 citizenship order nor the mandate’s immi-
gration legislation provided a defi nitive and fully accepted standard 
procedure for the mandate authorities and British consuls to enforce 
passport and visa controls, the disputes between offi cials of the Colo-
nial Offi ce and the Palestine Administration exacerbated the disagree-
ment over what procedures to apply to inhabitants of the mandate. 
Although a variety of governmental bodies attempted to coordinate, 
the need for each body to control a certain stage of the procedures 
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created divergences of opinion not only in Palestine and Whitehall, 
but in regions where British consulates dealt with Palestinian Arabs 
and Jews. The institutional control of Palestinian citizenship came 
to be linked closely with naturalisation, nationality legislation and 
imperial control over Palestinians in transit. 
Bureaucratising Palestinian Nationality: Naturalisation, 
Revocation and Amending Citizenship
Following Arab complaints and a multiplicity of positions on the 
regulations for the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by emigrant 
Arab natives, as well as the increased perception by colonial offi -
cials of the dangers of Palestine’s highly internationalised citizenship, 
the administration bowed to pressure to consider an amendment of 
the citizenship order in the latter 1920s. The reform of naturalisa-
tion standards became one of the main points of contention over the 
proposed amendment. The naturalisation process normally applied 
to Jewish immigrants, although a small number of native-born Pal-
estinian Arabs turned to the option if they found their claims to 
citizenship refused. Since immigrants had in the fi rst instance to go 
through the naturalisation process, the administration and the Brit-
ish Government constantly sought to ensure the effi cient application 
of its provisions. In large part, this meant institutionalising the dif-
ferent procedures of naturalisation. In other words, these procedures 
fi ltered through various bureaucratic departments in Palestine and 
Great Britain, becoming set practice with formal rules and differen-
tiations based on an individual’s nationality at the time that he or she 
entered Palestine. The distinctions and differences in the application 
and acquisition of recognised and legal citizenship between Arabs 
and Jews emerged from the institutionalisation of naturalisation and 
are crucial to understanding how each group experienced the loss of 
citizenship, the denial of naturalisation and instances of dual nation-
ality. Drawing on heightened British colonial perceptions of Eastern 
European Jews as deviant, disloyal political agitators, this section 
analyses how the Palestine Administration and Colonial Offi ce deter-
mined who was fi t to receive citizenship. The hierarchy of citizen-
ship and subjecthood applied in Palestine was far from novel. Rather, 
it was standard practice in European colonies to maintain imperial 
hegemony. For similar reasons of maintaining hegemony, during the 
interwar period the United States codifi ed such a hierarchy based on 
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‘ethnic’ or national origin into immigration law and produced the 
new category of the illegal alien.38
Palestinian naturalisation, while following British legislation, was 
conditional on other factors such as gender, marital status, deporta-
tion and the laws of other states. Since encouragement for Jewish 
immigration to Palestine was a cornerstone of mandate policy, the 
British offi cials focused mainly on how these conditions affected the 
Jewish residents. The Palestine Administration fi rst instituted natu-
ralisation in 1925 in accordance with the provisions of the citizen-
ship order-in-council. On the basis of the 1922 electoral order, Jewish 
habitual residents with provisional certifi cates of nationality would 
not need to naturalise, but new arrivals (including Arabs) needed to 
do so. As explained in Chapter 2, the stated qualifi cations for natu-
ralisation were simple: Jewish immigrants needed to have knowledge 
of Hebrew, English or Arabic, a good ‘character’ and residence in 
Palestine for two out of three years prior to their naturalisation. In 
addition, applicants paid minimal fees and gave an oath of loyalty 
to the government.39 The straightforward nature of the procedure 
suggests that debate over it was initially limited. In fact, the question 
of British naturalisation for Arab, Jewish and other civil servants in 
the Palestinian Government entered into discussion at the local and 
imperial levels fi rst. In early 1926 discussions between the Colonial 
Offi ce and the Palestine Government drew attention to questions of 
naturalisation procedure, highlighting the questionable status of the 
Palestine Mandate as part of the British colonial empire. The Colo-
nial Offi ce regarded naturalisation, whether to British or Palestinian 
citizenship, as a practice to be carried out entirely as provided for in 
United Kingdom legislation.40 The debate further demonstrated the 
unique situation of the mandate – as not a traditional colony but 
under Colonial Offi ce jurisdiction – and Great Britain’s obligations 
toward the Zionist Organisation.
Prior to 1925, the Colonial Offi ce had questioned whether future 
Palestinian citizens employed in the Mandate Government could 
be granted British naturalisation. This practice was widespread 
in British colonies. The status of Palestine as a mandate and not 
a colony did not impact the decision of the Colonial Offi ce on the 
issue, and in the fi nal decades of empire subjecthood was often 
classifi ed along blurred lines.41 The basic criteria of who could be 
a ‘European’ fl uctuated in different colonial contexts in the early 
twentieth century,42 but colonial offi cials voiced worries about loy-
alty of Palestinians, particularly Jewish citizens, to Great Britain. 
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In certain cases, as one offi cial explained, it would be ‘inexpedient’ 
to view Palestinians as subjects of the empire because the British 
Government ‘[has] brought into being the “Palestinian Citizen.” 
If we proceed to convert him into a British subject by naturalisation, 
we shall expose ourselves to criticism.’ Such a practice would go 
against the policy of the government to foster a Jewish (and strictly 
not British) national home. Palestine was considered a protected 
state with a local nationality but even so it became mandate practice 
to allow non-British or non-Palestinian civil servants in Palestine 
to choose the citizenship of either Great Britain or Palestine, pend-
ing the authorisation of the high commissioner.43 In imperial think-
ing, this cultivated loyalty to the empire. Any alien to Palestine who 
obtained (British) imperial naturalisation inside Palestine (such as a 
civil servant) was to be recognised legally – although not necessarily 
politically – as a British subject everywhere, including within Pales-
tine.44 The option for civil servants to naturalise as British subjects 
seemed an attractive one, but in practice Palestinian citizens had 
British protection outside of Palestine just as British subjects did, 
although they had no political rights. 
Palestinian naturalisation translated into enfranchisement for 
Jewish immigrants and only the names of citizens could be added to 
communal voting registers. Yet, a signifi cant number of immigrants 
did not actually naturalise as citizens for reasons explained in subse-
quent chapters. On one level, this led to the administration’s reassess-
ment of naturalisation policies.45 In 1929, Norman Bentwich stressed 
that naturalisation needed to appeal to as many Jewish immigrants 
as possible. He initially claimed that fees to naturalise hindered the 
policy meant ‘to encourage settlers to adopt Palestinian citizenship’.46 
In the fi rst instance, the Palestine Administration attempted to ensure 
that naturalisation procedures for married women and minor chil-
dren conformed to imperial legislation. Women married to Pales-
tinian citizens took on the nationality of their spouses in line with 
British Dominions legislation. The citizenship and nationality status 
of women and children required clarifi cation as cases of marriage 
and divorce both increased from 1930 and, specifi cally, offi cials took 
marriages and divorces very seriously in light of demands for quo-
tas and restrictions on Jewish immigration. Immigration authorities 
required proof of legitimate marriages between Jewish Palestinian 
citizens and foreigners, and obtaining such proof often presented an 
obstacle to naturalisation of new immigrants. 
An additional difference in the practice of naturalisation between 
Arab and Jewish Palestinians involved minor children. The local 
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administration sought to standardise the two sets of rules through 
which minor children not born in Palestine received citizenship 
through parents. The British, through little fault of their own, inter-
acted quite differently with Jewish men who nautralised as citizens 
and had minor children to add to naturalisation certifi cates than 
they did with Arab natives of Palestine who sought to have chil-
dren who were born abroad granted ipso facto citizenship. As noted 
elsewhere, the Colonial Offi ce had been especially clear that chil-
dren born to native Arab parents who resided outside Palestine and 
did not have Palestinian citizenship were not to be considered Pal-
estinian. Additionally, the Colonial and Home Offi ces agreed that 
Palestinian citizens who lived abroad could not register the birth of 
their children at British consulates. It seems from reports of consuls 
in the Americas and the Arab press that Arab citizens tended to be 
resident abroad more often than Jewish citizens when their children 
were born. The policy meant that British consuls, especially in Latin 
America with its population of Arabs in the tens of thousands, did 
not have exact records on the number of Palestinians by descent resi-
dent in their districts. Jewish immigrants to Palestine, or naturalised 
citizens returned from travels abroad, could add their minor children 
to their naturalisation certifi cates even if the children had not been 
born inside mandate territory.47 Finally, it should be noted that Arabs 
(as well as the few Palestinian Jews who migrated) in Latin America, 
particularly those involved in peddling or trade, often resided far 
from any consular offi ce and that rendered attempts to register them-
selves or their children nearly impossible by reason of geographical 
location. It can be argued that the local administration’s stress on the 
standardisation of provisions for minor children as well as the prac-
tice of registering children abroad was done to keep Palestine in line 
with imperial policy and to ensure consistency in any Foreign Offi ce 
instructions to consuls who came across natives of Palestine. 
Instances of dual nationality plagued both Jewish immigrants 
and the Palestine Administration and these complicated efforts at 
regulation. It must be recalled that dual nationality was acceptable 
only for Jewish immigrants in Palestine. Arabs born in Palestine 
who lived abroad could not return to their homeland as citizens if 
they acquired any new nationality, including that of Turkey. This 
offi cial stance against dual nationality was not unusual in emerg-
ing nation-states. On the one hand, dual nationality undermined the 
link between an individual and a sovereign state, while, on the other, 
it multiplied claims to protections and rights.48 Dependent on the 
regulations of the country from which Jewish immigrants came, an 
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application to naturalise in Palestine could lead to the revocation 
of individual, original nationalities. In these cases, immigrants were 
stripped of their former nationality and rendered stateless even if 
they were refused naturalisation in Palestine. Such immigrants faced 
a similar situation to that of Palestinian Arab emigrants who could 
not claim Palestinian citizenship: they became stateless, without con-
sular protection and without a valid passport. This was most often 
the case for the Jewish immigrants from states in Eastern Europe that 
refused to accept dual nationality of natives. It is perhaps for this 
reason that by the end of the 1920s many of the early immigrants to 
Palestine retained their provisional nationality certifi cates and were 
reluctant to opt for citizenship.
Palestine and imperial offi cials devoted signifi cant amounts of 
energy in their attempts to rectify the problems posed by dual nation-
ality, particularly the deportation of naturalised citizens from Pales-
tine. The mandate administration had the power to deport anyone 
refused Palestinian citizenship, disloyal to the administration or who 
carried citizenship while resident abroad. Once a naturalised Jewish 
citizen was deported by immigration authorities in Palestine, Great 
Britain and the Palestine Government were under no obligation to 
offer that former citizen diplomatic protection. Colonial offi cials 
such as Gerard Clauson proposed to ask foreign countries not to 
strip deported or non-naturalised Jewish immigrants of their origi-
nal nationality in order to avoid instances of statelessness. Even so, 
by 1930 some European governments forced Jewish emigrants to 
renounce their nationality before they left for Palestine.49 Colonial 
Secretary Leopold Amery advised Assistant Under-Secretary for the 
Colonies John Shuckburgh that the Jewish immigrants without Pal-
estinian citizenship were liable to be deported for not complying 
with the provisions of the citizenship and immigration legislation. 
It is noteworthy that the colonial secretary also tried to induce some 
foreign governments to accept their former nationals who had been 
deported from Palestine.50 
By the end of the 1920s, the remonstrations by a number of Pal-
estinian Arabs against what they perceived as the citizenship order’s 
failure to adequately address the nationality status of emigrants, as 
explained in the previous chapter, drew the attention of the high 
commissioner and added to the uncertainties over proposed changes 
to the 1925 order. Due to the active protest campaign led by the 
Committee for the Defence of Arab Emigrant Rights to Palestin-
ian Nationality (DAER), beginning in 1927, certain colonial admin-
istrators took a greater interest in applications for citizenship by 
5028_Banko.indd   132 24/06/16   4:34 PM
distinctions between arab and jewish palestinian citizens | 133
Palestinian natives who resided outside of Palestine. Yet the opin-
ions in the local administration and the Cabinet varied over how 
closely connected these individuals were to Palestine, hindering 
a unanimous resolution. Still, the protests forced the hand of the 
Colonial Offi ce: it reconsidered rejections of citizenship as a result 
of the large numbers of petitions received from Palestinian com-
munities in South and Central America from 1925 to 1930. In 1927 
Colonial Secretary Amery seemed inclined to support extension of 
citizenship to emigrants who maintained a connection with their 
native land.51 As seemed to be the trend regarding the mandate, the 
Foreign and Home Offi ces disagreed and, guided by imperial rea-
soning, continued to instruct British consular offi cials not to accept 
applications from individuals whom they deemed to want citizen-
ship for the purpose of obtaining diplomatic protection. High Com-
missioner Plumer advised colonial offi cials that individuals must 
show a ‘genuine desire to resume their connection with Palestine’ in 
order to receive consent to travel to Palestine and naturalise. Still, 
the Foreign Offi ce declined to stray from its policy on diplomatic 
and consular protection and it rejected thousands of applicants for 
citizenship through the latter 1920s, in spite of their possession of 
Ottoman identity documents.52 
Colonial offi cials in Britain initiated serious discussion of an 
amendment to the Citizenship Order-in-Council in 1929 after the 
violence and rioting that summer in Palestine and because of the 
unresolved issues that affected the acquisition and revocation of 
citizenship for both groups. Even prior to the riots, Colonial Offi ce 
Legal Advisor J. S. Risley supported the change in certain provisions 
of the legislation and wrote in a memo that the order-in-council’s 
use of terms and its ambiguities was ‘just the sort of enterprise’ from 
the mind of Attorney-General Bentwich who ‘loves the loose gen-
eralities of International Law’.53 These loose generalities, such as 
the meaning of nationality and citizenship in the international con-
text, were not the only stumbling blocks to amending the order. The 
synthesis of colonial and imperial legislation and the internation-
alised nature of citizenship in Palestine not only made the mandate 
legislation unique but also weakened its international standing and 
recognition. Bentwich, too, complicated matters because of his lack 
of experience in colonial administration and, according to some col-
leagues, in English law.54 Additionally, statements by the Colonial 
Offi ce suggest a general feeling that because some emigrants had not 
expressed interest in returning to Palestine, the majority of individu-
als in the diaspora had the same attitude. 
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By December 1927, Secretary of State for the Colonies, William 
Ormsby-Gore, discussed the Palestine Government’s proposal to 
reconsider those rejected claims for citizenship that were made in 
time by emigrants who were legally Ottoman subjects and left Pales-
tine before, during or after 1920 (and had since returned and resided 
for at least six months). In opposition to imperial policy, Ormsby-
Gore suggested that any Palestinian by birth who resided abroad 
with the newly created Turkish nationality would be ‘freely granted 
permission to visit or settle in Palestine with his family’. This sug-
gestion did not take into account stateless Palestinians who did not 
possess Turkish nationality papers but did possess Ottoman identity 
documents. According to Ormsby-Gore, the extent to which Pales-
tinian communities abroad took advantage of this concession would 
be regarded as the measurement of the genuine attachment of the 
entire community to Palestine. These emigrants should fi nd it easy, 
he continued, to fulfi l the conditions to be naturalised ‘if their prin-
ciple interests be in Palestine’.55 Yet, the key issue for determining 
the emigrants’ eligibility for citizenship was the period of time they 
resided outside Palestine.
A single amendment to Article 1 of the order came under consider-
ation by 1929. The basis of Article 1 was that former Ottoman sub-
jects habitually resident in Palestine on 6 August 1924 were entitled 
by the Treaty of Lausanne to Palestinian citizenship.56 Risley suggested 
the addition to Article 1 of an amended clause that allowed for ‘treaty 
nationality’. This meant that former Ottoman subjects who were 
habitually resident in Palestine on the date that the Treaty of Lausanne 
went into force (6 August 1924) but left before 1 August 1925 and 
returned anytime after without another nationality would be entitled 
to make a declaration of the retention of Palestinian citizenship. The 
Foreign Offi ce called such a provision unnecessary and suggested that 
the rest of the order should be amended instead of Article 1.57 How-
ever, provisions for treaty nationality would not have affected the vast 
majority of emigrants who left Palestine before August 1924. Within 
the Palestine Administration, High Commissioner Plumer recognised 
the need to make some concessions. He asked the Colonial Offi ce to 
agree to a consideration of applications for Palestinian citizenship 
by Ottoman subjects who resided in Palestine until October 1924 – 
several months after the Treaty of Lausanne came into effect – and 
then left, returning by 1927 to Palestine.58 This was only the minimum 
concession that the emigrants and their lobbyists had campaigned for. 
The subjective review of applications by the administration and the 
Foreign Offi ce did little to ease the hardships of emigrants not entitled 
to citizenship or entry to Palestine.
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Another entirely different idea came from Bentwich, representa-
tive of the local administration rather than Whitehall. Rather than an 
amendment to provide treaty nationality, he suggested that individu-
als resort to the court system. A court’s job would be to determine 
the habitual residency of Palestinian applicants for citizenship. Of 
course, the practice of obtaining court decisions on applications for 
citizenship from Palestinians abroad would be logistically diffi cult 
and time-consuming. Bentwich proposed other ideas that the Arabs 
found more favourable to their demands, including one in particular 
that would allow for any person who left Palestine during 1924 or 
1925 and returned within fi ve years to be regarded as a habitual resi-
dent according to the citizenship order’s Article 1.59 The implementa-
tion of this plan would have entitled these individuals to citizenship 
and it also offered the longest extension period for natives to choose 
citizenship as yet suggested by a mandate offi cial. It also allowed 
returning emigrants to ‘be treated as Palestinians as of right and not 
by naturalisation [which] is a great moment to those involved’, mean-
ing the Arab emigrants and their supporters. Bentwich’s proposal 
acknowledged and refl ected the argument of the emigrants against 
naturalisation and supported their demand for citizenship by right 
of nationality (haqq al-jinsiyya). He argued that this would bring the 
Treaty of Lausanne’s provisions and the order-in-council into closer 
conformity as the treaty gave Ottoman subjects habitually resident 
in territories detached from the Empire after the war the ipso facto 
nationality of the state those territories were transferred to, on the 
conditions of local laws within them.60 The Foreign Offi ce countered 
that the period for option for emigrants be changed to four years 
rather than fi ve.61 
In a subsequent memo from the Foreign Offi ce to the Colonial 
Offi ce, the Foreign Secretary wrote in 1929 that the entire citizen-
ship order-in-council should be amended. In other words, he felt that 
inserting new amendments to articles would not be suffi cient. The 
following year the Colonial Offi ce came to the same conclusion.62 
Although both offi ces agreed that the British Government should rat-
ify an entirely new order, other governmental departments as well as 
the Palestine Administration were asked to contribute to drafting the 
proposed amended order. Almost immediately after this agreement, 
the Foreign and Home Offi ces expressed differences of opinion over 
the draft’s new and re-worked provisions.63 One of the initial dis-
agreements concerned the distribution of power and, by extension, 
sovereignty, between the Palestine Administration and Whitehall in 
situations of granting or revoking the naturalisation or citizenship 
of Palestinian Arabs and Jews.64 In particular, one provision of the 
5028_Banko.indd   135 24/06/16   4:34 PM
136 | the invention of palestinian citizenship, 1918–1947
amended order draft gave high commissioners the power to revoke 
the citizenship from Palestinian natives who resided abroad but 
returned to Palestine to take citizenship after 1924, as well as from 
Jews who arrived to Palestine from 1918 to 1925.65 
In July 1931, the British Government won out over Bentwich and 
local administrators: it ratifi ed the newly written order, titled as the 
1931 Palestine (Amendment) Citizenship Order-in-Council. It incor-
porated the provision for treaty nationality and gave four years from 
the date of issue to allow native-born Palestinians to claim citizenship. 
Ottoman subjects who were habitually resident in Palestine before 
1 August 1925 received ipso facto Palestinian citizenship unless they 
had acquired another nationality prior to the amendment. Yet, the 
Home Offi ce reaffi rmed that native-born Palestinians resident abroad 
must maintain a substantial connection to Palestine to qualify for 
ipso facto treaty nationality – periodic visits to the territory were not 
enough.66 The administration in Jerusalem benefi ted from the new 
amendment. It gave a signifi cant measure of autonomy to the high 
commissioner, as it granted to his offi ce the explicit power to revoke 
or annul a certifi cate of naturalisation for any reason deemed legiti-
mate.67 This change contrasted with the near-hierarchy of Whitehall 
over local administrators in immigration and naturalisation legisla-
tion. In sum, the amended citizenship order did not radically alter the 
original order nor allow for a signifi cant number of Palestinian Arab 
emigrants to return to Palestine as citizens. In fact, only those Arabs 
who left in the year between the ratifi cation of the Lausanne Treaty 
and the issue of the 1925 citizenship order qualifi ed to return as such. 
Colonial administrators drafted the amended order during a time of 
change with the departure of both High Commissioner Chancellor 
and the attorney-general. The latter was a signifi cant change. Bent-
wich, who had become somewhat the resident expert on nationality 
legislation, was replaced by Harry Trusted in 1931.68 The secretary, 
under-secretary and other staff positions in the Colonial Offi ce were 
also re-shuffl ed. These administrative changes, plus new develop-
ments in the internal political situation in Palestine hampered any 
general agreement between all departments involved.
The Amended Order, Subversive Citizens
and the International Context
In the years immediately after the approval of the 1931 Palestine 
(Amendment) Citizenship Order-in-Council, the Mandate adminis-
tration and London were forced to consider the international travel 
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of Palestine’s citizens. The citizenship order amendment came during 
a time period of heightened surveillance over populations and indi-
viduals in transit within British – and French – territories. As a result, 
the distinctions in the application of the order did not necessarily 
privilege all Jewish immigrants. In the interwar period, the Colo-
nial Offi ce and Palestine’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) 
increasingly feared a connection between Bolshevism, anarchism 
and communism with Palestine’s urban, secular Jewish population.69 
A quiet, yet persistent, discourse that certain European Jews were 
subversive, disloyal and international conspirators grew alongside 
wider imperial apprehension over workers’ unions, labour strikes 
and anti-colonial protests.70 Such fears within the wider context of 
Bolshevist and communist anxieties were also prevalent in the Arabic 
press as well as among those colonial offi cials who did not fully sup-
port the Zionist project in Palestine and their counterparts in Iraq.
By virtue of the 1931 amended citizenship order the high com-
missioners had the power to grant or revoke any person’s citizen-
ship and the latter action was threatened more frequently after 1930 
against Jews. Jewish citizens who resided outside of Palestine in con-
travention of the residency clause faced the possibility of having their 
citizenship revoked or annulled. Mandate authorities began to place 
some of these Jews into the category of ‘undesirable persons’ due to 
their political beliefs, morals and suspected subversive acts.71 Still, 
the action of revoking the naturalisation of these ‘undesirables’ put 
Palestine’s high commissioners in an awkward position: they faced the 
British Government’s concern – and perhaps guilt – that the removal 
of Palestinian citizenship rendered certain Jewish immigrants from 
Eastern Europe stateless and unable to be easily deported. 
Throughout the 1920s, immigration authorities in the British 
Empire and elsewhere tightened controls on the entry of Eastern 
European immigrants, fearing the spread of Bolshevik as well as anti-
colonial propaganda. Prior to the First World War, Great Britain had 
set up special immigration controls for suspected subversive aliens 
who may incite political violence or anti-colonial riots.72 By the inter-
war period, the international range of Palestine’s potential Jewish cit-
izens elicited similar fears among offi cials and the CID. As discussed 
above, the British supported a particular type of Jewish immigrant, 
and so it comes as little surprise that in the late 1920s High Commis-
sioner Chancellor expressed anxiety over Eastern European and Rus-
sian Jews who immigrated to Palestine. Certain anticipation existed 
that the socialist and internationalist affi liations of these immigrants 
translated into a lack of patriotism and loyalty to Palestine and to 
Great Britain.73 Before 1931, the high commissioners recommended 
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the annulment of citizenship of a small number of ‘unsavoury’ 
Jewish immigrants. In the metropole, the Foreign Offi ce rather than 
the local administration faced the repercussions of these annulments 
and deportations when it attempted to negotiate with other coun-
tries to allow their natives to return. Most deportations of Palestine’s 
naturalised citizens did not affect only the deportee. With the removal 
of the citizenship of an adult male came the revocation of the same 
status of his wife and children. Although revocations and deporta-
tions did in fact happen, they refl ected poorly on the facilitation of 
Jewish immigration and they alarmed the Zionist Organisation.
Three years after the issue of the amended citizenship order, it 
was evident that the amendment had done little to clarify the intri-
cacies of Palestinian citizenship as it related to imperial policy. 
Dominions Offi ce member K. O. Roberts-Wray stated that it was 
an ‘indisputable fact’ that the legislation, including provisions on 
the revocation of naturalisation and the annulment of citizenship, 
was never intended to deny any Palestinian Jew of his citizenship. 
Roberts-Wray saw no reason for Palestine to be ‘guided strictly’ 
by the United Kingdom nationality laws and practices in matters 
of nationality and de-naturalisation, both of which did not always 
favour the Jewish national home project. Despite increased threats 
to Great Britain from so-called communist propaganda in overseas 
territories, Roberts-Wray expressed alarm at proposals to allow the 
Palestine Government to de-naturalise those long-standing Pales-
tinian Jewish citizens who were believed to have left Palestine and 
travelled for the purpose of obtaining communist propaganda. He 
emphasised that individuals who became Jewish citizens by virtue of 
provisional certifi cates of nationality granted before 1925 could not 
be de-naturalised in any circumstance.74 In fact, implementing such a 
provision to (as the Foreign Offi ce claimed) allow the Palestine Gov-
ernment to ‘keep these dangerous elements outside Palestine’, would 
risk confrontation with Zionist leadership.75 Other colonial offi cials 
suggested withholding travel facilities so that ‘indoctrinated’ people 
could not leave Palestine.76 A memo from the Dominions Offi ce to 
Sir John Maffey, the Under-secretary of State for the Colonies in 
1934, offered support for the proposal to deprive Palestinian citi-
zenship from any Arab or Jew who went to the Soviet Union for 
what was referred to as a course in communist propaganda. How-
ever, many of those accused as subversives had citizenship by virtue 
of their prior Ottoman nationality or habitual residence in Palestine 
and the administration had never proposed removing citizenship 
from these individuals.77 
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Attorney-General Trusted, Bentwich’s replacement, noted his 
wish to minimise confl ict with the Zionist Organisation when he 
wrote in a memo to the Department of Immigration in 1934 that 
three years’ residence abroad for a naturalised Palestinian Jew was 
‘not enough [cause] to revoke Palestinian citizenship’. He referred to 
the case of a Jewish immigrant who was given a certifi cate of natu-
ralisation in 1929 despite his apparent residence in Morocco since 
1927. When the individual applied to renew his Palestinian passport 
in 1934, offi cials questioned whether he had lost his connection to 
Palestine due to his seven-year residence abroad. The individual in 
question gave evidence in favour of retaining citizenship. He claimed 
that he refused French citizenship in Morocco, owned immovable 
property in Palestine and that Palestine was his home country. The 
administration decided to renew his passport for three years on the 
condition that he returned to Palestine to reside permanently before 
it expired.78 In addition, the commissioner for migration and sta-
tistics duly posted (often multiple) letters of warning to those Jew-
ish citizens resident outside of Palestine for three or more years that 
offered them the chance to refute the accusation that they had lost 
their connection to Palestine and that they forfeited their citizenship 
and passports. In a number of cases, citizens’ justifi cations of being 
too poor or ill to return to Palestine in due time to affi rm their con-
nection to that territory resulted in leniency by mandate offi cials and 
instructions to British consuls to renew the Palestinian passports of 
these citizens.79 
The disinterest in (or lack of ability on the part of the administra-
tion in Jerusalem) the revocation of Palestine passports in absentia 
often received mention in the Arabic press. Articles and nationalist 
leaders again accused the immigration offi cials of biases that allowed 
for Jewish citizens who settled outside of Palestine for a number of 
years to retain Palestine passports. A closer understanding of the 
application of imperial policy sheds light on the Arabs’ claims. In 
1928 the press reported on a new article to the mandate’s immi-
gration law meant to punish, with three months’ imprisonment and 
a fi ne of 100 lira, any immigrant who lied about his or her birth 
date or name in his or her passport. In response, an Arab journal-
ist ironically questioned how the government intended to punish 
the immigrant ‘who carries three passports in his pocket for at least 
three different nationalities’.80 While emigrants and their supporters 
within Palestine accused policy-makers of attempting to increase the 
number of Jewish Palestinian citizens in possession of passports and, 
as a consequence, diplomatic protection, British actions again make 
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some sense in light of imperial and diplomatic concerns. In 1927, 
Khalil Marcos, an emigrant and secretary of the Nablus Commit-
tee in support of the Palestinian Arab Congress, wrote to the high 
commissioner that 25,000 Palestinian natives lived in Latin America 
and were not considered citizens of Palestine. The number alone is 
signifi cant – the number of Jewish Palestinian citizens who resided 
abroad was likely well under 1,000 and these citizens had passports. 
Throughout the entirety of the mandate’s existence, the Foreign 
Offi ce saw these Arab emigrants, most of whom did not have Pal-
estinian passports, as a ‘class’ that was simply too large, too wide-
spread and too unmanageable. The Foreign Offi ce could not conceive 
of allowing this number of people to depend upon British diplomatic 
protection and call upon British consular resources. Furthermore, 
from the British Government’s point of view, British offi cials were 
doing as they were obliged to do under the terms of the mandate and 
the Treaty of Lausanne – that was to treat these emigrants as if they 
had acquiring ipso facto Turkish nationality after 1926.81 The fact 
that the latter process simply could not happen under international 
law did not impact British reasoning. The Jewish Palestinian émigrés, 
however, could be easily managed by British consuls in terms of their 
smaller numbers, residence in European and French North African 
urban locales, and the ability of consuls to keep tabs on where their 
passports were used.
At the crux of the governmental disagreements that continued 
even after the 1931 amended citizenship order was the idea that 
revocation of citizenship held by Jews refl ected poorly on the govern-
ment’s efforts to facilitate a Jewish national home. Still, other colonial 
administrators believed that certain immigrants had the potential to 
subvert and behave in a disloyal manner to both the Palestine Admin-
istration and Great Britain. Not only were Jewish male immigrants 
suspect, but in the early 1930s the status of Jewish female immi-
grants became a contentious one in the light of international politics. 
For example, in opposition to the opinion by H. F. Downie, the head 
of the Middle East Department, High Commissioner Chancellor and 
the Colonial Offi ce did not entirely support the empire-wide regula-
tion that when a man’s citizenship was revoked, his wife and chil-
dren lost theirs as well.82 One proposed, but unaccepted, amendment 
to the citizenship order concerned certain ‘undesirable’ women who 
sought a Palestinian passport and citizenship. This category included 
prostitutes, criminals and political offenders who married Palestin-
ian citizens in order to obtain citizenship and British protection. 
In accordance with the citizenship order’s Article 13, alien women 
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who became Palestinian citizens by marriage would not cease to be 
Palestinians if they divorced their husbands. These women had legal 
citizenship, but the administration also targeted for deportation the 
Jewish women who resided illegally in Palestine without citizenship 
of their own. Colonial offi cials lobbied before 1931 for the insertion 
of an amendment in the citizenship order to the effect that an alien 
woman could not acquire citizenship as a consequence of marriage 
or if she was faced with a deportation order as an ‘undesirable’ or 
otherwise labeled as a ‘bad character.’83 The detailed and lengthy dis-
cussions of these particular cases in the archives are perhaps indica-
tive of their frequency by the early 1930s. 
The debate over how to grant Palestinian naturalisation was part 
of an Empire-wide debate over the status of married women and the 
retention of their original nationality. In 1932, the Home Offi ce (with 
the support of the Foreign Offi ce) stated that it had no objection in 
principle to preventing any Jewish immigrant from receiving Pales-
tinian citizenship upon marriage, but noted international standards. 
Those standards specifi cally included the progressive 1930 Hague 
Convention principles that, although unsigned by Great Britain, 
maintained that all women retained their original nationality upon 
marriage. In that case, ‘undesirable’ women would not be stateless 
in the event of deportation.84 In reality, few divorced women were 
classifi ed as undesirable and they kept their Palestinian citizenship. 
Despite this, Palestine’s high commissioner in 1931, Arthur Wau-
chope, argued that the practice to allow women suspected of coming 
to Palestine to enter into false marriages and thus acquire citizenship 
was inconsistent with British nationality laws. He summarised his 
opinion thus: divorced women stayed in Palestine ‘free to continue 
their objectionable activities . . . with all the privileges of indefeasible 
Palestinian nationality’. At the same time, offi cials in Britain sug-
gested that the British nationality law, particularly as it applied to 
the Dominions, be changed to allow for separate naturalisation of 
husband and wife. This change, supported in the metropole, would 
have been complicated and expensive to implement in Palestine, 
and it threatened to curtain the immigration of Jewish women.85 
Wauchope suggested that future legislation must give Jewish wives 
the opportunity of separate naturalisation from their husbands ‘on 
very easy terms’, to assure women that they could naturalise quickly 
and easily upon their arrival with their spouses to Palestine.86
This debate again emphasises that the Palestine Mandate occu-
pied a unique position in the wider British Empire. Debates over 
the separate naturalisation for Jewish spouses underscore the distinct 
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bureaucratic measures envisaged by Jerusalem and Whitehall with 
regards to citizenship where the Jewish community was involved. 
The implementation of measures upon the Arab community and 
especially Muslim women was not mentioned, perhaps for fear of 
not treading upon Islamic family law. In support of the proposal for 
separate naturalisation for Jewish women, one colonial offi cial wrote 
that unless the high commissioner and Foreign Offi ce saw ‘strong 
practical objections to this (as opposed to objections based merely 
on principle and on the analogy of British practice), . . . the spe-
cial circumstances arising in Palestine should prevail’.87 The debate 
over separate naturalisation in Palestine extended to the Dominions 
Offi ce of the British Government in whose interest it was to ensure 
that nationality legislation was as uniform as possible throughout 
the Empire.88 
The Dominions Offi ce, which had considerable infl uence over wider 
imperial policy even beyond the management of its territories, held the 
opposite opinion on female naturalisation. Its comments refl ect how 
by 1933 Palestine came to be perceived in matters of nationality. To 
the Colonial Offi ce, Assistant Secretary of the Dominions Offi ce C. W. 
Dixon replied the following:
It would be rather a pity if so fundamental a change from existing 
British practice was made in a territory under Mandate of His Maj-
esty, as it might be quoted by some of the Dominions as an argument 
in favour of the view that the law of nationality as regards married 
women in relation to nationality of the Dominion concerned need 
not be the same as that in relation to British nationality. It is not 
likely that any Dominion would wish to copy Palestine . . . as the 
Dominions which attach most importance to the idea of separate 
Dominion nationality are those which are strongest on maintaining 
uniformity of nationality between husband and wife . . . Our answer 
would, I suppose, have to be that already suggested to FO, and HO, 
viz. that Palestine citizenship is not ‘nationality.’
In suggesting that Palestinian citizenship was not like British nationality, 
Dixon maintained that nationality legislation in the Dominions would 
not necessarily effect how Palestinian individuals acquired citizenship, 
in opposition to the belief of the Palestine Administration. He added 
that if the matter of independent naturalisation for wives was one of 
‘fi rst-class importance’, the possible embarrassment in the Dominions 
over policy contradictions should not be suffi cient grounds to refuse 
Wauchope’s suggested proposal.89 The Palestine Administration in 
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1933 consulted with Whitehall and asked the British Government to 
opt for separate naturalisation. Great Britain refused to consider the 
proposal not only since it diverted from Empire-wide policy, but also 
because the administration had not shown that the situation in Pal-
estine necessitated that a departure from uniformity was justifi able. 
Defeated when the scheme of separate naturalisations was not imple-
mented, the Colonial Offi ce cautioned that conditions of immigration 
in Palestine ‘rendered abuses of nationality laws more than ordinarily 
dangerous’ in light of the political activities of certain male and female 
Jewish immigrants.90 
In the early 1920s, Great Britain had argued that Palestinian citi-
zenship was not a sovereign, internationally recognised nationality 
in accordance with British nationality law. Furthermore, the law 
offi cers of the Empire had previously stated that Palestine was not 
a foreign state. Since Article 7 of the mandate gave the Palestine 
Administration the responsibility to enact a nationality law, offi cials 
suggested in the early 1930s that it would be diffi cult ‘to contend 
that the obligation imposed by that Article has not been discharged 
by the making of the Palestine Citizenship Order of 1925’. Still the 
Foreign Offi ce argued that Palestinian citizenship was not the same 
as Palestinian nationality, and that it did ‘not think it ought to be so 
. . . [Offi cials] do not regard Palestinian citizenship as “nationality.” ’ 
In other words, it was possible to claim that Palestinian nationality 
did not exist since the Palestine Administration had not yet enacted 
a nationality law. Nationality then did not exist in Palestine in a 
political or ethnic sense. Rather the British Government had passed 
a citizenship order-in-council and the citizenship it created simply 
conferred a non-political legal subjectivity, and the promise of a 
Palestine passport that granted imperial diplomatic and consular 
protection only for those citizens who travelled outside of the man-
date’s borders. Thus, the Palestine Administration could possibly be 
charged with not carrying out Article 7 of the mandate.91 Since the 
administration itself did not pass a nationality law, citizenship could 
be imposed and manipulated from London and the Colonial Offi ce, 
making the inhabitants of Palestine akin to colonial citizen-subjects. 
Similar to the discussion of independent naturalisation of women, 
the British Government was reluctant to set precedents of legislation 
in Palestine even in light of the increased threat of political agitation 
in Europe and in other British territories. The British Government 
connected threats of political agitation with the Arab community as 
well, particularly after Colonial Secretary Passfi eld recognised the 
struggle of the Arabs to attain rights as a ‘separate race’ in Palestine. 
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Against the constant Jewish immigration, an estimated 30,000 
Palestinian Arab emigrants and their children remained without 
citizenship by the mid-1930s, whether they wished for that status 
or not. The timing is important: discriminatory immigration quo-
tas and naturalisation policies against Arabs in the United States 
meant that Palestinians there did not become new American citi-
zens. In Latin American countries, xenophobic immigration policies 
restricted Arab settlement and access to employment, and state-
less Palestinians found themselves threatened with deportation and 
being unable to take on a new nationality due to lack of identity 
documents.92 The Passfi eld Letter linked the political inferiority and 
the lack of political rights of the Palestinian Arab citizenry with 
increased political agitation against British policy and the Zionist 
movement.93 For example, Lord Islington, in a speech to Parliament 
in mid-1934, stated ‘though fulfi lling the duties of citizenship, [the 
Arabs] are totally without its rights’.94 This situation, as he noted, 
explained the increased political agitation in Palestine and that agi-
tation was a sentiment that administrations in Palestine and London 
soon echoed.
Conclusion
The policy to facilitate the Jewish national home in Palestine encour-
aged a kind of settler-colonialism through citizenship legislation and 
its application. Jewish immigrants who settled in Palestine received 
naturalisation quickly and alongside of this came British imperial 
protection in the form of citizenship and passports. The inclusive sta-
tus of ‘the citizen’ and the privileges that came with it vis-à-vis British 
policy benefi ted immigrants who wished to help with the national 
home project. Arabs from outside Palestine, of course, did not have 
the option to take on Palestinian citizenship or settle. The British 
in Palestine and the Yishuv leadership saw the Jews as belonging to 
a distinct race that had not mattered for the Jewish community in 
Palestine prior to the mandate, argues Shira Robinson, while at the 
same time holding Palestinian citizenship.95 Efforts by the Yishuv to 
promote exclusive Jewish land and labour ownership and employ-
ment posited the Jewish immigrants, or at least the mainly Ashkenazi 
immigrants, as more European and white than the ‘native’ Arabic-
speaking population. This characterisation, and the entrepreneur-
ial promise of progress (and the promise of independent fi nancial 
means for this progress) in Palestine through Jewish immigration, 
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also impacted the favourable perception by the British Government 
of Jewish immigration, settlement and, by extension, citizenship. 
In many cases, the application of citizenship provisions and the 
naturalisation of Jewish immigrants confl icted with Empire-wide 
nationality laws, and the Palestine Administration and British Gov-
ernment shaped the regulations to fi t in with mandate policy but 
also to ease tensions between departments and offi cials responsible 
for different aspects of administration. Favouritism for Jewish immi-
grants, as some administrators and Arab leaders claimed, was not 
the driving force behind the application of citizenship and naturali-
sation policies. At the same time, different approaches by adminis-
trators to procedure served to reinforce Britain’s rule in Palestine: 
since standard policy and agreements on even the small details of 
citizenship legislation were usually hard to come by, complaints by 
the Arabs over contraventions of policy had little basis. Meanwhile 
the attempts to institutionalise citizenship refl ected the differences 
between citizenship for Jewish immigrants and citizenship for former 
Ottoman subjects. The experiences of colonial offi cials who served 
elsewhere in British territories prior to their service in Palestine infl u-
enced certain nationality, naturalisation and immigration regula-
tions that were implemented in the mandated territory. Indeed, the 
language used by colonial offi cials in reference to immigration and 
the population of Palestine refl ected certain colonial ideologies and 
understandings. For example, Palestinian Arabs and Palestinian Jews 
were viewed as separate races in the colonial vocabulary of national 
identity. Jewish Palestinian citizens were treated as more akin to Brit-
ish subjects in matters of immigration and travel by virtue of the 
fact that since their naturalisation was recorded, they easily received 
documentary identity in the form of passports and thus could claim 
diplomatic protection as Palestinian citizens while abroad. 
As the chapter demonstrates, the 1931 amended citizenship order 
came at a time of scrutiny of policy in Palestine by the British Gov-
ernment, but the order itself was not included in the larger scrutiny 
of policy by investigative commissions or the prime minister. Great 
Britain exercised power in the Palestine Mandate as if it was a col-
ony and, as such, offi cials expected inhabitant-subjects to maintain a 
measure of loyalty to the laws as well as the political beliefs of Great 
Britain. Consequently, Whitehall ultimately approved or rejected 
nationality and citizenship proposals, and took into consideration 
the imperial and the European contexts during the decades after 
the end of the First World War. In addition, the nature of citizen-
ship legislation as decentralised and constructed amidst competing 
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agendas and opinions clearly hindered smooth passage of amend-
ments or changes to the legislation. The hindrance can be attributed 
to the actions of different governmental departments, offi cial and 
unoffi cial advisers who all played a role in approving or challeng-
ing changes to mandate legislation. In sum, by 1931 the changes to 
the order-in-council of 1925 did not grant greater civic, political or 
social rights as requested by Arab nationalists – they simply affected 
a legal realm. The following two chapters devote specifi c attention to 
the changes in the Arabs’ understanding and application of political 
citizenship and rights during the 1930s. By the end of 1935 the ways 
in which the Palestine Administration classifi ed and treated the Arab 
citizens began to be dependent upon how volatile the political rela-
tionship became between the administration and the majority Arab 
population.
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Whose Rights to Citizenship? Expressions 
and Variations of Palestinian Mandate 
Citizenship, 1926–1935
. . . and when the children ask why no shops are open or salesmen 
are in the streets, the mother will answer that the Palestinian 
Arabs are striking to show the amount of dissatisfaction with the 
government and the Zionist policy . . . [This strike] will be civilised 
dissent.
‘Idrāb ghadān!’ [Strike Tomorrow!], 
Mir’at al-Sharq (22 August 1931)
In August 1931 a number of Palestinian Arab populist groups con-vened a congress in the city of Nablus that subsequently called a 
general strike throughout the territory to oppose British policy that 
allowed Jewish settlements to be armed.1 The main nationalist body 
in Palestine, the Arab Executive Committee, ultimately issued the offi -
cial call to strike on 23 August 1931 but the strike and demonstra-
tions would not have attracted the attention that they did without 
the growth of Palestinian civil society and its general emphasis on a 
number of demands for political, civil and national rights of the Arab 
population. Populist leaders, grassroots forums and civic associations 
converged to play a major role in the political community of Palestine 
by this time. In the decade after the order-in-council, new ideas of 
citizenship and what it entailed as a political status emerged out of 
the context of both civil society and popular politics. At the centre 
of these new ideas, expressions and vocabularies of Palestinian Arab 
citizenship was the Arabic press. The growth and popularity of the 
press allowed it to communicate legal developments and link these 
developments to the changing notions and the political mobilisation 
of Palestinian Arab citizenship.2 In other words, by the early 1930s, 
the Arab press succeeded in disseminating a new language, vocabulary 
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and ideology of citizenship rights and duties in the political, legal and 
social spheres in an increasingly easily understood fashion to a larger 
portion of the Arab population. 
After the visit of Lord Balfour to Palestine in 1925, newspapers 
referred to the rights, duties and practices of Arab citizens with more 
frequency. However, it was the administration’s plan to hold munici-
pal elections in 1926 that galvanised the press to delving into the 
links between legislation and the changing nature of the political and 
civil rights, as opposed to the strictly legalistic aspects, of citizen-
ship. Concepts such as rights, justice and legitimacy – heavily used 
in the press and written statements – were understood in large part 
through historical experiences of the rule of law in Palestine from the 
Ottoman Administration. Editors and writers constantly appealed 
for the reinstatement of a representative parliament, of laws delin-
eating the rights of all citizens vis-à-vis the government, and of a 
written constitution.3 They, and others, began to more frequently 
demand active expressions of discontent through boycotts, strikes, 
petitions and other non-cooperation measures. By 1926, newspa-
pers took on the task of informing their readers of the citizenship 
order’s provisions and, in particular, general mandate legislation that 
they argued favoured Jewish immigrants. Periodicals did not always 
report in precise detail the large amount of legislation issued in Pales-
tine4 but writers pointedly focused on regulations that privileged the 
Yishuv. In doing so, a particular journalistic tone became common-
place: legislation that negatively affected the livelihoods and political 
aspirations of the Arabs was conceived of as a negation of the rights 
associated with citizenship. 
The following historical analysis frames certain vocabularies, 
expressions and active behaviours of citizenship and national iden-
tity in the decade before the 1936 Palestine Revolt as more dominant 
and others as more subaltern. Importantly, it traces how citizenship 
became political and rights-based for the Palestinian Arab leader-
ship, despite the insistence by mandate offi cials that it be legal and 
apolitical. Citizenship has been described in more theoretical studies 
as a set of practices and as a bundle of civil, political and social rights 
and duties that defi ne an individual’s membership in his or her polity, 
and many of these rights come from practices of citizenship that are 
put into law.5 From the late 1920s through the mid-1930s, different 
Arabic-speaking social, political and civic groups in Palestine began 
to articulate a demand for this bundle of rights that went with mem-
bership in what they conceived as the nation-state polity of Palestine 
and, specifi cally, for rights to this ‘state’ rather than religious and civil 
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rights within the mandate, as guaranteed by the Balfour Declaration. 
Certain dominant and certain subaltern groups perceived entitlement 
to this bundle of rights in different ways. One group that highlighted 
the argument that rights should be given to all Palestinian natives 
was the populist Palestinian Arab Istiqlal (Independence) Party. The 
Istiqlal Party played a prominent, albeit brief, role in the process 
through which the young middle-class Arab leadership integrated the 
rhetorical nationalistic language of rights and duties into a repertoire 
of public and civic action. Their language emphasised the role of the 
subaltern citizens, such as the Arab workers, students and peasants, 
in laying claim to rights of political representation, employment and 
welfare.6 The rhetorical language and vocabulary used by this cross-
section of society further explains a number of distinctions between 
the British and Arab notions of Palestinian citizenship after 1925. 
The middle-class nationalist leadership was guided by pan-Arab 
and anti-colonial ideologies and attitudes, and many members of this 
community were urban-based. Some of these remained part of the 
Arab Executive as they shaped a new framework of populist (sha‘bī) 
politics that idealised all Palestinian Arabs as rights-bearing citizens, 
including previously non-political groups, under the banner of ‘the 
nation’. The chapter begins with an analysis of the increasingly vocal 
demands for citizenship rights after the issue of the 1925 Citizen-
ship Order-in-Council and prompted by legislation in the realms of 
municipal election laws and land and cultivators ordinances. Brit-
ish offi cials had no intention to offer political rights to the Palestin-
ian Arab citizens; rather, legislation reinforced the apolitical nature 
of citizenship. The Arabs’ reaction to this legislation infl uenced the 
changing language and expression of citizenship in the context of 
popular politics. The Istiqlal Party, which popularised Palestinian cit-
izenship as an inseparable political component of national identity, 
helped to spur this new approach. 
The more inclusive redefi nitions of Palestinian citizenship and 
civil and political rights after 1925 allowed for certain citizens to 
both have a greater stake in the nationalists’ political projects to 
shape belonging to the nation and to become empowered by iden-
tity politics. The empowerment of civic identity politics happens, 
according to Margaret Somers, when individuals feel that a sense of 
who they are has been violated, especially in terms of their perceived 
natural rights. In order to assert claims to political and civil rights 
the ‘politics of citizenship discourse’ is mobilised to justify rights 
through membership in a historically constructed national commu-
nity. Citizenship rights take on signifi cance as they become a practice 
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rather than simply a noun.7 In Palestine, the realm of popular poli-
tics and its emphasis on Palestinian Arab and pan-Arab identities 
provided the space in which the Arab community could assert its 
active opposition to the mandate and Zionism as a key part of citi-
zenship’s rights and duties. The legislation – or lack of certain leg-
islation – from the late 1920s increasingly affected working-class 
and rural Arabs more so than it affected the Jewish community. 
The Jewish population of Palestine was, in large part, segregated 
from the Arab community as the Yishuv became more like a state-
within-a-state, providing schools, employment and other economic 
opportunities to the Jewish immigrants. The impact of this policy 
was most clearly understood by the Arabs in the form of the grow-
ing Jewish settlements and the legislation that stimulated Jewish 
immigration. 
The Arabic Press and Mandate Legislation
The 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council initially had little 
impact on the Arabs who resided in mandate territory. This is under-
standable since their residence guaranteed ipso facto citizenship. 
Citizenship took on signifi cance as a status once national leaders and 
newspapers publicised reports on the situation of the thousands of 
Palestinians in the diaspora who were unable to claim that status. In 
light of the reported plight of the Arab emigrants (muhājarīn) and the 
statistics on Jewish immigration to Palestine national and local lead-
ers began to draw attention to legislation that negatively impacted 
all individuals that they termed as Palestinian Arab nationals. These 
leaders defi ned Palestinian citizenship fi rst as a status granted by nat-
ural right through birth in the territory or descent from Palestinian 
parents. To this end, by 1927 associations, conferences and Arab 
Executive members presented a number of demands to the Palestine 
Administration and the British Government for the recognition of 
jus sanguinis and jus soli in citizenship legislation as well as explicit 
political rights for Arab citizens. 
The indigenous press fostered the linkages of global civil society 
and what Emma Hunter calls the ‘globalization of political con-
cepts’ that captured the attention of colonised peoples between 
Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and the Soviet Union by 
the early 1930s.8 In Palestine, Arabic periodicals reported the pub-
lication of the citizenship order in the autumnn of 1925, but many 
newspapers focused on other events, particularly the uprising in 
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Syria’s Jabal Druze against the French during 1925 and 1926. 
News about the anti-colonial revolt in Syria, growing factionalism 
in the Arab Executive Committee and the confl ict between the fac-
tion headed by Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni (the Majlisiyun) and 
that of the leaders of the opposition in Jerusalem (the Mu‘āridun) 
monopolised the news. 
Yet after 1926, the rhetorical vocabulary of rights became man-
ifest alongside that of nationality and citizenship. Rachel Sieder’s 
work on Guatemala in the 1930s provides an interesting compari-
son with the ways that citizenship rights were perceived by non-
dominant political groups. Sieder has shown in the context of 
interwar Latin America that governments tried to create a certain 
type of subject or citizen through legislation. These same laws that 
gave or removed political rights provided a medium through which 
the would-be subjects or citizens resisted or accommodated to their 
conditions of subordination.9 As in the Guatemalan case, the Arab 
leadership frequently challenged the legalities of mandate policies 
and civil society leaders actively encouraged claims to political and 
civil rights of citizenship by the Palestinians as citizens and as part 
of a historical trajectory based on their prior experience as Ottoman 
nationals. The fi gure of the pre-war Ottoman Arab (and, of course, 
male) national, embodied with a number of political and civil rights, 
was used by writers as a rallying point to mobilise individuals to 
demand that the administration offer similar rights associated with 
citizenship. In Palestine as elsewhere, the development of citizen-
ship depended on interactions between different understandings of 
‘rights’, ‘obligations’, and ‘justice’ that were, in the words of Sieder, 
constituted by different individuals and groups within particular 
frameworks.10 In the case of the Levant generally and Palestine spe-
cifi cally, that framework was of a communitarian understanding of 
national identity and belonging.
The fi rst citizenship right in the mandate granted to both Jewish 
and Arab Palestinians, the franchise, came into effect with the Citi-
zenship Order-in-Council. Prior to that, the 1922 Legislative Elec-
tion Order-in-Council gave the franchise to all residents of Palestine 
provided they were former Ottoman subjects or Jewish immigrants 
who pledged to take on citizenship once legislation was passed to 
that effect. Although citizenship became a requirement for the fran-
chise and to stand for offi ce, by 1926 the mandate administration 
failed to implement High Commissioner Samuel’s proposals for the 
devolution of local and municipal government functions to the citi-
zens themselves. Therefore, this right to vote did not translate into 
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the Arabs’ requested rights to the territory of the mandate through 
self-government. Samuel’s successor, Herbert Plumer, stated that the 
Arabs specifi cally had too little sense of civic responsibility to even 
have the right to vote.11 Even so, in 1926, his administration sup-
ported the formation of municipal and local councils (that existed 
in the Ottoman Empire) to regulate communal affairs as a step 
toward self-government.12 The 1926 Municipal Franchise Ordinance 
ensured proportional representation on municipal councils in accor-
dance with the number of votes from each religious community.13 
Palestinians could vote only for other members of their own religious 
community. Thus, no sense of a unifi ed civic citizenship factored into 
the municipal elections because of the separation of citizens into reli-
gious groupings. 
The Arabic newspapers immediately took issue with the munici-
pal property tax qualifi cation required of all voters for the municipal 
council elections. Only individuals who paid a fee on immovable 
property, or paid a standard fee if they did not own immoveable 
property, in the twelve months prior to the elections could vote. Vot-
ers also had to be occupants of recognised premises worth a certain 
amount of money within the municipal area. Candidates for council 
positions had to have paid a specifi c sum (100 piasters) in taxes.14 
The ordinance, according to one Arab journalist in late 1926, was 
‘contrary to the spirit of true democracy’ since its most striking fea-
ture was that it did not enable what he referred to as ‘all classes of 
people’ the right to vote. Specifi cally, he argued that certain classes 
of Arabs were treated ‘as if they are enemies and not natives of this 
country’ since the poorer urban Arabs – and their Jewish counter-
parts – did not meet the fi nancial qualifi cations for enfranchisement. 
The author noted that if the reader could imagine the extreme pov-
erty of the people of Palestine, he would know that the majority of 
the population’s rights had been taken away by the qualifi cations 
for the franchise. The British constructed the law with their vision 
of Palestine as divided into religious groups in mind, and the author 
addressed this as ‘the irony in this law . . . which indicates [the gov-
ernment’s] consistent policy in this country [to] invest it as three 
communities for the benefi t of colonialism’. He wryly added that the 
law came about after the Palestinian people asked the government to 
‘civilise’ the nation, and he asked why the British did not put proper 
civil laws in place in Palestine as they did in Great Britain and else-
where in the Empire.15 
The press viewed the elections as an example of the mandate’s dis-
criminatory attitude towards the urban lower-class whose members 
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were unable to participate in local politics or hold positions of leader-
ship. The discussion over the municipal elections continued through 
1927. The Arab writers and local leaders depicted the right to vote as 
inalienable and meant to be held by (male) Palestinians by virtue of 
their nationality.16 The mandatory’s attitude, according to the press, 
served to negate what nationalists argued to be the most important 
right of Palestinian citizens: the right to representation. Furthermore, 
although Clause 3 of the Municipal Franchise Ordinance explicitly 
stated that electors had to be Palestinian citizens, Attorney-General 
Bentwich advised the mandate administration that those Jewish immi-
grants awaiting the outcome of their applications for naturalisation 
had no reason to be refused and were eligible to vote.17 This further 
angered Arab leaders.
For the municipal elections held in 1933, the election ordinance 
defi ned a Palestinian citizen for the purpose of the legal franchise 
as any person who had applied for citizenship before 1 September 
1933 as long as their application was not refused. Applicants for 
citizenship did not need to have been granted that status in order 
to vote; in fact, Jewish applicants could very well have been denied 
citizenship after they cast their vote, or could withdraw their appli-
cations for naturalisation after voting. The following year, the Per-
manent Mandates Commission asked the Palestine Administration 
whether a large proportion of those who voted in 1933 ‘in virtue 
of an application’ for Palestinian citizenship subsequently failed to 
secure the citizenship. Chief Secretary Moody responded that as of 
1 September 1933, 1,500 applications for citizenship awaited deci-
sion and the applicants with a receipt of the fee paid for submitting 
their application were entitled to exercise the right to vote. Of this 
number, Moody informed the commission that 20 per cent failed to 
obtain citizenship. In Haifa, the District Commissioner found that 
only two out of seventy Jewish voters were actually qualifi ed to vote 
because only these two individuals had applied for citizenship.18 
These are not insignifi cant numbers considering that one-fi fth of the 
non-citizens who voted in the 1933 elections were never granted cit-
izenship. Thus, they contributed to increasing the proportional rep-
resentation of their own religious community on municipal councils 
in a country that was not yet their legal residence. In the Arabic 
press, editorials argued that the denial of rights to a large number of 
poor citizens served only to bolster the political standing of Jewish 
immigrants (who were generally but not always in better economic 
positions) within Palestine’s municipalities. These criticisms, pub-
lished and read throughout the country, had some justifi cation as 
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shown by the fi gures given by Moody to the Permanent Mandates 
Commission.
Newspapers reacted to legislative changes in land, public works 
and development with the argument that the Arabs’ civil rights were 
eroded in order to give way to greater rights for Jewish citizens. For 
example, although Arab merchants, labourers and corporations had 
few explicit rights, Jewish residents and their companies – whether 
nationals of Palestine or not – received concessions for public works 
and development projects. The mandate charter guaranteed this pref-
erence, stating as it did that Jewish-run businesses could be offered 
the rights to construct or operate any public works, services or utili-
ties.19 The registered ‘nationality’ of the business or corporation was 
irrelevant to its right to hold a monopoly in Palestine. Editorials and 
articles focused on the conditions that this allowance by the admin-
istration created for Palestine’s Arab citizens. One newspaper article 
stated in 1928 that the ‘citizens of the villages’ were neglected because 
the government and the Jewish companies that operated public works 
did not take their requests (such as to pave the roads) seriously. That 
same year, a number of nationalist organisations asked that Arab 
employees of the Department of Works go on strike in order to force 
the government to address the most important of their civil rights: the 
improvement of the economic situation in Arab villages.20 
Editorials argued frequently that the administration’s support 
for Jewish-run companies limited Arab business ventures and thus 
rights to a stake in ownership of the economy. Similarly by the lat-
ter half of the 1920s the Arabic press, alongside local nationalist 
leaders like ‘Isa Bandak, discussed other pieces of mandate legisla-
tion related to citizenship, elections and taxation. Bandak’s Sawt 
al-Sha‘b invoked the phrase ‘no taxation without representation’ 
(la dara’ib bilā tamthīl). The fi rst editorial to use the phrase alluded 
to the notion that until citizens were granted certain rights to the 
polity, they should not pay taxes to the government – a simple and 
effectively communicated slogan.21 Other arguments against the 
mandate legislation that centred on the negation of Arab citizen-
ship rights extended to the spheres of employment and welfare. 
Urban workers’ associations, often infl uenced by young anti-man-
date activists, referred to the government’s duty to ensure equal-
ity in employment, wages and benefi ts pay as well as safe working 
conditions for all citizens.22 Civil rights of citizenship also came to 
be associated with employment especially as the national leadership 
questioned the lack of government job opportunities for educated 
Muslim Palestinians. In 1928, a delegation of young men from Jaffa 
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argued that only Palestinian citizens should be entitled to serve in 
the administration, although it did not go as far as to demand com-
plete control by citizens over all matters of government.23 This pub-
lic dialogue and the arguments that arose from it were infl uenced 
by the belief that the Arab citizenry deserved a privileged position 
in Palestine by virtue of their citizenship, their numerical superior-
ity and their Arab nationality. At the pinnacle of these arguments, 
citizenship was portrayed as an active status that the administration 
manipulated in order to deny Arab individuals the right to partici-
pate in government, the economy and legislation.
Populist civic and national groups portrayed the government 
legislation that impacted the Arab fellahin (peasants) as one of 
the biggest affronts to Palestinian Arab rights of citizenship. This 
particular portrayal allowed national and local groups to construe 
(perhaps largely unknown to the peasants themselves) a notion of 
civic and political belonging and project it on to this class within 
Palestinian society. One year after the announcement of the 1925 
citizenship order, a news editorial explained the duties of the gov-
ernment toward the peasant citizens of Palestine: the most impor-
tant was to provide assistance to the fellah through favourable 
land legislation. Despite the deteriorating economic situation of 
the mid-1920s, the system of taxes and tithes imposed on peas-
ants was so high that the money taken was equivalent to at least a 
third of the Palestine’s yearly budget. On top of their constant debt 
to money-lenders who charged exorbitant interest rates, peasants 
were expected to contribute tithes (werko) in cash to the govern-
ment, which alone made up about 32per cent of a family’s income 
by 1930.24 Newspapers, and in particular the Gaza district’s weekly 
al-Ittihad al-‘Arabī, gave a great deal of space to the peasants’ 
situation. Although urban Palestinian Arab citizens faced different 
challenges due to legislation, the activities of a number of writers, 
students and lawyers effectively challenged land legislation and 
brought the situation of the peasant to the fore of press reports.
Palestinian Arab populist leaders had long accused the British 
administration of ratifying land legislation that harmed the peas-
ants’ livelihoods and these leaders inserted the vocabulary of rights 
into their accusations by 1930. Indeed throughout the mandate’s 
existence, rural owner-occupiers, agricultural tenants and labourers 
were never entitled to legal protection through tenancy rights. For 
example, when absentee Arab owners sold land to Jewish settlers the 
tenants often had no choice but to leave the land they farmed. In 
Ottoman times, tenants farmed land in common and were forced to 
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leave far less frequently when that land changed hands.25 Further-
more, the government did not recognise the Arab village, village land 
funds or rural development associations as legal entities able to pos-
sess immovable property. Zionist companies and the Jewish Agency, 
on the other hand, could register land in their name, since they were 
treated legally as if they were individual citizens of Palestine. Accord-
ing to the memoirs of the Palestinian land lawyer Hanna Nakkarah, 
the 1928 Land Settlement Ordinance required the registration of title 
deeds in order to record taxes, fees and development, and to partition 
common land. Unclaimed land was held in trust by the high commis-
sioner. The problematic issue was that in every Arab village common 
land was used for public purposes and perceived as being for the ben-
efi t of all residents.26 
Arab peasant associations borrowed this language of rights that 
the more radical, young political leaders and the press employed in 
order to express their displeasure with mandate legislation. For exam-
ple, in 1928 and 1929 agricultural groups in Gaza presented protest 
letters to High Commissioner John Chancellor in opposition to the 
Land Settlement Ordinance. The peasant spokesmen, like the press, 
invoked the idealised notion that Ottoman nationals had previously 
held the civil right of land ownership. The Muslim Youth Association 
in Khan Younis stated that the ordinance ‘[took] away the people’s 
rights of natural ownership of land’.27 Another appeal written by the 
Society to Conserve the Land of Gaza alleged that the goal of the 
Land Settlement Ordinance was to ‘remove all that is Arab and erase 
all traces of the Arab in Palestine’.28 Infl uenced by other national bod-
ies in Palestine, peasant associations adopted and re-shaped the rhe-
torical language that framed access to land as an inalienable right. As 
a result of increased communication among urban and rural commu-
nities by the end of the 1920s larger segments of Palestinian society 
tailored their reactions to legislation and their specifi c, often localised 
demands into a style of language that emphasised the rights-based 
notion of their civic and political membership in the polity of Pal-
estine. The activities of populist leaders and writers publicised legal 
developments and opened up a space for both the educated and the 
subaltern to be represented as rights-bearing citizens of Palestine. 
Variations and Representations of Mandate Citizens
Awni Abd al-Hadi, a veteran pan-Arab nationalist and Palestinian 
politician from Nablus, addressed the government’s failures to imple-
ment benefi cial legislation for all Arab inhabitants of the mandate 
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and stated in 1931 that in the Palestinian case, ‘it will be the duty of 
every one of [the] citizens to call upon [the administration] to live up 
to its duties’.29 If political rhetoric represented ‘every one’ of the Pal-
estinian Arabs as monolithic citizens, variations of types of mandate 
citizens – and who classifi ed certain individuals as citizens – existed 
in practice. Recent research by Weldon C. Matthews stresses the need 
to study concepts of identity as contingent on specifi c circumstances 
in order to analyse how the different Palestinians defi ned themselves 
as part of a nation after a decade of mandate administration.30 The 
current section analyses the ways in which the new generation of 
nationalist political leaders engaged with the representation of the 
citizen and particularly the subaltern citizen, and the types of rights 
assumed by these leaders to be entitled to different social groups by 
virtue of their national identity. Certain groups in Palestine – work-
ers, peasants, women and students – came to be represented as citi-
zens both through their own efforts and through the support of the 
popular politics movement. 
In his study of the ideological and practical processes by which 
French peasants became full-fl edged members of the citizenry after 
the French Revolution, Eugene Weber notes that national and civic 
consciousness arises once rural inhabitants become aware of national, 
as opposed to only local, issues.31 One way to do this in rural Pal-
estine, according to the Arab leaders, was to appeal to citizens to 
establish village national schools.32 By their account, an educated 
peasant was a peasant who could speak for himself, demand rights 
as a citizen including the right to vote, own land and access govern-
ment services. In reference to India, Dipesh Chakrabarty writes that 
‘[t]he peasant did not have to undergo a historical mutation into 
the industrial worker in order to become the citizen-subject of the 
nation’.33 The same is true for Palestine: peasants, as well as other 
members of the working classes, became represented by others as 
citizens often under the umbrella of the ever-widening populist, mid-
dle-class national movement. The ideology of a multiplicity of Arab 
citizens, with a number of social and political roles, came in large 
part out of the type of civic education offered by national schools 
and their teachers who were affi liated with nationalist associations. 
Civic education placed emphasis on a historical Arab nationality in 
Palestine and the symbiotic relationship of rights and duties between 
nationals and their nation. Such an education not only played a role 
in imparting the concept of civil rights and civic duties to students 
but by 1928 it also stimulated the formation of Palestinian branches 
of the Young Men’s Muslim Association, or YMMA (jam‘iyyat 
al-shabān al-muslimīn), and the Arab Scouts in rural areas as well 
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as in towns. The former association published its own newspaper, 
Sawt al-Haqq (The Voice of Truth), and its outspoken young editor, 
school-teacher Hamdi al-Husayni, introduced the concerns of Arab 
urban workers and the importance of civic activities into the plat-
form of the YMMA. For instance, the more rural Gaza branch set 
up night courses to teach workers how to read.34 Students’ clubs and 
numerous civic-minded urban associations (that boasted heavy stu-
dent involvement) formed throughout the late 1920s and worked to 
organise unions of Arab workers, discussed political issues in public 
forums, and raised funds to buy agricultural land in trust for Arab 
peasants.35 
At the same time a former law student and schoolteacher from 
Nablus named Akram Zu‘aytir began to advocate that the youth 
lead popular protests and actions of civil disobedience (al-‘asīyan 
al-madaniyya). His inspiration came from the actions of Gandhi 
in India. In 1929, Zu‘aytir suggested that the Palestinian Arabs 
implement a programme of non-cooperation that included the 
refusal to pay taxes and the resignation of civil servants. Since he 
wrote for the newspaper Mir’at al-Sharq, this and other periodi-
cals promoted the programme.36 Indeed many of the younger Arab 
nationalist clan worked as journalists and editors and most were 
educated, having completed at least secondary school. Full-fl edged 
youth associations in this period were not all political in nature 
but their structure meant that they promoted civic ideals and a 
civic identity for their members. As an example, the Youth Club of 
Bethlehem, established in 1928, claimed that its task was to spread 
the spirit of patriotism as well as to work for Arab unity. Members 
also sought to carry out practical work: the club gave attention 
to women’s affairs and especially women’s literacy, established a 
night school and a public library and gave charity aid to the poor.37 
Youth associations used publications, public lectures and teachers 
to inform the population of their aims. At the January 1932 Youth 
Conference in Jaffa, delegates debated certain duties to be under-
taken by the citizens of Palestine. The conference passed a number 
of resolutions and formed several civic committees composed of 
and administered by a variety of Arab citizens, including students, 
writers and lawyers. The committees, such as that for civic educa-
tion, called upon the mandate government to establish national 
schools and include curriculums in agricultural education as part 
of their duty to the Arab citizens.38 The emphasis by youth associa-
tions and their conference resolutions on civic identity and rights 
for both the rural peasants and the urban workers meant that the 
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two groups were represented as part of the Palestinian citizenry. 
The students and middle-class national leaders sought to demon-
strate that all classes could claim rights and pressure the adminis-
tration to give up its obligations to the mandate charter. Prominent 
was the issue of the protection of the land holdings of the Arab 
peasants in the face of increased Jewish immigration by the early 
1930s. In times of crisis due to the increased debt and poverty of 
the peasants and the threat posed by the Histadrut, the exclusively 
Jewish labour union, to the Arab proletariat legitimised specifi c 
social demands through participation in civil society and national 
demonstrations, as Joel Beinin has shown.39 
However, prior to 1936 the demands for civil and political 
rights and the representation of subaltern citizenship originated 
from urban, educated, radical nationalists. Peasants were depicted 
in newspapers, congress resolutions and handwritten petitions to 
the government as active participants in politics and anti-mandate 
activities. Migdal also notes that interdependence between peasants 
and other classes created a national identity consciousness in the 
1930s.40 Public conferences and their resolutions on behalf of the 
peasants shaped the perception of the peasant as an equal citizen 
by the virtue of his native birth in Palestine and his service to the 
nation. A May 1928 newspaper editorial posed the serious question 
of whether the peasants knew their rights and their duty to demand 
them.41 Charters drawn up by landowning farmers who belonged 
to rural associations expressed the aims to improve the standard of 
living for the fellahin and to help protect their land rights. Indeed, 
every adult fellah had the ‘right’ to join most societies and elect 
their administrative bodies. In the early 1930s, village societies 
increased in number and in activity. For example, the principles of 
Acre’s Village Cooperative Society stated that its members oppose 
everything that ‘intrud[ed] on [the farmer’s] national and political 
rights’.42 Not only did the number of letters and petitions to the 
administration by peasant associations increase through the 1930s, 
but the administrative surveillance of rural associations that were 
deemed too political also increased.
Arab urban workers were a signifi cant bloc that drove the expan-
sion of populist political activities by the latter half of the 1920s. The 
growing workers’ movement contested the meaning of citizenship 
offered by the mandate and, in particular, the failure of citizenship leg-
islation to extend certain social and civil benefi ts to the Arab working 
class. To counter the administration’s defi nition of citizenship, leaders 
of urban unions commonly expressed the belief that the mandatory 
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had a duty to provide Arab workers with rights (of unionisation and 
shorter work hours) and welfare (housing and health care) equal to 
that offered to Jewish labourers by the Histadrut. Arab railway work-
ers in Palestine fi rst organised themselves with their Jewish co-workers 
in Haifa in 1921 but it took several years for a workers’ movement to 
emerge.43 Once it did come into being, the movement was one of the 
few in Mandate Palestine that bridged the divide between Arab and 
Jewish citizens.44 
At its most basic level, the socialist, anti-colonial principles of 
the union leadership attracted Arab workers particularly in the 
impoverished, crowded port cities of Haifa and Jaffa. The mem-
bership rolls of Arab workers’ societies included farmers, labour-
ers, clerks, masons, drivers and others. Signifi cantly, the spoken and 
printed rhetoric of the labour leaders – reproduced in the press and 
at national conferences – employed the same vocabulary as the popu-
list national leadership. The language used depicted the urban, low-
income Arab worker as deserving the same treatment as the Jewish 
worker by virtue of his Arab nationality. The Palestine Arab Workers 
Society (PAWS) enhanced this image as it aimed to attain benefi ts for 
all workers, to promote educational, social and economic improve-
ments, to enact a law to limit work hours and fi x salaries, and to 
provide housing and access to health services.45 
Palestinian Arab middle-class women differed little from their 
male counterparts in the national movement with regard to their col-
lective platform and identity. While the politically active women were 
usually from elite, educated backgrounds, their activities nonetheless 
contributed to the representation of all Arab women as citizens of 
Palestine despite legislation that denied them the right to vote. At 
once subaltern and elite, these women claimed to speak on behalf 
of the entirety of Palestinian Arab citizenry. The activities of Arab 
women during the mandate administration have been narrated else-
where, but these studies lack specifi c analysis of conceptualisation 
of Palestinian citizenship.46 Arab women organised themselves and 
created their own civil society networks in Palestine and in the mah-
jar just as they did in other Arab mandates and countries. Female 
newspaper columnists called upon women to educate themselves, to 
demand their rights to a civic, national education and to fulfi l their 
national ‘duties’ to the country.47 As historian Ellen Fleischmann 
explains, notions of rights were never fully defi ned but female writers 
in Palestine, as in other Arab countries, referred to liberal citizenship 
rights such as participation in the public and political sphere.48 
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The proceedings of women’s conferences offer a better explanation 
of the rights that Palestinian women discussed among themselves, 
agitated for and hoped to receive. These public gatherings offer a 
glimpse of the ways in which these women expressed themselves as 
Palestinian citizens. The fi rst Palestine Arab Women’s Congress took 
place in 1929 organised by a network of societies such as charities, 
educational associations and the Arab Women’s Association (AWA). 
Attended by more than 200 Palestinian women, the congress’ deci-
sions were liberal and supportive of women’s efforts to participate 
in civil society.49 Petitions and statements by the executive body 
of the congress mimicked the wording and tone and suggested the 
same tactics as the male-dominated national associations and confer-
ences. Petitions issued by the Executive of the Women’s Congress in 
1932 explicitly discussed the issue of citizenship rights. The Execu-
tive referred to the unfair administrative practice that allowed non-
Palestinian civil servants such as Greeks, Persians, Italians, Egyptians 
and Syrians to acquire Palestinian citizenship despite retaining the 
nationality of their native countries. These men, the women argued, 
could easily be replaced ‘by bona-fi de Palestinian citizens’. As for 
civic education, the women emphasised the ‘vital importance to the 
Arabs’ to support improvements of the ‘intellectual, moral and social 
standing of future citizens of the country’. The Executive noted that 
citizens, especially the peasants, had been deprived of constitutional 
rights and protections despite their standing. In closing their charter 
of congress resolutions, the signatories (President Wahide El-Khalili 
and Secretary Matiel Mogannam) demanded the establishment of a 
democratically elected national government.50 The politicisation by 
the press and the nationalist leadership through their forums and 
conferences of the often poor or disadvantaged situation of unrep-
resented peasants, young people, workers and women meant that 
the identity of these groups became politicised as well. As a result, 
these different groups represented themselves and one another as 
rights-bearing citizens of Palestine, whose Arab identity translated 
into their entitlement to rights to the self-government of the territory. 
The growing popularity of this representation of ‘the citizen’ in 
Palestine came perhaps in part from its similarity to citizens in West-
ern European and American political systems. This concept of citizen-
ship received support not only in the press but through the networks 
forged between subaltern citizens and the institutions that repre-
sented them and whose leaders familiarised themselves with styles 
of civic belonging common in imperial metropoles. These discourses 
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of rights and the sets of practices of political membership fashioned 
‘the new man . . . [as] transformed into the citizen of the new state’.51 
It is more diffi cult to argue that the lower-class or non-affi liated indi-
viduals in Palestinian society broadly advocated for citizenship rights 
with a pure understanding of what those rights entailed in the wider 
British empire or in sovereign nation-states but this is not the point 
for the discussion here. Rather, it is that multiple meanings of citizen-
ship were often imposed upon different socio-economic and political 
classes in Mandate Palestine by the populist national leadership as 
a means to achieving an end: that of full, sovereign rights to both 
citizenship and national representation to participate in government 
and legislative processes.
Transitioning into the Second Decade of the 
Mandate: The Istiqlal Party
In order to understand the parameters of the internal Arab political 
situation in Palestine by the end of the 1920s it is necessary to note 
events of 1923. That year, the Sixth Palestinian Arab Congress made 
a demand for complete independence of Palestine – for the last time. 
In fact, the Arab Executive Committee felt it unnecessary to hold 
any further national congresses after the sixth meeting until early 
1928. The seventh (and last) congress offered even less of a challenge 
to British policy than the previous six congresses had done.52 In the 
period between the sixth and seventh congresses, the populist move-
ment had grown strong enough to take part in changing the political 
language of citizenship and its associated social, political and civil 
rights. The continued changes to political language can be attributed 
to the political and social situation in Palestine in the aftermath of 
the August 1929 Wailing Wall riots.53 The 1930 execution of three 
young Arab men charged for their role in the riots served as the 
particularly salient event for the national movement and the men 
immediately became martyrs.54 The emerging populist movement 
characterised the three martyrs as patriotic citizens who defended 
the Arabs’ political and civil rights.55 As a result of the events from 
1929 through early 1931, pan-Arab activists including ‘Awni Abd 
al-Hadi appealed to the British to grant the ‘religious and civil rights 
[that were] closely interrelated’ with self-governing institutions. His 
views, and those of the more radical movement, articulated a post-
1929 conceptualisation of distinct views on citizenship rights and 
duties.56 In response, political, youth and social groups asked that 
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the Arab Executive convene to discuss policies of non-cooperation 
with the Palestine Administration and a boycott. The fragmented 
political factions split over the tactics. As a consequence, the more 
radical nationalist groups assumed the task of carrying out measures 
of non-cooperation as an explicit duty of citizenship.57
From the beginning of the British administration of Palestine, 
the fi rst writings by nationalist leaders and those in the press rarely 
included the term ‘citizen’ (muwātin) but rather used the Arabic term 
‘ahl Filastīn’ (Palestinian people) and ‘natives of Palestine’ (abna’ 
Filastīn). Throughout the 1920s, the differences in the ever-evolving 
political language of nationality, nationalism and, later, citizenship 
were subtle. These early terms expressed a sense of secular communi-
tarian belonging, similar to the way in which ‘umma’ translated into 
‘community’ in the era of nationalism. As noted previously, muwātin 
came into use in Arabic newspapers and documents printed by 
nationalist associations in Palestine alongside legislation that marked 
members of the Arab national community as having a legal status vis-
à-vis the administration. However, the use of jinsiyya (nationality) 
continued to be dominant in reference to citizenship legislation. Yet 
the political language of citizenship changed in about 1930. As early 
as the 1931 strike and demonstrations in Nablus, the populist Arab 
leaders asserted their citizenship by informing offi cials that public 
demonstrations were active civil rights. Press editorials concluded 
that the inhabitants of Palestine knew their rights and their duties 
as citizens even if the government did not allow their exercise.58 On 
the eve of riots in Jerusalem in October 1933, an article in the city’s 
al-Jamiyya al-‘Arabiyya stressed that the British did not consider the 
Palestinians as Arab nationals and urged the Arabs to assert their 
citizenship rights in Palestine through protest’.59 The infl uence of the 
Istiqlal Party, ideologically linked to earlier pan-Arab national move-
ments, can be seen in an analysis of the changing discussions of citi-
zenship after 1930.
The Istiqlal Party, offi cially formed in 1931 as the fi rst non-factional 
Palestinian political party, has been the subject of only two mono-
graphs.60 The party was active for three years but its membership, 
principles and formation were crucial to the creation of a grassroots 
civic movement and to the evolution of a new meaning of pan-Arab 
citizenship. The party, based in Nablus, advocated Palestinian Arab 
citizenship as inseparable from an inclusive, wider notion of Arab 
nationality. Weldon Matthews refers to the party as a watershed: at 
once Palestinian, pan-Syrian and pan-Arab and the fi rst of its kind to 
attempt to form a public, mass organisation whose adherents used 
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different approaches to mobilise nationalist and civic sentiments.61 Its 
founding members announced the party’s charter at the same time as 
the sessions of the Islamic Congress convened in Jerusalem in Decem-
ber 1931. Drawn up in the home of Arab Executive member ‘Awni 
Abd al-Hadi, the pact stated the anti-colonial demand for indepen-
dence and called for a democratic government in Palestine as part of a 
pan-Arab federation. The idea of the federation necessitated that the 
Arabs of the former Ottoman provinces of Greater Syria be granted 
a federated citizenship based upon their Arab nationality.62 The party 
included prominent members, young and veteran pan-Arab activ-
ists as well as writers, teachers, lawyers and other intellectuals from 
the upper and middle socio-economic classes such as Mohammad 
‘Izza Darwaza, Akram Zu‘aytir, Hamdi al-Husayni, Ibrahim Shanti, 
‘Isa Bandak and Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam.63
The Istiqlal Party, unlike the Executive, addressed its appeals to 
‘the citizens’. In 1933, the party’s conference in Jaffa highlighted the 
vision of its executive committee for a full-scale boycott of the Pal-
estine Administration. Istiqlalists characterised the boycott as a way 
through which citizens could demand rights, and the party encour-
aged the act of boycott as a duty of citizenship. By advocating actions 
such as boycotts, the party’s populist leaders created a version of civil 
society in which all Arabs were represented as active citizens. To this 
end, members organised a range of political activities, public festivals 
and holidays, issued political statements through local leaders and 
connected with other groups that supported the peasants, workers 
and students.64 Seven festivals, holidays and major conferences took 
place in the early 1930s under the party’s auspices and included the 
celebration of Hittin Day in Haifa, memorial days for martyrs and 
commemorations of the British occupation of Palestine.65 
One of the party’s most prominent members, Sobhi al-Khudara, 
explained that national public opinion could be harnessed through 
the patronage of educated and non-educated Arab citizens using 
the language of rights and democracy.66 In the early 1930s the party 
organised actions including strikes and boycotts of British goods, 
particularly in the city of Nablus. In late 1932 the party encour-
aged a general boycott of all British administrative functions and 
events. According to a statement issued by the party to High Com-
missioner Wauchope, these acts re-affi rmed the civil rights of Arab 
citizens of Palestine. Similar to demands from other sectors of the 
citizenry, the Istiqlal Party argued that the citizens deserved equal 
employment opportunities as those of Jewish and British inhabit-
ants, access to education and an independent parliament.67 One of 
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the most debated components of active citizenship was non-cooper-
ation with the administration. During a 1933 conference of nation-
alist leaders, one speaker suggested that non-cooperation should 
start with the non-payment of direct taxes as a civic duty in order 
to force the British to abrogate the mandate. Although the meet-
ing’s members split over policy implementation, the tactic itself 
demonstrates the ways in which populist leaders attempted to put 
the language of citizenship into practice.68 It is important to rec-
ognise that the Arab organisers of strikes and boycotts attempted 
to garner support from the rural and working classes in the early 
1930s at conferences and public meetings, in part through accusa-
tions that British colonial policy caused the poor economic condi-
tions faced by these classes. 
After 1933, the activities of the Istiqlal Party ceased due to the 
lack of strong leadership. Members were periodically arrested, 
exiled, placed under house arrest and forced out of jobs as teach-
ers and civil servants due to their campaigns for civil disobedience. 
At the same time, Palestine was in recovery after the urban riots of 
late 1933, which occurred in several cities after Arab demonstrations 
and marches against increased immigration fi gures and the mandate 
itself turned violent. The riots themselves, although not discussed 
here, and their interpretation in the press indicate that the language 
of active citizenship promoted by the Istiqlalists had made an impact 
on the citizenry: Arabs assembled in several cities to demand par-
ticular political rights from the government and did so through the 
practices advocated by the Istiqlal Party. However, with the loss of 
the Istiqlal Party’s advocacy for a pan-Arab civic identity by 1934, 
other nationalist political groups of a younger generation stepped 
into the vacuum to represent – or fail to represent – Arab citizenship 
in Palestine on the eve of the Palestinian Arab revolt. 
Even after its demise, the party’s grassroots-styled activists saw 
themselves as a new generation inspired by anti-colonial leaders like 
Gandhi and by their links to the League to Combat Imperialism and 
to the Communist International.69 During the early 1930s, these 
activists increasingly used public space for displays of nationalism, 
with the idealistic hope that the civic nature of their activities could 
bring the Arab population together on the basis of their common 
citizenship and the threats posed to that status by Zionism and the 
Mandate. Still, prior to 1936 these leaders largely failed to engage a 
large majority of peasants in active citizenship, as demonstrated by 
the lack of long-term involvement of the rural classes in the urban-
based national movement and civil society. When peasants stressed 
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their identities as citizens who were guaranteed certain rights by 
virtue of that identity, they did so mainly in response to economic 
pressures. This is evidenced in protest letters and testimonies of peas-
ant associations to government offi cials that asked for, among other 
things, an agricultural bank, a reduction of tithes and taxes and agri-
cultural and secondary schools in villages.70 
By the mid-1930s a new type of ‘civic’ activism emerged in Pal-
estine aimed at stemming the infl ux of Jewish immigrants and stop-
ping the transfer of land from Arab to Jewish ownership. The new 
activists had a separate ideology from that promoted by the Istiqlal-
ists and urban civil society, which had worked to change policy or 
to remove altogether the mandate administration from Palestine. 
Rather, a number of individual leaders from the peasant and work-
ing classes organised secret bands in the countryside and carried 
out guerilla-style tactics against the Jewish settlements in north-
ern Palestine. Secret cells were also formed in urban shantytowns 
such as those in Haifa by Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassem, an itinerant 
preacher, teacher, marriage registrar and member of the YMMA and 
Istiqlal Party. These bands attempted to educate and mobilise citi-
zens through the idea of a popular revolt against the government.71 
Guerrilla organisations and tactics later inspired these novice fi ght-
ers to shape a new resistance movement and orchestrate the Pales-
tine Revolt of 1936–9. Through the ideology of revolt as a means 
to achieve independence, the guerrilla groups played a role in shap-
ing another meaning of Palestinian civic identity as they insisted 
that the revolt was a civic duty that Palestinian Arabs should sup-
port in order to ‘gain back’ their homeland from the British and, by 
extension, Zionist colonisers. Rebel leaders stressed to the popu-
lation through memorandum, strongmen, publications and funds 
the importance of unwavering civic, social, economic and political 
support for their anti-mandate cause. They often did this through 
force or tactics of fear in the latter year of the revolt and publica-
tions couched these appeals in the language of citizenship duties and 
patriotism. Despite the tactics used by the populists to engage with 
a larger section of subaltern Palestinian society and to represent all 
Palestinians as citizens, the populist movement ultimately remained 
small and based in urban areas. For the rural population after 1933, 
citizenship rights and civic identity became less abstract once village 
leaders manipulated the populists’ and the nationalists’ vocabulary 
of rights and advocated a type of ‘civic’ behaviour meant to allevi-
ate their poor economic situation – that of revolt against the British 
authorities and the Jewish settlers.
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Conclusion
By 1935, the Istiqlal Party and the active youth movement 
had all but disappeared from Palestine. New political parties 
emerged through the efforts of leading personalities from either the 
Jerusalem-based Husayni or Nashashibi factions. Five parties of 
some importance and standing took the place of the Istiqlalists. Still, 
their platforms differed very little from each other and none initially 
advocated direct confrontation, demonstrations or non-cooperation 
against the administration.72 The brief mobilisation and use of the 
language of citizenship rights and membership in Palestine through 
the exercise of those rights to dismantle the mandate had been 
snuffed out and replaced with a return to factional politics. The 
representations of citizenship, which had formerly been presented 
on the pages of Arabic periodicals, barely factored into the activities 
of the new political parties whose familial ties and sectarian politics 
dominated them.
Still, the half-decade prior to the Palestine Revolt was one in 
which the Istiqlalists and the more radicalised individuals associated 
with it shaped a particular representation of Palestinian citizenship 
as connected to what contemporary historians of citizenship call the 
bundle of rights granted to the nationals. This representation trans-
formed the earlier proposals of an equal national identity between 
Arabs and Jews in Palestine into proposals for a future self-rule by 
the Arabs based on their majority status and ‘Arab’ nationality. By 
the middle of the 1930s, the terminology of citizenship used by the 
Arabs changed as demands for the rights of citizenship became more 
frequent and increasingly contested by the lower classes. The press 
published letters signed by ‘citizens of’ (muwatinīn min) rather than 
‘nationals of’ (qawmī or watanī min), cultivating a broader sense 
of civic identity and the rights and duties that went along with this 
identity. As opposition to the mandate came to be advocated in 
stronger terms, citizenship was transformed from being a middle-
class concept, transported to the Arab world from Western Europe, 
to becoming an active practice and expression of belonging for – and 
occasionally, by – the lower classes.
Numerous pieces of legislation and the growing emphasis by 
the Cabinet to manage tensions between the Arabs and Jews in 
Palestine contributed to the continued denial by the local adminis-
tration to follow the League of Nations’ prerogative to develop self-
governing institutions in the mandate territories. The administra-
tion enshrined neither the rights nor the protections that both Arab 
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and Jewish population demanded – be they political, social or civil 
aside from the provisions of the electoral and municipal council 
ordinances – in a constitution as both groups wished. The admin-
istration also never gave in to the demand to grant a representative 
council the power to draft a constitution or bill of rights, as in the 
other Arab mandates. Although the United Kingdom itself did not 
have a constitution, a fact that Arab leaders sometimes noted, their 
experience with the Tanzimat legislation, the 1908 constitution and 
similar documents in the wider region and bills of rights in Europe 
infl uenced this constant demand for rights to be enshrined in a writ-
ten document. The mobilisation inherent in popular politics, such 
as that of the Istiqlalists, caused a shift in public opinion to focus 
on the failure of the mandate to provide for its citizens in the social, 
economic and political realms. Through this process, the historical 
agency of a more inclusive Arab citizenry allowed for new negotia-
tions of identity and citizenship. As Partha Chatterjee has written, 
political institutions – in this case, citizenship in Palestine – must be 
linked into a network of norms in civil society that are independent 
from the state in order for the behaviours of such institutions to be 
put into wide and active practice.73 The Palestinian Arabs succeeded 
in encouraging types of behaviours of active citizenship in civil 
society and associational life outside the realm of the state. Finally, 
the press must be considered as the medium through which the citi-
zenry learned of, explained and challenged mandate legislation. As 
readership spread to rural areas, public displays of citizenship and 
civic identity such as protest marches, demonstrations, unionisa-
tion and strikes included the subaltern population who witnessed 
and became part of the national community of Arab citizens, often 
for the fi rst time. When the Palestinian Arab general strike began 
in April 1936, it gathered massive support throughout the country, 
owing to the attention the press gave to it throughout its dura-
tion. The resurgence of an active citizenship was owed to the Arab 
community’s experiences of the late 1920s and early 1930s and 
the mobilisation by nationalist leaders and groups against mandate 
legislation. 
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The Palestine Revolt and Stalled 
Citizenship
There is no genuine enthusiasm to be observed in Palestine for Palestinian citizenship,’ wrote the members of the Royal Com-
mission in 1937 after their return from Palestine where they had 
been sent by the Government of Great Britain in order to investigate 
the causes of the general strike, adding that ‘it is only the Arabs in 
South America who are really anxious for it. And under present 
conditions this does not surprise us . . . To the educated Palestin-
ian Arab, who has always resented the separation of Palestine from 
Syria, the very idea of Palestinian citizenship is obnoxious as being 
associated with the Mandate and all it involves.’1 The Palestine 
Royal Commission of 1937, known as the Peel Commission after its 
appointed chairman, is most often remembered as the fi rst offi cial 
British investigative body to suggest the partition of Palestine. The 
Commission recommended more than simply partition: Sir Earl Peel 
validated the long-standing demand of a number of Arab national-
ist and local leaders and Arab Executive Committee members that 
Arab emigrants be given Palestinian citizenship in order to return 
to Palestine if they wished. Although the report is important in that 
it suggested that the tense situation in Palestine could be solved by 
partition, it can also be read as providing a broader understand-
ing of the socio-political and legal institution of citizenship and its 
importance to the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine in the 
mid-1930s. In particular, the report offers clear hints at contempo-
rary notions and meanings of, and the vocabulary associated with, 
nationality and citizenship. It also offers suggestions for the future of 
an internationally recognised Palestinian citizenship. The Commis-
sion heard evidence between the end of 1936 and January 1937 as 
part of its attempt to uncover the reasons for the ‘disturbances’, or 
the early years of the Great Revolt (al-thawra al-kubra) in Palestine. 
As part of the investigation, a number of Arab witnesses testifi ed on 
‘
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the issue of Palestinian citizenship and its inclusion in anti-Mandate 
protest demands – an opportunity that the authorities had never 
made available to the Arab population of Palestine.
The work of the Peel Commission and its fi nal report demon-
strate continuities and changes in both British and Arab perceptions 
of nationality, citizenship and rights by the end of 1937. Here, I 
attempt to shed light on the ways in which British and Arab actors 
continued to negotiate multiple defi nitions of ‘the citizen’ in the legal 
sphere and the socio-political meanings of citizenship during the six-
month general strike in Palestine in 1936 and the fi rst year and a 
half of the Palestine Revolt through 1937. In the latter half of the 
three-year revolt, alternating factions of rebel leaders, mostly lower-
class Muslim villagers rather than the middle-class nationalist elites 
and intellectuals, attempted to assert their control over the revolt 
and garner support through various appeals to different groups in 
Palestinian Arab society. The tense situation between rebel leaders 
themselves in Palestine, between these leaders and the central com-
mand in Damascus and between the rebels and the British meant that 
the nationalists’ pre-1936 language and vocabulary of nationality 
and citizenship transformed into a new language popularised by the 
rebels: this language prioritised expressions of patriotism, loyalty, 
anti-Zionism and action to support the continuation of the revolt 
until victory (that meant, for the rebels, an end to the mandate). The 
idea of citizenship as linked to a political status and bundle of rights 
had little currency among the rebel commanders although their aim 
of self-government and an end to Jewish immigration mirrored that 
of the middle-class Arab national leaders. While the previous chapter 
demonstrated the signifi cance of the representation and the language 
of rights, duties and belonging to a broader understanding of citizen-
ship and civic identity for the Arab population, this chapter offers 
insight into the changing language used by both the Arab population 
and the British administration during the general strike and revolt. 
This language evidences a shift in the understanding on the part 
of mandate offi cials about citizenship and the place of Palestine as 
linked to a broader British colonial model. 
In a recent refl ection on subaltern studies, Partha Chatterjee has 
suggested that the contemporary Indian peasant must be understood 
within a new framework of democratic citizenship – one that is defi -
nitely not subjecthood but that is perhaps fundamentally altered 
from the normative ideas of citizenship in Western liberal democra-
cies. The suggestion is relevant to the history of the Palestine Revolt 
and the place of citizenship in it. I have argued thus far that the 
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ideas and ideals of citizenship expressed by the Palestinian Arabs 
during the mandate were increasingly conceived of and understood 
within a conceptual framework of primordial or communitarian citi-
zenship and nationality, alongside strong infl uences of democratic, 
liberal citizenship, while rooted in notions of jus sanguinis and jus 
soli nationality infl uenced by late Ottoman practice. The changes to 
Arab civic identity owing to the events of late 1935 through 1937 
requires the historian to situate the Arab fellahin – whose livelihoods 
were greatly affected by the revolt – alongside the more middle-class 
nationalist and populist leadership as actors who contributed to and 
infl uenced new notions and expressions of Palestinian citizenship. 
Following Chatterjee’s argument, the rebels from rural Pales-
tine (who became more and more numerous by the end of 1936) 
can be construed as political actors, rather than passive reactionar-
ies, whose leaders presented themselves as members of ‘the nation’ 
mobilised against the British authorities.2 However, the argument 
cannot be followed through at face value: the historian must be care-
ful to take the nuances of peasant identities and actions into account. 
Rural insurgency from 1936 was stirred not only by the prior activi-
ties and propaganda of populist national leaders but also in reaction 
to increased economic problems in the countryside. Still the revolt 
cannot be characterised as one of an entirely reactionary nature on 
the part of the peasantry stirred to action by the notables. It must 
be stressed that the peasant leadership of agricultural and village 
associations did not use the actual term for ‘citizen’ with the same 
political, Western-infl uenced connotations that many middle-class 
or youth leaders had done from the early part of the decade. Rural 
Palestinians certainly knew the term for ‘citizen’ and the more radical 
nationalists frequently noted that the former had a number of ‘citi-
zenship rights’: this language cropped up in the appeals for unity and 
support that they made to the fellahin, which linked the economic 
problems and the absence of sovereignty over land and resources in 
the countryside to the mandate’s support of Zionism and its encour-
agement of land sales to Jews. The framework of the growth of mass 
political mobilisation that stemmed from land losses and economic-
based grievances in Palestinian villages during the revolt allows his-
torians to understand the expansion of civic notions and behaviours 
as well as the shelf-life of both in light of the nationwide revolt staged 
against the British. 
Throughout the fi rst phase of the revolt and as a result of the 
increase in violence by the Arab and British sides, authorities cen-
sored the press, vetoed the right of assembly and enacted emergency 
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regulations: all measures that primarily affected the Arab popula-
tion and only rarely the Jewish immigrants and citizens.3 Although 
the six-month general strike itself under the direction of the Higher 
Arab Committee (HAC) was mostly a peaceful show of civil disobe-
dience infl uenced by the tactics adopted by the populist movement 
since the early 1930s, at the same time insurgents in the countryside 
(themselves loosely connected with the HAC and rebel leadership in 
Damascus) embraced anti-British and anti-Zionist violence. After a 
lull in violence once the strike came to a brokered end, insurgency 
started again in September 1937 as a result of the publication of the 
report by the Peel Commission that recommended partition of the 
territory. The report emboldened the rebels towards greater violence 
as it forced the British, particularly High Commissioner Arthur Wau-
chope, to pay attention to their actions. In some respects violence 
halted the development of Arab civil society as tensions increased 
between urban and rural Palestinians and as divisive sentiment 
against Arab Christians spread.4 Shortly before the mass outbreak 
of revolt – and perhaps a contributing factor to the ability of reb-
els in the countryside to undertake attacks on British personnel and 
Jewish settlements – Palestine’s pan-Arab and populist Istiqlal Party 
collapsed and the moderate political current again came to dominate 
Arab politics.5 
Meanwhile, the provisions of citizenship legislation that nega-
tively impacted the Arab emigrants ceased to feature in the press in 
the mid-1930s. The amendments to the citizenship order of 1925 
had made little effort to solve the problem of statelessness for native 
Arabs emigrants. As suggested by the Peel Commission’s report 
cited above, the grievances that remained over the citizenship legis-
lation and the treatment of the Jewish immigrants as opposed to the 
Arabs did not disappear but rather remained relevant at the advent 
of revolt. 
Palestinian Arab Civic Identity and the 
General Strike of 1936
At the end of 1935, High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope wrote to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies of his growing concern over 
what he reported as radical Arab groups in Palestinian villages. He 
had cause for concern. That autumn, the death of Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din 
al-Qassam during a gun battle with British forces resulted in an out-
pouring of Arab nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment against the 
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British and it turned al-Qassam into a martyr for the liberation of 
Palestine. Al-Qassam came to Palestine from Syria in the early 1920s 
(avoiding a French-issued death sentence), worked as a preacher and 
social reformer in Haifa and gained a following with his anti-British 
appeals to the Muslim working class and students. He joined the 
Istiqlal Party and led the Haifa Young Muslim Men’s Association 
(YMMA) for a time. He secretly organised cells of fi ghters known as 
the Black Hand Gang (al-yad al-sawda’), which included the unem-
ployed, labourers and the peasantry, and planned to begin a revolt in 
the north of Palestine in late 1935.6 Al-Qassam’s death in November 
reinvigorated a specifi cally rural nationalist movement. The surge in 
nationalist activity came in spite of the atmosphere that was described 
by Bahjat Abu-Gharbiya, a friend of al-Qassam, as follows: ‘in the 
1920s and 1930s, an important popular national element formed for 
[the Palestinian Arabs] but Mandate authorities worked to reduce it 
from 1935 until . . . it was as if it did not exist’.7 
The following section analyses the increasing normalisation of cer-
tain practices and expressions of citizenship in the months leading to 
the general strike of April through October 1936 and the subsequent 
spread of violent insurgency. The agrarian Arab population engaged 
to an extent with the urban middle-class nationalists’ language of 
social, political and civil rights and duties of citizenship. The rhetoric 
that emphasised political rights to representation or civil rights to 
economic assistance, for example, became associated with expres-
sions of discontent with the mandate such as strikes and protests 
that peasants and the urban labourers attended. Rural associations 
increasingly penned letters of protest to the Palestine Administra-
tion, expressing opposition to its policies and claiming to represent, 
in their own words, the ‘citizens of the villages’. The general strike, 
which marked the start of the revolt and featured episodes of vio-
lence in the urban and rural areas, has been analysed in a number 
of studies, yet these works have not considered events from the per-
spective of the ways in which rights of citizenship were manipulated 
by rebel leaders and educated elites to feature at a wider discursive 
level within the tense Arab society-in-revolt.8 This is hardly surpris-
ing since explicit slogans of citizenship by leaders and from civic 
associations were not a predominate feature of the strike. Yet the 
revolt’s Arab commanders portrayed their rebellious actions as part 
of their civic and national duties and rights. 
The strike marked a turning point: for the fi rst time, it mobil-
ised a language of rights alongside widespread physical violence, 
the latter of which was imagined by revolt leaders as a necessary 
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and legal path towards the attainment of an independent and rep-
resentative government in Palestine. It is important to note that the 
strike was part of a broader regional context of unrest and politi-
cal struggles, such as in Syria and Egypt (although this is too large 
a discussion to include here), and it was also certainly infl uenced 
in part by Zionist labour organisation. Civic identity played a key 
role in the strike as Arab nationalist leaders heavily stressed that 
all Palestinian Arabs had the same rights associated with citizen-
ship and they formed part of a wider civic and national community 
in Palestine. In a study on violence and civil society in Quebec 
and Ireland, Jeffrey Cormier and Phillipe Couton maintain that 
certain mobilising structures such as civil society organisations are 
necessary for the emergence of both non-violent and violent social 
movements.9 The application of Cormier’s and Couton’s logic to 
the revolt years in Palestine helps to explain the historical connec-
tion between urban and rural networks that supported the strike 
and the violence – and signifi cantly, the endurance of both despite 
superior British manpower and fi repower.
Before al-Qassam’s death in 1935, High Commissioner Wauchope 
began to advocate proportional representation in a new legislative 
council, one of the Arabs’ most consistent, long-standing demands.10 
However, his attempt to reintroduce a plan for a legislative council 
after the failed attempt in 1922 (due to the Arab boycott of elections) 
did not come to fruition because Parliament refused to support the 
plan, exposing growing tensions between the local Palestine Admin-
istration and the Cabinet and Parliament in London. In response to 
frustration over the continued failure of the administration to intro-
duce representative government into Palestine, ‘independent groups’ 
led by Arab young men such as secondary-school teacher and jour-
nalist Akram Zu‘aytir in Nablus declared several general strikes in a 
number of urban centres. For example, the Arab Scouts in rural areas 
and the Youth Sports Club oversaw a November 1935 city-wide 
strike in Nablus to protest the ‘Judaising’ of Palestine and to ask 
for a representative council. Zu‘aytir addressed letters of response 
to those who participated in the strike as ‘thanks to you, the citi-
zens!’ (shukrān lakum, al-muwātinīn!) linking nationalist actions to 
a sense of civic duty. Similar language was used in other acts of civil 
protest. In Jerusalem, thousands attended a demonstration to mark 
the anniversary of the city’s occupation by the British, and speakers 
such as the schoolteacher and newspaper editor Hamdi Husayni and 
the labour unionist Michel Mitri appealed to ‘the citizens’ to form a 
popular confi guration of resistance.11
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After the November 1935 strike, Wauchope noted – and began 
to fear – the links between the more radical civil society and youth 
groups in rural Palestine. Similarly, the demands for political rep-
resentation at the village level alarmed offi cials. These groups and 
individuals advocated direct political action against the Palestine 
Administration by appealing for public and, at fi rst, civil tactics. 
A meeting of local leaders in Nablus decided to support acts of 
non-cooperation including demonstrations, the resignation of Arab 
Government offi cials and a boycott of Jewish and British social and 
political events and declared their willingness to be imprisoned for 
the national cause. By that time, various urban nationalist leaders 
travelled to rural areas to speak in clubs and mosques. In the coun-
tryside, peasants expressed a greater interest in politics than they 
had previously.12 Indeed, the Arab Scouts were particularly politi-
cally active in 1935 in villages. Young members explained their 
actions of spreading nationalist propaganda and encouraging non-
payment of tithes in terms of national and civic duty.13 Similarly, 
in Syria during the Great Revolt against the French, a romanticisa-
tion of Arab leaders took place within the context of the changing 
approaches to popular mobilisation in the national movement. To 
legitimise the leadership of the populist leaders, their fi gures had to 
be juxtaposed with ‘unjust’ leaders.14 In Palestine, al-Qassam made 
these juxtapositions as he walked through the countryside to preach 
jihad (holy struggle) against the administration.
Public meetings became a standard way to chart the public opinion 
of the peasants and labourers and to encourage greater participation 
in political affairs. The gatherings of grassroots organisations infl u-
enced thousands of supporters to join demonstrations in towns and 
cities. By January 1936 a strong populist movement led by former 
Istiqlal leaders and Arab youth groups withdrew confi dence from the 
Jerusalem-based political parties and gave their support to the young 
men’s groups.15 As a result of the changing political situation and 
the higher level of political activity in the countryside, active expres-
sions of citizenship such as the use of the term itself in petitions, the 
establishment of rural clubs for Palestinian Arabs and letter-writing 
campaigns by which residents demanded a variety of ‘rights’, grew in 
number. Meetings, demonstrations and even non-payment of taxes 
and donations made to the National Land Fund allowed Palestinian 
Arab citizens to craft an ideology of citizenship duties during the 
revolt. In the months before the general strike began, the national 
committees in Nablus made the fi rst appeal for citizens to stop the 
payment of taxes to the Mandate Government came in March 1936. 
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From the beginning, the Nablus leaders portrayed the refusal to pay 
taxes as a civic, national and wholly legal duty. However, in the 
countryside local groups took a more violent approach: small groups 
cut telephone wires, bombed bridges and blocked roads as a show of 
resistance to the government.16 By early April 1936, after Parliament 
refused to support Wauchope’s legislative council, villages and towns 
throughout Palestine bombarded the British administrators with 
petitions in support of the council, taking the lead from the national 
committees in Nablus.17 
In April 1936, a number of Arab civil servants, urban tradesmen 
and transportation workers went on strike. In response, the adminis-
tration issued the Emergency Regulations that criminalised calls for 
strikes and threatened those who encouraged the strike with legal 
action.18 Regardless, nearly 140 Palestinian senior government offi -
cials in a letter to High Commissioner Wauchope explained their 
resignation in terms of civic duty. Their role, they explained in the 
petition, was to serve as a link between the government and all 
classes of Arab citizens.19 The letter demonstrates the connection 
between the notion of ‘duties’ as supported by Arab civil society and 
the support for the call of non-cooperation with the government on 
the part of civil servants or the striking working and middle classes. 
The call for a comprehensive general strike, the fi rst phase of the Pal-
estine Revolt, came after murders in mid-April 1936: members of an 
Arab armed gang near Haifa killed two Jewish truck drivers.20 The 
murders led to a cycle of Jewish reprisals followed by Arab counter-
reprisals and within days the British imposed a curfew on Arab areas 
of the country. 
Demonstrations turned violent as they spread to urban areas, 
with the Arabs expressing anger against increased Jewish immigra-
tion. Local leaders in Nablus urged the use of tactics of non-violence 
and took the lead in prompting other municipal authorities to form 
local committees that linked up to larger national bodies such as the 
Youth Congress and the Arab Patriotic Society (al-mujtam‘a al-‘arabī 
al-watanī) (formerly the Muslim–Christian Association). These lead-
ers then announced a general strike in protest against immigration 
policy and the mandate, and prepared a statement that explained the 
purpose of national committees and asked for support from all Pales-
tinian Arabs to recognise the Nablus leadership as representative of 
the population.21 As the work by the urban Nablus strike committee 
began, slogans of non-cooperation appeared in letters supporting the 
committee. The committee soon received a letter from a Jerusalem 
club signed by 150 self-professed ‘citizens’ such as doctors, lawyers, 
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union leaders, students, teachers and tradesmen. They announced 
their support for the practical implementation of ‘no taxation with-
out representation’ (la dara’ib bilā tamthīl). In Nablus, Akram 
Zu‘aytir and others agreed that the fi rst serious political step was 
to embark on a campaign of civil disobedience by refusing to pay 
taxes. The letter from the Jerusalem club added that only through 
non-cooperation (alata‘āwun) could the Arab population maintain 
its identity.22 
By the end of April 1936, grassroots national committees swiftly 
formed in other Palestinian cities and towns and they unanimously 
agreed to adhere to the general strike. The committees, backed by 
press reports, called for all Palestinian Arab citizens to participate. 
On 25 April, the Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, met with the fi ve 
largest political parties in Jerusalem and formed a coordinating body, 
the Higher Arab Committee (HAC), led by Hajj Amin. According to 
Swedenburg’s study on the revolt, this committee represented an alli-
ance between traditional notables and the newer middle-class urban 
radicals.23 However, the national committees were often organised 
at a local level and their leaders did not want to follow the exclusive 
leadership of the elite.24 Subhi Yassin’s history of the revolt notes that 
local leaders and committees immediately demanded that the HAC 
support civil disobedience and the non-payment of taxes and yield to 
public opinion.25 
By mid-May 1936, the HAC announced that the position of ‘no 
taxation without representation’ to be the hallmark of citizenship 
practice. The committee stated in a communiqué published in the 
press and addressed to the Palestinian Arabs that this would ‘help pre-
serve your identity and your nationality [qawmtik]’.26 One observer, 
the Egyptian-Palestinian newspaper owner Mohamed ‘Ali El-Tahir 
noted that the non-payment of taxes and the peaceful strike were 
the duties of ‘citizens employed in the national cause’ (al-qadiyya 
al-wataniyya).27 The adherence by a large part of the Arab popula-
tion to the HAC’s request that the Arabs stop paying taxes as part of 
the general strike is a signifi cant active expression of involvement in, 
and understanding of, civic and political behaviours of belonging. 
The communiqué took into account struggles elsewhere in history 
for independence, such as in the United States. The response by the 
Arab community proved to the mandate administration the power 
of both the individual and the collective. At fi rst, the strike showed 
the diversity of Palestinian Arab civil society. Alongside the workers 
and the notables, the peasant leadership expressed its support and 
children refused to go to school.28 National committees throughout 
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Palestine worked at the local level to ensure that the population 
received food supplies. Initially, certain groups were given strike 
funds in lieu of their salaries. The wealthy were asked to contribute 
money and women went door-to-door to fundraise and encourage 
sumud (steadfastness) and sacrifi ce.29 
Meanwhile, although a number of village committees advocated 
civil disobedience such as the non-payment of tithes alongside their 
urban counterparts, other village leaders instead urged ‘disobedience 
in all senses of the word’, meaning armed revolt.30 Violence was touted 
as a legitimate expression of citizenship and resistance to the mandate. 
Support for violence as a tactic to resist the government and the land 
policies that favoured immigrant settlers can be traced back to the 
organisation of countryside bands of rebels, even prior to the works 
of men like al-Qassam. Indeed, as noted above, civil society even in 
its nascent form in rural areas could be mobilised to support violent 
acts against government infrastructure and personnel using the lan-
guage of colonial oppression to incite peasants. In Palestine by 1936, 
the rebels justifi ed violent disobedience as the means to achieve fully 
the goal of forcing the British to surrender control of the country to the 
Arabs. The violence initially took place in the fi rst weeks of the strike as 
Arab guerilla rebels, often from the countryside and who worked inde-
pendently from the HAC, committed numerous murders and attacks 
on Jewish settlements and British police.31 Soon after the strike began, 
a former Syrian Ottoman army offi cer who had fought against the 
French, Fawzi al-Din al-Qawuqji, assumed control of the rebel bands 
in Palestine and claimed his title to be commander-in-chief. One of the 
fi rst communiqués issued by al-Qawuqji, addressed to the ‘citizens’, 
argued that the revolt was a humanitarian, religious and national duty 
of the Arabs in Palestine and of the entire Arab nation. Al-Qawuqji 
called on the citizens to take up arms as a matter of duty.32 
Swedenburg’s ethnographical study on the Palestine Revolt pro-
vides the insight that many peasants often depicted their identity as 
primordial and linked to the very land of Palestine – but they did not 
explicitly mention citizenship.33 Rather, rural groups issued appeals 
in the name of Allah to the nation (al-umma), its native sons (abna’) 
or the noble people (karīm al-sha‘b). The appeals contained local-
ised narratives and arguments such as the need for the peasants to 
sacrifi ce themselves to protect their land (ard) and honour (sharaf) 
as Arabs. The link between land, economic stability and revolt is an 
important one as it seemed to be the driving force for many peas-
ants to join guerilla bands of fi ghters under al-Qawuqji. Rural Arabs, 
unlike urban nationalists, thought of rights primarily as rights to 
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land and fairer taxation. More recently, historian Michael Provence 
has demonstrated that since the revolt’s commanders and many indi-
vidual rebels had all been Ottoman subjects they had exposure to 
notions of nationalism and collective struggle through Ottoman edu-
cation and conscription prior to 1918. These former Ottoman sub-
jects communicated and mobilised through the language of popular 
patriotism and Arab nationality.34 For some peasants and for urban 
labourers, the notion of civic rights and duties and their subsequent 
expression developed through a process that involved daily interac-
tions with strike committees, strikers and the authorities. Throughout 
1936, associations and press editorials encouraged active behaviours 
of political citizenship, suggesting that village and urban Palestin-
ians alike begin legal proceedings and boycotts against the mandate 
government over the loss of civil and political rights.35 For example, 
in Nazareth the Chamber of Commerce informed the high commis-
sioner just as the general strike began that since the city’s merchants 
would strike, the government should not send them any bills.36 In 
a sense, both the rebels and the peaceful strikers crafted their own 
expressions of citizenship rights and duties even if they rarely articu-
lated the term ‘citizen’. 
A number of Egyptians and Syrians worked in Palestine on 
railways and ports just as Palestinian Arabs lived and worked in 
Egypt and Syria. Emigrants in these two countries, and those in the 
Americas, were actively involved in supporting the events of 1936. 
These links served to emphasise further the notion of Arab nation-
ality as an inclusive status tied to concepts of national and natu-
ral political rights throughout the Levant. Notably, El-Tahir, who 
became head of the Palestine Arab Committee in Cairo, wrote 
updates (republished from his newspaper and elsewhere in the press) 
on the strike for the emigrants in North and South America, and 
informed them of the intensifi cation of violence and the tolls of dead, 
wounded and jailed. One of his letters stated that ‘it becomes the 
duty of every Arab emigrant in the service of his country and his 
nation’ to support the Palestinian Arabs’ strike and revolt. El-Tahir 
and those who read his reports and newspaper editorials thus helped 
to export the discourse of civic duty as linked to the revolt into the 
Palestinian Arab diaspora.37
The general strike was called off after six months, in October 
1936, as a result of negotiations between the HAC and other Arab 
leaders primarily in Iraq, Egypt, Transjordan and Arabia. Ultimately, 
the strike failed to paralyse the economy. Additionally, by that point 
the poorer segments of the Arab population expressed an often-dire 
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discontent with the strike and the diffi culties they incurred in their 
trade, particularly in the transportation of produce. Although the 
national committees and newspapers portrayed the strike as sup-
ported by all Palestinian Arabs, in reality their propaganda neglected 
to account for a large part of the population that simply could not 
afford to strike.38 
Stalled Citizenship: From the Citizenry to the ‘Population’
By early 1937, new British legislation put in place in order to quell 
the revolt in Palestine served to deny the few political and civil rights 
that the Palestinian Arabs had enjoyed before the outbreak of the 
revolt. The new Emergency Regulations impacted urban and rural 
Arabs as they were imposed from above by the military authori-
ties sent to Palestine and by the British Government, and Matthew 
Hughes has termed these regulations de facto martial law.39 This 
implementation was colonial in that the administration of Palestine 
adhered to imperial emergency and martial law provisions as models 
for the provisions specifi cally put into place in Palestine. Further-
more, the emergency situation made it increasingly diffi cult for the 
British to view the Arabs in any fashion as rights-bearing citizens, 
as it eroded civil and political rights. Here, it is useful to refer to 
the difference between ‘the citizens’ and ‘the population’ in light of 
the response to the Palestine Revolt by the authorities. In terms of 
policy and theory, ‘the citizens’ and ‘the population’ are often viewed 
as separate groups under colonial rule. Chatterjee has written that 
the concept of the citizen carries with it ‘the ethical connotation of 
participation in the sovereignty of the state’, while the concept of the 
population, by contrast, ‘makes available to government . . . a set of 
rationally manipulable instruments for reaching large sections of the 
inhabitants of a country as the targets of their “policies.” ’40 With 
the outbreak of collective violence in Palestine the British found it 
necessary to remove certain rights given to the Palestinian Arabs by 
treating them not as citizens of the mandate but rather as its colo-
nised population. This is important: through the early 1930s the leg-
islation around citizenship in Palestine continued to shape the legal 
status and the international recognition of ‘the citizen’ and small 
steps had been made through 1935 towards granting Arabs and 
Jews greater political rights to representation in a proposed legisla-
tive assembly. Additionally, the terms of the mandate and the League 
of Nations’ Permanent Mandates Commission had made explicitly 
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and repeatedly clear that Great Britain could not treat the inhabit-
ants of the Palestine Mandate as colonial subjects. The sovereign 
imposition of emergency laws and martial law went against League 
policy (as did similar actions by Great Britain and France in other 
mandates previously) and caused friction between the international 
body and the government in London. 
The legislation drawn up during the revolt in London, 
and the referral of British troops to Palestine served to classify the 
Palestinian Arabs in the minds of Cabinet offi cials in the metropole 
as simply the majority segment of Palestine’s population. As such, 
they were subject to the terms of martial law without any need 
for further discussion and without the need for popular approval. 
During the Palestine Revolt, the examples of Chatterjee’s ‘manipu-
lable instruments’ included old and new British colonial legislation 
that was implemented by the administration: collective punish-
ment, forced exile of certain individuals including most of the Arab 
leadership of the Palestine Communist Party,41 the emergency and 
martial law regulations and military trials. While the Palestine Gov-
ernment could easily apply these public security measures on colo-
nial populations it was more diffi cult to justify their application 
to a population of Palestinian citizens internationally recognised 
as British-protected persons and over whom Great Britain did not 
have full sovereignty. Not only were certain rights and privileges 
withdrawn from the Arab population, but the existence of Palestin-
ian citizenship as separate from British colonial subjecthood became 
muddled. Mandate authorities increasingly placed the inhabitants 
of Palestine within a more broadly colonial category as a popula-
tion to be made loyal to Great Britain. This was a direct result of 
the revolt and the British reaction to Arab violence as defensive to 
protect not only the mandate territory but Great Britain itself. Dur-
ing the revolt, the British in Palestine referred to the Arab citizenry 
collectively at best as ‘the population’ of the territory, and at worst 
as suspected guerrillas. 
Under the regime’s statutory martial law, a stage between full 
military control with martial law in Palestine and the continued 
exercise of civil powers under partial military control, offi cials could 
disregard the civil rights that offered certain protections for entire 
civilian populations of villages and towns.42 Although Great Britain 
did not introduce a complete martial law ordinance in Palestine, 
related ordinances that sanctioned collective and punitive punish-
ments primarily affected the Palestinian Arab inhabitants by turning 
them into colonial subjects. As historian Naomi Shepherd states, 
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after the passage of the Mandate’s Emergency Regulations by High 
Commissioner Wauchope in the early summer of 1936, ‘the legal 
system of Palestine became harnessed to repression . . . [S]uccessive 
Emergency Regulations led to summary justice and the curtailment 
of civil rights.’43 The regulations additionally allowed for all sorts of 
collective punishment measures, from imposing fi nes to demolishing 
Arab quarters of cities and Arab homes in villages. Despite the high 
commissioner’s objections, Whitehall decided that the army and the 
Royal Air Force (RAF) be sent to Palestine as a show of force to 
contain insurgent Arab groups and to control areas once the vio-
lence intensifi ed. The tactics meant to contain and stop the revolt 
were not new creations: a British volume on ‘small wars’ from the 
late 1890s supported collective punishment of ‘uncivilised’ natives 
and the book’s recommendations had been used in Egypt and Iraq 
as well as in the Boer War, India and Ireland.44 
By 1935, the imperial martial law ordinance had been amended 
so that it no longer required offi cials to prove a crime was committed 
before imposing collective punishment. After the outbreak of revolt 
in 1936, the British Government gave the High Commissioner’s 
Offi ce the power to apply collective punishment in municipal areas 
in response to crimes committed by rebels such as the cutting of 
telephone wires, the destruction of infrastructure and rifl e fi re.45 Yet 
as Palestine was not a colony under full British sovereignty, theoreti-
cally the administration, the military and the Palestine Police were 
bound by international and British regulations that offered a stan-
dard for the proper treatment of civilian populations to maintain 
law and order during incidents of rebellion. The most well-known 
example of collective punishment actions during the general strike 
was the June 1936 demolition of the Arab quarters of the old city of 
Jaffa, which left up to 6,000 Palestinian Arabs homeless. More com-
mon were punitive acts committed by British soldiers in villages.46 In 
1936, collective fi nes started to be used as punitive measures under 
the Collective Punishment Ordinance and the Emergency Regula-
tions. These types of punishments, done under a civil administra-
tion prior to the arrival of military authorities to Palestine, took 
away any sense of legal standing or presumed rights to protection 
of life, property or welfare. The Jewish Palestinians did not suffer 
collectively from either type of punishment. As a result, the civil and 
military authorities could continue to treat one set of recognised 
Palestinian citizens differently from the other set of citizens. 
The Arab villagers recognised their lack of legal rights even during 
the strike. Residents of the village of Qula reported on the excesses of 
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force, including home demolitions, by British soldiers. They referred 
to the actions of the soldiers as ‘inconsistent with the principles of 
justice and humanity’ and invoked the villagers’ rights to an immedi-
ate legal inquiry. Despite their hopes for legal action, those citizens 
whose homes were demolished or partially destroyed by the British 
were not allowed to give evidence in court.47 In fact, the citizens of 
Palestine could not take legal action against the government itself 
during the revolt but could only press civil charges against individ-
ual soldiers. The British justifi ed their actions as defensive measures 
meant to protect the Government of Palestine. Simoni notes that dur-
ing the years of revolt, any welfare offered by the British to the Arab 
population was halted as security became the overriding concern, 
thus widening the gap in the political relations between the Arab and 
Jewish communities.48 
The emergency and collective punishment laws, particularly the 
1937 Prevention of Crimes Ordinance, allowed for deportation and 
the detention of suspected criminals or politically active leaders. 
Throughout 1936, the authorities suspended Arab dailies thirty-four 
times.49 In March 1937 the Palestine Defence Order-in-Council gave 
High Commissioner Wauchope the power to carry out a variety of 
defence measures in the interest of law, order and public safety. The 
order-in-council made the carrying of fi rearms punishable by death 
and the private possession of a fi rearm could result in a life sentence in 
prison; furthermore, it criminalised any meeting or procession includ-
ing more than twelve people. Citizens risked imprisonment if they did 
not give the correct identifi cation information and travel permit or 
passes to any offi cial who requested such information.50 Since the Brit-
ish Government classifi ed the revolt as an internal insurrection, Arab 
suspects and rebels were denied treatment as civilians such as due pro-
cess. After the murder of British District Commissioner Lewis Andrews 
by an Arab gang in September 1937, the Colonial Offi ce authorised 
British soldiers to torture Arab suspects and non-combatant villagers 
in areas with heavy rebel activity in order to gather intelligence.51 The 
HAC was declared illegal and its members forced to fl ee from Palestine 
or face arrest and deportation. In early 1937, civil society groups and 
Arabic newspapers sent numerous petitions to High Commissioner 
Wauchope to complain of the treatment of political and other pris-
oners.52 According to the memoirs of Arab lawyer Hanna Nakkara, 
as a result of the Prevention of Crimes Ordinance arrests took place 
regularly and the British opened several detention camps for politi-
cal detainees, a category that increasingly included intellectuals and 
workers.53 
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At the same time, as the revolt became more widespread, rebel 
leaders attempted to act as government fi gures. They implemented 
their own rebel courts and laws, and enforced certain civic duties. 
The Arab rebels also reduced Palestinian citizenship – in the form 
granted by the mandate – to a meaningless status by the end of 1937. 
The rebel leaders themselves did not directly address the issue of 
rights of citizenship but instead used rhetorical nationalist terminol-
ogy and imposed their own vision of public order in line with their 
tactics in support of the rebellion. The rebels used a type of rhetoric 
that differed from that of the urban leadership and that of the British 
authorities. By 1937, in some important respects these rebels sought 
to offer certain rights and expressions of citizenship without being 
familiar with the term. They ordered the cancellation of rents and 
rural taxes and prescribed a certain style of dress in order to cement a 
sense of solidarity with the lower classes.54 Rebel leaders did not rec-
ognise identity documents given to the Arabs by the government and 
went as far as to order the Palestinians to not show these documents 
to military or police offi cers.55 The rebel leadership issued calls and 
demands to the population to resist the government using religious 
phrases and appeals to jihad. In doing so, these rebels represented a 
new version of civic public order and political and civil action. The 
defensive measures on the part of the British and the Arabs during 
the fi rst half of the revolt shifted the understandings of the citizenry’s 
rights, protections and objects of loyalty.
Palestinian Citizenship and the Royal Peel Commission
This penultimate section steps back from the 1936 general strike and 
the fi rst year of the revolt. Through two case studies on citizenship 
requests and a closer inspection of the Peel Commission’s recommen-
dations on citizenship, it investigates the affects of legal changes to 
the acquisition and revocation of citizenship for Arabs and Jews. It 
also discusses the response by Arab nationalist leaders to the recom-
mendations of the Peel Commission with regards to citizenship and 
partition. The Peel Commission arrived to Palestine in November 
1936, just after the strike had been called off.56 To put the actions 
of the commission and its interviewees into perspective, it must be 
emphasised that even during the fi rst stage of the revolt the Colonial 
Offi ce allowed for nearly 2,000 more entry permits to be given to 
Jewish immigrants. As a result, the Palestinian Arab leaders boycot-
ted Peel and his colleagues until January 1937.57 
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In 1936, the Colonial Offi ce defended its policy that gave Jewish 
immigrants an easier route to the acquisition of Palestinian citizen-
ship by stating that offi cials in Palestine were obliged to keep citi-
zenship legislation favourable for immigrants or risk litigation from 
the Jewish community negatively impacted by its provisions.58 In the 
meantime, the Arab population had not seen any signifi cant redress of 
their own grievances over the provisions. The following case studies 
serve to demonstrate that during the period of tumult and political 
and legal transformations caused by the revolt, citizenship continued 
to be a subject of contestation for individual Arabs. They testify to the 
unequal treatment in the grant and recognition of citizenship between 
Arabs and Jews.
The fi rst case of a man born in Ottoman Palestine in the 1890s 
demonstrates how mandate politics played a role in infl uenc-
ing the treatment of natives who wished to return from abroad 
under extraordinary circumstances. Hussein Khalil Abu Ziyad left 
Palestine in the early 1920s and married an American woman in the 
United States, all while he retained his Ottoman nationality docu-
ments. Ziyad applied to the British consulate in California in 1934 
to return to Palestine as a citizen and the consul requested the appli-
cation be considered by the high commissioner. However, once the 
consul informed Palestine’s Commissioner for Migration and Statis-
tics that Ziyad was ‘unsound and an inmate of a state hospital for 
the insane’ as a result of a diagnosis with a form of dementia Ziyad’s 
visa for Palestine was cancelled.59 
By the end of 1936, the Colonial Offi ce feared that the denial 
of Ziyad’s return to Palestine could be given a ‘political complex-
ion [sic]’ and that his exclusion from Palestine could not be justi-
fi ed under the mandate’s 1933 Immigration Ordinance. The case had 
a legal element. Ziyad’s lawyer stressed in early 1937 that his cli-
ent appeared to be a ‘Turkish citizen of Palestinian birth’ who met 
all of the requirements of the Foreign Offi ce consular instructions 
that permitted an individual’s return to Palestine. The lawyer added 
that Ziyad’s wife threatened to politicise the matter, which was most 
undesirable to the British Government in the climate of revolt in 
the mandate territory. In this connection, Ziyad’s wife stated that 
she had recently discovered ‘that, due to a British law passed at the 
time they [Britain] gave Palestine to the Jews as a National home, all 
Arabians then in foreign countries had to renew their citizenship or 
lose it’. Thus, Ziyad lost his citizenship and lacked both a passport 
and a visa to return. Still, the administration refused to admit Ziyad 
as a citizen of Palestine.60 
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In certain circumstances, Arabs born in Palestine posed prob-
lems in terms of classifi cation dependent on their birth. In 1936 the 
question of the divestment of Ottoman nationality for certain Arabs 
confused Palestine and British authorities. The son of George Rock, 
an Ottoman subject naturalised as a British citizen in the 1890s, 
enquired as to whether his father’s status made him a British subject 
or a Palestinian citizen. Although John George Rock was born in 
Palestine, his father had been a resident of Britain prior to 1914. 
When John George enquired as to his nationality in the 1930s, the 
British initially responded that he was Palestinian rather than Brit-
ish. In a series of interdepartmental correspondence on the case, the 
Home Offi ce referred to the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869 in its 
attempt to decide upon the status of John George Rock in late 1936. 
It found that according to the Ottoman law, since the elder Rock did 
not automatically lose his Ottoman nationality upon British natural-
isation, John George could not be regarded as a British subject as he 
had hoped.61 The issue of multiple loyalties came into the picture in 
the case of John George Rock. He stressed, as did his father, that the 
elder rock severed any ties with Turkey. At the time of John George’s 
questioning as to whether he or his father were British subjects, his 
father proclaimed his readiness to give a statement that ‘on [his] nat-
uralisation he swore allegiance to the British Government and no one 
else’.62 The case also demonstrates the uncertainty of the revolt years 
as to whether Palestinian Arabs such as John George, who assumed 
that he was in fact a British subject, would be loyal to Great Britain. 
At the end of 1936 the Colonial Offi ce and other departments 
were in discussion with the Palestine Administration over a pro-
posal to draft another amended citizenship order-in-council. The 
outbreak of revolt and the activities of the Royal Commission in 
Palestine forced offi cials to pause their talks until the Commission 
published its report, which included recommendations on citizen-
ship, naturalisation and immigration. As early as August 1936 the 
commission headed by Lord Peel received a memorandum from the 
Mandate Government that asked it to consider the division of Pal-
estine under a cantonisation scheme. The cantonisation proposal 
meant that the mandate territory would become a federation of can-
tons, or self-governing units. The idea was an unpopular one with 
the British Government and with other members of the administra-
tion, but Peel and his colleagues studied it briefl y.63 To continue to 
analyse the multiple understandings of citizenship and nationality 
in Mandate Palestine, it is useful to question whether the cantoni-
sation plan proposed a new structure for both statuses. A former 
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administrator in Palestine, L. G. Archer Cust, submitted one of 
the cantonisation plans to the Commission. In essence, the scheme 
involved the formation of three cantons: Arab, Jewish and a mix of 
the two groups. The aim was to segregate Palestinian communities 
to avoid clashes of interests between Arabs and Jews. Cust’s plan 
outlined the separation and autonomy of Jewish and Arab areas. 
For example, Jewish immigration and land sales could be permitted 
only in the Jewish canton. In the Arab canton, a central canton gov-
ernment and elected assembly would supervise the local bodies and 
Jewish immigration would be prohibited.64 Palestine’s Chief Secre-
tary Sydney Moody was quick to ask other offi cials ‘whether any 
of us know what cantonisation means?’65 It was unclear whether 
Arabs and Jews would carry equal rights of citizenship, and the 
proposal neglected to mention the concept of Arab nationality. In 
theory and practice, the cantonisation plan went against Britain’s 
mandatory obligations because the plan would effectively force the 
Arab citizens out of their traditional geographical areas through a 
population transfer if they decided not to live in the Jewish canton. 
Ultimately, the Peel Commission also rejected the scheme but its 
eventual recommendation of partition refl ected persistent, deeper 
questions on nationality and citizenship in a partitioned Palestine.
In January 1937 the Commission heard evidence that explicitly 
criticised the mandate’s citizenship legislation. With the Arabs’ boy-
cott of the Commission over, a number of outspoken leaders pro-
vided it with a different account from that of the mandate offi cials 
as to proposals for a future Palestinian government. A very small but 
vocal handful brought up the problems of Palestinian citizenship for 
Arab emigrants and contrasted the emigrants’ situation with that of 
the Jewish immigrants. Importantly, their statements are examples of 
the ways in which discourses and defi nitions of nationality and citi-
zenship had evolved from the early 1920s. These leaders stressed jus 
sanguinis and jus soli nationality provisions as equivalent to rights to 
citizenship in Palestine as well as to Arab nationality. Furthermore, 
the witnesses made clear attempts to connect their ideas of citizen-
ship rights for the Arab emigrants with the provisions of nationality 
legislation in force in Great Britain.
The testimony of ‘Awni Abd al-Hadi in early 1937 exemplifi es 
some of the arguments and hopes of Arab middle-class and for-
mer Arab Executive body leadership for new citizenship regula-
tions. His words to the Commission highlight the Arab nationalists’ 
(often simplistic) understanding that the 1922 Legislative Election 
Order-in-Council was the fi rst piece of legislation to allow any Jew 
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to enter Palestine and receive citizenship with minimal restrictions.66 
The fears built up in the previous decade that Jewish citizens would 
become a majority in Palestine were evident. Abd al-Hadi’s testi-
mony also suggests that immigration statistics were actively com-
piled by Palestinian activists. He stated that at least 4,000 Jews 
entered Palestine on tourist visas yearly and then were subsequently 
‘lost’. As these individuals were not claimed as immigrants or as citi-
zens they were excluded from the numbers of Jews who settled and 
contributed to the economic capacity of the territory.67 However, 
Arab witnesses presented a great deal of nationalist-oriented rheto-
ric and demands to the Peel Commission, which seemed to weaken 
the potential impact of the testimony on citizenship, naturalisation 
and immigration statistics. 
Akram Zu‘aytir and Abd al-Hadi’s colleague, schoolteacher 
Muhammed ‘Izza Darwazah, gave similar statements to the Peel 
Commission. Both argued that the Arabs’ claims in Palestine were 
based on their centuries-long residence as Arab nationals. They 
argued, based on the development of notions of citizenship from 
the early 1920s, that citizenship status in Palestine was a natural 
right based on birth and descent in the territory.68 Furthermore, ‘Isa 
Bandak, the leader and activist touted as an expert on Palestinian 
nationality and citizenship due to his lobbyist efforts in support of 
all Palestinian Arabs to receive citizenship, testifi ed before Lord Peel. 
Bandak urged the Commission to implement the Arabs’ own sugges-
tions in its future report on the issue of citizenship.69 Still these Arabs 
who spoke to the Commission, all upper- and middle-class individu-
als and self-professed nationalist leaders, couched their grievances 
in nationalist language and rarely explained in specifi c terms which 
rights citizenship entailed. The rebel leaders and the rural population 
as a whole were not directly represented to the Commission.
Finally, the testimony of the popular leader Abd al-Latif al-Saleh, 
who both rural and urban Palestinian Arabs regarded with respect, is 
unique in that it traced the concept of Arab nationality from Ottoman 
times through to the creation of citizenship in Palestine. Al-Saleh com-
mented directly on specifi c cases in which the administration denied 
citizenship to native-born Palestinian Arabs. Al-Saleh also linked 
citizenship in Palestine to British colonial policies, thereby placing 
Palestine into a larger narrative of British imperialism as he refer-
enced colonial settlement and the nature of colonial economies as tied 
to Great Britain. In addition, he stressed that the prejudice against 
the emigrants, rendered without nationality, was ‘quite apparent’ 
and indeed the latter was ‘forbidden by international law’. Al-Saleh 
5028_Banko.indd   188 24/06/16   4:34 PM
the palestine revolt and stalled citizenship | 189
spoke of the discourse of citizenship rights in stating that the man-
date text did not distinguish ‘civil rights’ from ‘religious rights’.70 The 
civil rights to citizenship were instead under the umbrella of religious 
rights and, as a result, citizenship came to be governed by religious 
communities. 
The Arab nationalists in Palestine were not the only ones asked 
to offer testimony to the Commission on the issues of citizenship 
and immigration legislation. Mandate offi cials (and Jewish leaders) 
did as well but it was the testimony of Palestine’s Commissioner for 
Migration and Statistics, Major E. Mills, which matched up with 
the arguments given on citizenship fi gures by the Arab interviewees. 
Mills’s statements supported the Arabs’ argument that the admin-
istration categorised Jewish citizens separately from Arab citizens 
in matters of immigration, emigration and naturalisation. His testi-
mony also suggests the importance placed by administrators upon 
information-gathering on Jewish immigrants in order for the gov-
ernment to prove the success of the mandate’s Jewish national home 
policy. Mills admitted to the Peel Commission in 1937 that ‘the 
natural increase of the population has not been tabulated by citizen-
ship’, and instead explained that at the end of 1936, 43 per cent of 
the estimated 384,000 Jewish inhabitants were Palestinian citizens. 
In fact, he added that the number of Jews resident ‘unoffi cially’ in 
Palestine was much higher. It could then be surmised that less than 
43 per cent of immigrants actually took Palestinian citizenship.71 
Mills’s fi gures are reminiscent of debates from the late 1920s and 
early 1930s in which the administration revealed that many of the 
Jewish voters in the municipal elections were not actually citizens of 
Palestine. The fi gures given to Peel show that less than half of the 
Jewish population could legitimately claim the rights to Palestinian 
citizenship in 1937.
For Great Britain, these fi gures compiled on citizenship, naturali-
sation and immigration called into question the success of the man-
date’s extension of Palestinian citizenship to the Jewish immigrants, 
and thus the success of the Jewish national home policy itself. The 
low numbers of Jewish citizens, out of the total population of Jews 
in Palestine, highlighted questions regarding the loyalties of this 
population to the Palestine Government. In sum, the Commission 
did not look favourably upon provisions of citizenship and the dual 
system that separated Arab and Jewish residents. In its fi nal report 
issued in July 1937 the Royal Commission recommended the alle-
viation of the Arabs’ grievances in large part through the parti-
tion of Palestine. The report had sections devoted to citizenship 
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and naturalisation of both Arabs and Jews. It provided informa-
tion on the means by which the government attempted to facilitate 
the Jewish national home policy. For example, the report stated 
that so-called naturalisation fi eld offi cers visited the outlying Jew-
ish villages and settlements specifi cally to ensure that immigrants 
naturalised.72 Out of just over 6,000 applications for naturalisa-
tion made in 1935, more than 1,500 were accepted by a fi eld offi -
cer from Jewish settlements. The Commission also noted that in 
1936, out of the 384,000 Jewish residents of Palestine, 92,000 were 
recent immigrants unable to qualify for naturalisation. Peel and his 
men affi rmed what Great Britain feared, that the high percentage 
of non-citizen Jews was due to the fact that the chief allegiance of 
many immigrants was to the Jewish community rather than to the 
Palestine Government.73 
Two months before the Royal Commission report recommended 
partition, Lord Peel asked the Palestine Administration and White-
hall whether either objected to the inclusion of certain recommenda-
tions on the issue of citizenship in the fi nal report. The Commission 
made clear that fi rst and foremost it planned to recommend revi-
sions to the citizenship order-in-council in the direction desired by 
the Arabs, specifi cally to enable all natives to obtain citizenship. 
The Commission was extremely favourable to the Arab argument 
that the hardship for those Arab emigrants who did not sever their 
connections with Palestine loomed large as a grievance for all of 
the Arabs.74 
The British Colonial and Foreign Offi ces objected to the recom-
mendations. The British Government re-stated its long-standing 
objection:
It is undesirable to grant Palestinian citizenship to persons who 
have been absent from Palestine for several years and who have no 
intention of returning to Palestine within a reasonable period and of 
residing there permanently . . . [I]n many cases, the principle object 
of applications . . . is to obtain British protection for the purpose of 
pressing claims against the Governments of the countries in which 
they reside. Further, it is undesirable on general grounds to create a 
class of persons permanently resident abroad who would be entitled 
to British protection.75
As explained in Chapters 4 and 5, this argument was used for more 
than fi fteen years against stateless Palestinian Arabs. The Commission 
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further noted that mandate offi cials failed to take the initiative to con-
sult or survey the emigrants themselves through British consuls.
The Commission’s offi cial report included the testimony by the 
Arab witnesses. It noted the fi gure of approximately 40,000 emi-
grants who had lost their chance to acquire Palestinian citizenship 
due to the 1925 citizenship order requirements. In particular, those 
interviewed noted that emigrants found one particular question on 
the mandate’s form for Arabs who intended to ‘opt’ for ipso facto 
citizenship: that of ‘where do you intend to reside?’ Thus, answers 
usually listed the applicant’s current country of residence rather than 
Palestine. The Commission stated that, as a result, out of more than 
9,000 applications, only 100 were accepted by the mandate admin-
istration.76 The Peel Commission considered that the Arabs had a 
genuine grievance as to the denial of citizenship for emigrants and 
that the British should utilise every effort to restore to these Arabs 
‘a right ordinarily enjoyed by the nationals of civilized peoples’. The 
Commission’s report addressed the Palestinian Arab emigrants who 
did not take up any other nationality after they left Palestine as ‘peo-
ple who do not wish to be regarded as Turkish citizens’ and who 
owed no allegiance to Turkey; further, Turkey did not want their alle-
giance. Instead, the emigrants had long ‘regard[ed] Palestine as their 
country where their relatives still live’ and that ‘on the whole they 
maintain a substantial connextion [sic] with their families and their 
hope is to return to Palestine . . . to retire’. As for the mandatory, the 
Commission wrote that the administration knew the position of the 
emigrants and supposedly took all measures to facilitate their return 
and travel but large numbers of Palestinian Arabs in Latin America 
were unable to opt for citizenship and return to Palestine.77 From the 
report, it is evident that Peel and his colleagues supported the argu-
ment of the Arabs against the mandate’s citizenship provisions. 
The Peel Commission concluded that it was ‘reasonable and 
proper’ that protection should be extended to the Arab emigrants 
by the mandatory. Indeed, it seems that the Commission felt that the 
emigrants’ situation was important enough to be discussed despite 
objections by the British to the report. The Commission understood 
the attitudes of the middle-class nationalists towards Palestine’s citi-
zenship legislation:
There is no genuine enthusiasm to be observed in Palestine for Pales-
tinian citizenship. It is only the Arabs in South America who are really 
anxious for it. And under present conditions this does not surprise 
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us. Jewish immigrants may well hesitate to abandon the citizenship 
of some old established state in favour of citizenship in a country 
of which the future seems so uncertain. To the educated Palestinian 
Arab, who has always resented the separation of Palestine from Syria, 
the very idea of Palestinian citizenship is obnoxious as being associ-
ated with the Mandate and all it involves.78
Ten years after the fi rst stirrings of discontent over the citizenship 
order, the voices of the emigrants and their supporters fi nally found 
public resonance and offi cial expression in the report of the inves-
tigative commission. For the Arabs, however, the recommendation 
of partition overshadowed the report’s favourable attitude toward 
citizenship legislation.
As is well known, the Arab leadership rejected the Peel report’s 
suggestion of partition of Palestine. Although the report recom-
mended that Palestine be split into an Arab and Jewish state with 
the designated holy areas (that is, sacred places such as Jerusalem 
and Nazareth) under an international mandate, it recognised the 
problems that that partition would cause for nationality and citi-
zenship. The Commission referred to the initial and complicated 
problem of the status of Arabs in the Jewish state and vice versa, 
and expressed their hope that another body could ‘avail itself of 
the service of experts on Nationality and Minority problems’.79 It 
did recognise that those experts would need to design nationality 
and citizenship regulations broadly in order to accommodate the 
demands of the Arabs and the Jews in the territory. The Commission 
listed three possibilities for the implementation of the national and 
civic status of the inhabitants of the partitioned territories. First, 
it suggested that complete and full citizenship be given to every 
adult Arab who resided in the Jewish state if he wished. Of interest, 
the report also noted that nationality and citizenship were not the 
same and the differences could cause problems as states increasingly 
defi ned themselves in ethno-national terms. It was also noted that 
Arabs in the Jewish state may be given the option of citizenship in 
the co-national ‘Mother State’ on the other side of the border, mean-
ing the Arab state.80 The fi rst option, to be sure, was quite new for 
the British Government since such fl exible nationality and citizen-
ship legislation had not been implemented in any of Great Britain’s 
colonies or possessions.
In a partitioned Palestine, the Commission stated the second 
option to be the need for an inclusion of a minority statute as part 
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of the constitution of the Jewish state in order to recognise the Arabs 
who resided within that state as a ‘National Minority’. Presumably 
the same would be done in the Arab state, although the report envis-
aged that the number of Jewish residents was likely to be low given 
that the administration would be able to stop Jewish immigration 
and land purchases. Yet the rights to be given to national minori-
ties were unclear. The third suggested option was that a ‘National-
ity Statute’ recognise the Arab Palestinians as ‘an Equal Nationality 
on par with the Jews, as a “staatsvolk,” ’ meaning that the Jewish 
state would be composed of and administered by the two constitu-
ent, equal nationalities.81 The third option supported an egalitarian 
notion of citizenship for both groups. 
British offi cials in London and in Palestine interpreted the recom-
mendations in different ways. The report suggested that the third 
was the most feasible option as the one most likely to ensure coop-
eration from the Arabs in the administration of the Jewish state and 
to prepare the territory for a future union in a federation. The prin-
ciple of bi-nationalism would be part of both the Arab and Jew-
ish states. Some colonial offi cials argued that a minority nationality 
would not be adequate for either partitioned state because national-
ity would not be held equally and the minority group would not 
exercise the full political rights of citizenship.82 In response to the 
report, the Higher Arab Committee commenting on the plans for 
minority and majority citizenships in a new Palestinian state argued 
the inadequacy of minority nationality. The HAC felt partition was 
simply neither possible nor acceptable.83 
Each of the three options, if implemented, represented an attempt 
to create an effi cient system of documentary identity, which had 
increased in global and colonial importance since the signing of the 
Treaty of Lausanne. These options were the expression of classifi ca-
tions of national identity and citizenship status as ‘from above’. The 
Commission did not consider that the Arab and Jewish leaders them-
selves may be directly involved in the implementation of new nation-
ality and citizenship regulations. Moreover, although the partition of 
Palestine meant that the Arab and the Jewish states would adminis-
ter their respective territories autonomously, the legislative frame-
work of the new status, including provisions of citizenship, would be 
devised by Great Britain. Despite the space given by the Peel Com-
mission to Palestinian voices, the Commission did not address the 
Arabs’ hope to design their own citizenship laws through an elected, 
representative parliament. 
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Proposed Amendments and Changes to 
Citizenship Legislation
Strong opposition to the plan for partition from within sections of 
the British Government, the Arab leadership and the Zionist Organ-
isation prohibited its implementation. The Foreign Offi ce objected 
to the Peel Commission’s recommendation of partition and of unity 
between the Arab Palestinian state and Transjordan, while the Colo-
nial Offi ce endorsed it as the only acceptable solution to the situ-
ation in Palestine. The Foreign Offi ce felt, as the Arab nationalist 
leaders had believed and voiced for nearly two decades, that the 
British could not possibly fulfi l the mandate’s obligations.84 Since 
the partition scheme and options for new national statuses were not 
actually implemented in accordance with the Peel Report, the Brit-
ish Government in London and the Palestine Administration could 
begin the draft of an amended citizenship order in line with the 
report’s other recommendations regarding Palestinian citizenship. 
The draft amendment of the citizenship order did not see offi cial 
publication for two years after the Peel Report. 
The events of 1936 and 1937, including the general strike, out-
right violent revolt and the work of the Peel Commission in Palestine 
highlight the multiple meanings for different segments of the Arab 
population on nationality, citizenship, civic duties and civic loyalties 
to the ambiguous ‘nation’. The new atmosphere in Palestine after 
1935 changed the Arab and the British understandings of the rights, 
duties and expressions of Palestinian citizenship as a result of the 
violent measures taken by the British administration to stop the Arab 
population from participating in the revolt. For a number of rea-
sons, Palestinian citizenship lost some meaning during the revolt. On 
the one hand, the British military and civil authorities recommended 
emergency regulations and martial law measures such as collective 
punishment and the treatment of all civilians as rebels be applied only 
towards the Arab population. On the other, the Arab rebel leaders 
did not fully support liberal notions of citizenship such as due pro-
cess and democratic representation as shown by their actions during 
the revolt. Hallmarks of citizenship practices such as non-payment 
of taxes and the general strike rested uneasily with those Palestinian 
Arabs who called for civic duties to be undertaken through violent 
resistance to the government.
Throughout the revolt, the vocabulary of citizenship and nation-
ality did not change substantially. Rather it was partially appropri-
ated by the Arab rebels in order to fi t the concepts of citizenship and 
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nationality into their view of a future Palestine independent from 
British control and Zionist infl uence. Still, the assumed legal param-
eters of citizenship were expressed actively through Arab support 
for the revolt. For example, protests, the non-payment of taxes and 
even the new, albeit non-democratic, measure of due process imple-
mented by rebel courts transformed citizenship into a more tangible 
status of belonging to the Arab nation of Palestine. Yet the paral-
lel legislative and judicial system put into practice by the peasant 
rebels during the revolt fell short of providing rights to the Arab 
population. Instead, it allowed for Arab civilians to be tried in rebel 
courts as ‘traitors’ and ‘collaborators’ without recourse to protec-
tions typically offered by civil constitutions. At the same time, the 
Peel Commission referred to problems caused by the citizenship leg-
islation highlighting British favouritism for Jewish immigrants. The 
civil administration was not bound to implement the report’s recom-
mendations since the British Government did not require it to do so. 
The testimony of Arab national leaders on the issue of citizenship 
and their statistics on Jewish citizens are also telling. While heavily 
infl uenced by nationalist rhetoric and propaganda against mandate 
policy, it is diffi cult to construct a nuanced historical narrative based 
on the words of a few educated political leaders and writers. One 
can assume that these Arabs represented the feelings and beliefs of 
the majority of the population but it is diffi cult to gauge the extent 
to which mass notions of civic identity changed during the revolt. 
Similarly, the peasant rebel leaders did not have the full support of 
the wider population. What is clear, as shown by the actions of the 
rebels and the words and conclusion of the Peel report, is that by 
1937 Arab nationality and Palestinian citizenship were imagined as 
distinct statuses as each entailed a different type of political, civic 
and social belonging to Palestine. The rights, protections and duties 
associated with this belonging also varied according to urban and 
rural leadership. These distinctions are crucial to the understanding 
of the process of citizenship and national identity affi liation in Pales-
tine after the end of the revolt.
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Conclusion – The End of the Experiment: 
Discourses on Citizenship at the 
Close of the Mandate
In 1938, the last full year of the Palestine Revolt, most of Palestine’s more radical Arab leaders including former Istiqlalists and mem-
bers of the Higher Arab Committee (HAC) had been deported to 
the Seychelles following their involvement in the general strike and 
revolt. Most remained interned as political prisoners through 1939. 
For these men, Palestinian citizenship seemed to be a meaningless 
status. As he began a hunger strike to protest his imprisonment, for-
mer Jerusalem mayor Husayn Khalidi wrote to High Commissioner 
Harold MacMichael (Arthur Wauchope’s replacement) of his shame 
in ‘remember[ing] I carry a British passport’. That passport issued 
by the Palestine Administration, wrote Khalidi, ‘cannot accord its 
bearer the element once famed [of] British justice which accorded 
every citizen a right to stand his trial and defend himself’. Here, 
Khalidi referred to the lack of citizenship rights despite holding 
Palestinian citizenship – a legal status created by Great Britain – that 
he and many other Arabs had long envisioned would eventually con-
fer such rights. Deported without a trial and held as a political pris-
oner on an island in the possession of Great Britain, Khalidi lamented 
to no effect in a petition to the high commissioner that ‘[w]e are 
either subjects of Your Majesty’s Government and Empire or we are 
not’. If the former were true, Khalidi begged MacMichael to ‘submit 
that we are entitled to some sort of protection, and such treatment 
consistent with the fact that we are human beings’, such as rights of 
due process and return to Palestine.1 The following year, the Foreign 
Offi ce reaffi rmed that Palestinian nationality did not refl ect national-
ity in an ordinary sense, nor did it confer rights. Since the start of the 
mandate, the Palestinian Arabs had not given up demanding that the 
British grant them the bundle of rights that the former assumed were 
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natural based on their Arab membership in the historical community 
and nation of Palestine. Instead, because the mandate territory was 
not an independent nation and since the mandatory had done very 
little to advance self-governing institutions, Palestine’s inhabitants 
held a specialised and apolitical form of British-protected person or 
protégé status.2 
The Palestine Revolt ultimately ended in 1939 as a failure for 
the Arab citizens of the mandate and their supporters outside of 
Palestine who desired self-government entirely free from British 
trusteeship. The revolt, like the general strike in 1936, ended due to 
Britain’s overwhelming military and legislative power harnessed to 
arrest, deport and execute suspected rebels. For their part, Palestine’s 
Arab leadership rejected the 1937 Peel Commission plan to partition 
the country between its Arab and Jewish inhabitants, but their calls 
for renewed strikes in opposition to the mandate had little effect. In 
addition to the deportations of urban Arab national leaders the man-
date authorities executed more than 100 rebels and destroyed hun-
dreds of houses. Arab deaths totalled 5,000 and the number of Arabs 
detained totalled more than 5,500.3 The Palestinian Arab national-
ist movement effectively split into a number of factions and a stark 
division emerged between the rural and the urban Arab leaders. In 
addition, a less stark but signifi cant division started to grow between 
Christian and Muslim communities. Any inkling of a populist move-
ment that could encompass all classes of Palestinian Arabs had little 
chance of succeeding and even the Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, had 
fl ed to Beirut during the revolt and did not return.
In the fi nal months of the revolt in 1939, the British Govern-
ment issued a new White Paper that for the fi rst time described 
future limits to Jewish immigration and land purchases in Pales-
tine, greater Arab involvement in the mandate government and the 
promise of independence within ten years. The 1939 White Paper 
ultimately meant very little, since both the Palestinian Arab lead-
ership, which adhered to the opinion of the exiled Mufti, and the 
Zionist Organisation rejected its proposals.4 At that time, Great 
Britain was increasingly pulled into European political events and 
could not devote signifi cant resources to the post-revolt problems 
in Palestine. Despite their rejection of it, the Arabs affi rmed the 
signifi cance of the White Paper: they believed that the past two 
decades of appeals to Great Britain made a number of inroads. 
For the study of citizenship and political identity, the policy paper 
seemed to promise that Arab political control over Palestine could 
be tantalisingly close at hand. Once Jewish immigration and land 
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purchases were curtailed, many nationalist leaders surmised, man-
date institutions and legislation could be challenged and disman-
tled. Of course, the White Paper also seemed to signify that at the 
centre, Great Britain’s Conservative Government warily realised 
the danger of continued support for rising immigration and the 
aims of Zionism in Palestine.5 
The international situation in the late 1930s, particularly with 
regard to Germany’s Jewish policy, affected Palestinian citizens in 
more ways than the related increase in both Jewish immigration 
and naturalisation. The Palestine Administration and, by extension, 
Whitehall, attempted to balance the mandate policy of support 
for Jewish immigration at a time when Germany began to clamp 
down on its Jewish citizens, with giving suffi cient attention to the 
Arab demands for self-government. Great Britain also calculated 
its response to the Peel Commission report and although Whitehall 
ultimately refused to consider partition of Palestine, the government 
also knew that certain conditions proposed in the report to benefi t 
the Arab inhabitants needed to be met. This fi nal chapter explores 
the immediate reactions by Great Britain and the Mandate Gov-
ernment to the increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine and the 
changes made to the mandate’s citizenship legislation in the wake of 
the revolt and the Peel report’s recommendations. Signifi cantly, on 
the eve of the Second World War citizenship in Palestine continued 
to be a crucial issue for Arab inhabitants and emigrants, as both 
groups increasingly feared the impact upon their communities as a 
result of the benefi ts and rights that accompanied citizenship status 
for Jewish immigrants and new Jewish refugees. The Arab commu-
nity and its understanding of nationality, citizenship and political 
membership in the envisioned nation-state had changed greatly by 
1939: this understanding was shaped by the immediate post-war 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the accompanying trans-
formations to political, social and civic interactions, and political 
institutions introduced (often inadvertently) by the existence of the 
mandate administration and the inclusion of Palestine in the British 
imperial system between the two world wars. The shifting demo-
graphics also changed the Arabs’ perception of space, territory, civic 
behaviour and identity as it strengthened their sense of responsibili-
ties, rights and duties within Palestine. Ultimately, high immigration 
and naturalisation fi gures in the years following the end of the Pal-
estine Revolt in 1939 pushed up the percentage of Jewish citizens in 
Palestine vis-à-vis the Arab citizens. The outbreak of war in Europe 
and the subsequent impact on British administration in the mandate 
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territory meant that Palestinian citizenship never fully evolved into 
a meaningful status that provided Palestinians with equal rights and 
duties as members of a nation-state. 
Immigration, Nationality and Documentary 
Identity on the Eve of War
Signifi cant changes to the perception of Jewish identity and immigra-
tion began to take place within Europe just as the attention of Great 
Britain was drawn away from the political situation in Palestine at 
the end of the 1930s. These changes affected the Arab citizens of 
the mandate as well. The treatment of Jews in Germany beginning 
in the early 1930s forced the Palestine Administration to differenti-
ate between Arab and Jewish Palestinians when each left Palestine 
for international travel. It fell upon Great Britain to provide Ger-
many with assurances that certain Palestinian citizens who requested 
residence in Germany for professional or academic reasons were in 
fact Arab, rather than Jewish, citizens. This is evidenced by an inter-
nal Colonial Offi ce discussion on Germany’s requirement that Great 
Britain forward a note of identifi cation for a Palestinian Arab doctor, 
Mafi d Abd al-Hadi. The offi ce noted that it was evident that Abd 
al-Hadi was suspect due to his Palestinian nationality.6 However, the 
suspicion of immigrants went both ways: the Palestine Administra-
tion received a number of warnings from the British Government to 
ensure that all persons who entered the mandate territory were genu-
ine immigrants who did not attempt to evade immigration controls 
or seek political refuge. 
In 1938, the Foreign Offi ce warned the Crown’s consular offi -
cers to be aware of individuals who impersonated Palestinian citi-
zens in order to request Palestine passports. The problem had been 
widespread since the early 1930s, but with the increased number of 
Jews who sought Palestinian citizenship for political reasons, the 
Foreign Offi ce hoped to stem any attempts by immigrants to use 
their nationality only for diplomatic protection. In particular, the 
offi ce aimed the warning at a growing number of European Jews 
who requested Palestine passports for identifi cation and travel pur-
poses but who could not produce proof of their actual Palestinian 
citizenship.7 The same problems that the administration encoun-
tered in the early 1930s persisted into the latter years of the decade. 
For example, a signifi cant number of Jewish women tried to evade 
immigration regulations by entering false marriages with Palestinian 
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citizens. In the fi rst fi ve months of 1938, Palestine’s Commissioner 
of Migration and Statistics withheld Palestine passports from sev-
enty-three Jewish women in Poland who falsely claimed to be legiti-
mately married to Palestinians. E. Mills, the commissioner, noted 
that although his department withheld hundreds of passports alto-
gether, incidents of so-called marriages of convenience decreased 
as immigration authorities carried out strict identity checks. Even 
so, out of almost 4,500 Palestinian Jewish marriages in 1936, half 
ended in divorce only two years later.8 As the high commissioner 
and the Colonial Offi ce simultaneously worked on draft citizenship 
amendment orders, both struggled with questions of how to prevent 
such abuses of Palestinian citizenship status and naturalisation in an 
internationally turbulent time period. 
The 1938 Annual Report of the administration to the League of 
Nations included the year’s summary of nationality issues and special 
cases. The report noted that in most special cases, the high com-
missioner granted naturalisation for Jewish immigrants regardless of 
whether those immigrants met the qualifi cation of three years’ resi-
dence in Palestine prior to their application to naturalise. In total, 
the administration issued more than 9,000 nationality certifi cates in 
1938, which brought the total of certifi cates issued since 1925 to 
nearly 54,000 out of almost 61,000 applications. In 1938, more than 
18,000 individuals acquired Palestinian citizenship, including wives 
and children of male immigrants, and possessed nationality certifi -
cates. Despite the high fi gures, the administration noted that com-
pared to previous years, the number of naturalised citizens for the 
year actually dropped. Offi cials blamed the decrease on the distur-
bances and violence of the previous two years of revolt. Out of those 
naturalised in 1938, the majority were Polish and German Jews. In 
addition, ninety-two ‘Turkish’ individuals, forty Syrians and seven-
teen Egyptians became Palestinian citizens.9 
The Palestine Administration issued a large number of Palestine 
passports in 1938 – nearly 15,600 – in spite of the disturbances. 
Offi cials noted that many Palestinian Arabs sought passports once 
they found themselves unable to cross freely into Syrian, Lebanese 
and Transjordanian territory. Palestinian Arabs who voluntarily 
left Palestine due to the revolt also needed passports.10 Although 
offi cials tried to keep tabs on whether Jews who sought Palestine 
passports were actually entitled to them, a number of Jews who 
lived outside of Palestine and claimed to be too ill or poor to return 
were able to have their passports renewed by the administration. In 
most of these cases, the Palestine Administration consulted with the 
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Colonial Secretary and granted extensions of individual passport 
validity until the passport’s holder claimed that he or she could 
return. Despite long absences and repeated failures of such Jewish 
Palestinian citizens to return to Palestine, most did not have their 
passports or certifi cates of naturalisation revoked.11 
The Palestine passports themselves became symbolic of the seem-
ingly unending internal administrative disagreements over Palestinian 
nationality and the role of Great Britain in providing documentary 
identity to Arab and Jewish citizens. Husayn Khalidi’s letter to the 
high commissioner in 1938 is just one example of the complexities 
caused by the disagreements. In early 1939, the Foreign Offi ce – then 
offi cially charged with Palestine policy – proposed that Palestine 
passports no longer have their covers labelled as a British passport 
but rather as ‘Passport – British Mandated Territory of Palestine’. 
The change came as a response to two factors: the fi rst, a larger 
move by the Dominions Offi ce to have ‘British Passport’ printed on 
any passport issued by a British protectorate. Dominions offi cials felt 
Palestinians were as similar to British-protected persons as possible 
and the Foreign Offi ce agreed that British passports did not mislead 
other nations as to the status of Palestinian citizens as not under the 
full sovereignty of Great Britain. However, other offi cials noted that 
since Palestinians were aliens under British immigration legislation, 
their claim to British passports was indeed misleading, and criticised 
the label ‘British passport’ because it gave an impression that holders 
were entitled to certain privileges. One Foreign Offi ce member sug-
gested the change because the then-current form of the passport ‘was 
ambiguous to the ordinary man, particularly the ordinary Palestin-
ian and he (unfortunately) cannot by any means be relied on to have 
an exact and correction notion of what a passport is or what the 
rather complicated international situation of Palestine is’.12 Foreign 
offi cials suggested the change to the wording of the passport for a 
second reason. A court case at the end of 1938 that involved a Jew-
ish Palestinian, Rex vs. Ketter, resulted in a legal report by the Court 
of Criminal Appeal titled ‘Citizen in Palestine not a British subject’.13 
Palestinian citizens who also claimed British nationality often faced 
different treatment as to their status both within Great Britain and 
abroad. The court case affi rmed that Palestinian citizenship did not 
translate to ipso facto British nationality.
Within Palestine, the administration also instituted a wider use of 
documentary identifi cation cards. Through the fi nal year of the Pal-
estine Revolt, High Commissioner MacMichael discussed propos-
als for identity cards with Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald. 
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The men concluded that compulsory cards would stem illegal immi-
gration but they both realised the diffi culties in obtaining coopera-
tion from the Jewish community. In the fi nal months of 1938, the 
Palestine Government instituted a voluntary system of identifi cation 
cards with the hope that the population would become accustomed 
to showing their cards. By the end of 1938, more than 170,000 
citizens had identity cards and, of that number, in the region of 
90,000 were Arabs. However, the administration feared that Pales-
tinian Arabs could be easily induced to destroy their identity docu-
ments for political reasons.14 By the end of the fi rst two decades of 
the civil administration, identity cards continued to be issued on a 
strictly voluntary basis. It is interesting to note that although some 
offi cials within Great Britain pressed for a more inclusive Palestin-
ian citizenship for Jews, the Jewish community in Palestine did not 
wholeheartedly support compulsory identifi cation cards or other 
measures to ensure they were documented as citizens.
Jewish Identity and Changes to Palestinian Citizenship
Shira Robinson argues that in post-Ottoman Palestine, the turn-of-
the-century concept of ‘racial unmixing’ through the creation of states 
for one specifi c people (as popularised by British colonial offi cial Lord 
Curzon) took on a decidedly more racialised cast in the mandate era. 
The Yishuv leadership posited Jewish immigrants and Jewish citizens 
as a racial, rather than religious, community. By the second decade of 
the mandate, the British also placed the Jewish immigrants into the 
‘white race’ category. The British and, later, the 1947 United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) visualised Palestine’s Jews 
as composing their own racial – albeit white – group that was thus 
entitled to self-rule in part of Palestine.15 The proposed exclusiveness 
of a Jewish Palestinian citizenship was not new – Chaim Weizmann 
had proposed a separate nationality for the Palestine’s Jews even 
before the ratifi cation of the mandate – and at the time of the grow-
ing Jewish refugee situation in the late 1930s members of Parliament 
began to discuss a greater racial segregation in the application of Pal-
estinian citizenship as well.
After the release of the Peel Commission report in the summer 
of 1937, High Commissioner Wauchope and the Colonial Offi ce 
separately drafted their own amended citizenship order-in-council 
in response to the report’s recommendations for changes to the 
existing legislation. Up until that time, the process of drafting a new 
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amended order had been deferred until the publication of the report. 
As in previous attempts to amend the 1925 Palestine Citizenship 
Order-in-Council, the administration questioned whether amend-
ments would contravene the Treaty of Lausanne’s nationality pro-
visions. It remained recognised protocol that the other signatories 
of the treaty were required to approve proposed amendments to 
the mandates’ citizenship laws.16 Yet, unlike the previous years of 
debate over citizenship, the new issue of security played a major role 
both in terms of the need for the British to prevent further violence 
by the Arabs and to manage the ever-growing German and Polish 
Jewish immigrants.
In the fi rst half of 1938, the Colonial Offi ce expressed alarm after 
The Times published details of a bill introduced by a Member of Par-
liament that proposed a universal Palestinian citizenship for all Jews. 
Offi cials in the Colonial and Foreign Offi ces immediately feared the 
Arab reaction once news of the bill became known in Palestine. They 
quickly expressed the hope that the bill would not progress further. 
The under-secretary for the Colonial Offi ce met with the bill’s spon-
sor, Commander Locker-Lampson, and the latter explained that he 
meant the bill to only be ‘a “gesture” . . . a matter more of “emo-
tion” and he had not expected a division’ as a result of its provi-
sions. The sponsor affi rmed his hopes that Great Britain would offer 
protection in the form of extra-territorial Palestinian citizenship for 
about 200,000 Jews in central European states.17 Although after the 
secretary’s discussions with the sponsor himelf, Locker-Lampson, the 
latter withdrew the proposed bill to extend Palestinian citizenship 
to all Jews. The Colonial Offi ce stated that if such a freer grant of 
citizenship was contemplated for Jews outside of Palestine, ‘it would 
be imperative not to overlook the claims of Arabs born in Palestine 
who are living abroad and have no opportunity in the present law 
to become Palestinian citizens’.18 However, the mandate’s citizen-
ship legislation could not have been changed by the bill since an act 
of Parliament could not change the existing legislation in Palestine. 
Rather, only the king could do so through an order-in-council. In 
addition, United Kingdom legislation required that citizenship be 
based on domicile. 
The Colonial Offi ce also expressed the belief that if Palestine 
were partitioned in the future, the Jewish state would enact its own 
nationality law and defi nition of a Jew.19 That defi nition compli-
cated matters for the administration as it and the Colonial Offi ce 
drafted changes to citizenship legislation. The discussions that arose 
out of attempts to resolve the complicated defi nition of ‘Jewish’ 
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harked back to similar discussions that took place on the nationality 
of Jewish individuals in the early 1920s between the Palestine Arab 
Executive, including Musa Kazim al-Husayni, and the British Colo-
nial Offi ce. The settlement upon a proper defi nition of ‘Jewish’ had 
long been avoided by British and mandate offi cials despite numerous 
Arab requests for the defi nition of nationality in relation to the Jew-
ish national home. 
By 1938 the government in Great Britain increasingly gave atten-
tion both to the Jewish refugee problem in central Europe and to 
a fear that Palestine was far too small a territory to play any sig-
nifi cant role in its solution. Other political leaders agreed with the 
idea behind the bill noted above, and the possible solution it posed. 
Colonial offi cials continued to stress to Cabinet that if all Jews were 
granted Palestinian citizenship, Great Britain would be obliged to 
undertake special duties ‘to the Jewish race as a whole’. Such a view 
had been resisted by successive British governments since the time of 
the Balfour Declaration in 1917; instead, the Colonial Offi ce stated 
that governmental obligations were ‘strictly limited to facilitating the 
Zionist ideal of the establishment of a national home for Jews in 
Palestine (an ideal to which large numbers of Jews are indifferent, 
or even hostile)’. A number of specifi c changes suggested to Pales-
tinian citizenship were ‘fundamentally inconsistent with accepted 
British principles of nationality laws’, according to the Colonial 
Offi ce, which began to make this stance publically clearer. Despite 
the problems with the proposal to extend Palestinian citizenship to 
Jews throughout the world, the House of Commons split the vote 
perfectly on Locker-Lampson’s bill before its withdrawal, with 144 
votes in support and 144 votes in opposition.20 
The late 1930s ushered in a fl urry of Jewish lobby efforts to 
infl uence the proposed amended citizenship order. The Jewish 
Agency requested that Jewish refugees from Germany be given the 
‘full rights of citizenship’ upon their arrival into Palestine, which 
would entail that the administration overlook the two-year resi-
dency period required before these immigrants could naturalise. The 
Home Offi ce declined to consider the suggestion while High Com-
missioner MacMichael expressed his disagreement with it, noting 
that the provision would ‘differentiate between Jews in Palestine 
on the grounds of nationality’. Indeed, no longer would the distinc-
tion in citizenship be between Jews and Arabs but between Jews of 
different origins and political backgrounds. The status of German 
Jews in British territories as ‘enemy subjects’ would actually become 
a privilege if the administration enacted the suggestion. The Jewish 
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Agency’s plan could have allowed one group of Jews to receive natu-
ralisation under exceptional circumstances. In a climate of increas-
ing anxiety over a new war, MacMichael did, however, note that it 
could be benefi cial to grant Jews in Palestine who joined His Maj-
esty’s Armed Forces immediate citizenship upon enlistment.21
The problematic situation of Palestinian Arab natives abroad 
received attention once again in light of the proposed bill and the Peel 
Commission recommendations as the Palestine Administration and 
the Colonial Offi ce drafted versions of a citizenship order-in-council 
amendment. In fact, the Middle East Division of the Colonial Offi ce 
wrote to Palestine’s Chief Secretary Sydney Moody in mid-1938 that 
the department had not forgotten the question on grants of citizen-
ship to persons born in Palestine and resident abroad. The Colonial 
Offi ce and other offi cials in London analysed Peel’s recommenda-
tions for these Arabs who could not receive citizenship. The offi ce’s 
draft amendment met the points made by the Royal Commission 
but expressed hope to further quantify the meaning of ‘unbroken 
personal connection’ with respect to the need to offer citizenship to 
those emigrants who demonstrated such a connection.22 By 1938, the 
draft amendment had been seen and re-drafted by the Colonial, For-
eign and Home Offi ces of the British Government.23 Although draft 
amended orders were started by both the Palestine Administration 
and the Colonial Offi ce in 1937, they fl oated between departments 
and individual offi cials until 1939. Only then was the amended citi-
zenship order-in-council published.
The drafts of the new amendment focused on the status of Jew-
ish immigrants, married Jewish women and children, all of which 
had remained unsolved by the 1931 amendment. The usual debate 
over changes ensued, particularly as to whether a married woman’s 
nationality depended entirely on her husband and whether women 
could be naturalised as Palestinians separately from their husbands. 
The League of Nations had debated the same issue earlier in the 
1930s but the Government of Great Britain and its Dominions Offi ce 
did not agree with demands by women’s organisations to implement 
such a change. After much discussion, in May 1939 High Commis-
sioner MacMichael accepted the fi nal draft for the amended order-
in-council, minus one fi nal change that involved questions over how 
the administration could deprive minors of citizenship. The admin-
istration initially intended for the amended order to end the nearly 
decade-long debate over the naturalisation of women separately from 
their husbands. The 1939 amendment’s Article 6 clearly stated that 
the citizenship status of women was governed by their husbands. 
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This came despite the insistence from various governmental offi cials 
in Great Britain that separate naturalisation facilities would bar the 
entrance of ‘undesirables’ into Palestine. 
Two months later, on 25 July 1939, His Majesty’s Government 
ratifi ed the new Palestine Citizenship (Amendment) Order-in-Council 
of 1939. The primary change in the new amendment, which revoked 
the 1931 order’s Article 12, allowed that an alien woman married 
to a Palestinian citizen did not become a Palestinian by reason of 
marriage but, rather, she would receive a certifi cate of naturalisa-
tion on separate terms from her husband.24 The problem of undesir-
ables in Palestine who evaded immigration controls remained only 
tenuously solved. For the Palestinian Arabs, the changes made to 
Article 2 of the principle (1925) order had a signifi cant impact. The 
changes affected the status of Palestinian-born Arabs who resided 
abroad: those who possessed Ottoman nationality on the date of the 
1925 Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council, or continued to hold 
Turkish citizenship, and who had ‘since maintained an unbroken 
personal connection with Palestine and intend to resume permanent 
residence in Palestine’ were given the opportunity for the fi rst time 
to acquire Palestinian citizenship by stating their option for it. The 
option was, as it had always been, subject to the consent of the 
Government of Palestine and those who chose to opt could not hold 
any other nationality but Turkish. The article allowed for two years 
from the date of the amendment for natives to exercise their option 
for citizenship, and allowed natives to send their applications to do 
so to any British consul to be forwarded to the Director of Immi-
gration in Jerusalem.25 The amended Article 2 exclusively benefi ted 
the Palestinian Arabs by offering natives abroad the chance to take 
on citizenship that had been denied for nearly fi fteen years. The 
victory was signifi cant for the Arab Palestinians in that the govern-
ment fi nally met the demands of the emigrants and their nationalist 
lobby group. The change had also come less than two years after the 
publication of the Royal Peel Commission recommendations, which 
included a proposal to extend Palestinian citizenship to all Arab 
natives abroad. Indeed, the change came after signifi cant discussion 
between the Colonial, Foreign and Home Offi ces. The Home Offi ce 
in particular felt that the Treaty of Lausanne allowed states to offer 
certain options in cases of nationality not provided for in the treaty 
itself thus allowing ‘default’ Turkish nationals to choose Palestinian 
citizenship.26
The fi nal amendment to the Palestine citizenship legislation came in 
1942. A new amendment granted an extension of the initial two-year 
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timeframe for option for citizenship (as included in the 1939 Amend-
ment Order) to six years.27 Despite the changes to legislation to allow 
for native Palestinians to return to their homeland and choose its cit-
izenship, only a small number of individuals did so. From 1925 to 
1946, fewer than 500 native Palestinian Arabs who lived outside of 
Palestine actually returned and acquired citizenship. The reasons for 
the small numbers of returnees are not entirely clear. As Mutaz Qaf-
isheh rightly argues, a number of factors played a role as to how and 
why emigrants returned as Palestinian citizens. He suggests that the 
discretion exercised by the high commissioners had a negative impact 
on Palestinian Arabs who applied to opt for citizenship but could not 
prove a defi nitive, unbroken personal connection with their homeland. 
Perhaps just as important was the international context after 1939 – 
the outbreak of war in Europe meant that immigration to Palestine 
became more restrictive not only for Jews but also for Arabs born in 
the territory.28 Furthermore, many Arabs had since established busi-
nesses, social networks and familial roots outside of Greater Syria, 
territory that some of them left prior to 1914.
The Palestine Citizenship Order-in-Council of 1925, and the sub-
sequent amended articles and amended orders that replaced it, trans-
formed the Palestinian Arab and the Jewish immigrant populations 
into the citizenry of a quasi-colonial state. For the Arab inhabitants, 
the orders did something more: the provisions differentiated the for-
merly Ottoman nationals born in Palestine from Arabs (and other 
ethnic groups) born elsewhere in Greater Syria. The institutions and 
the new political, civic and social interactions created and main-
tained due to the British-administered government shaped new public 
spaces and new systems of meaning and power that Palestinian Arab 
leaders linked directly to their notions of citizenship and nationality. 
Although the Palestinian Arab leadership conceived of themselves 
as Palestinians long before the citizenship order – and for some time 
before the beginning of the civil administration – these national and 
local leaders also saw themselves as Arab nationals alongside Syr-
ian, Lebanese and Iraqi Arabs. The citizenship legislation changed 
that perception both ideologically and in practical, on-the-ground 
ways. In the middle of 1939, less than ten years before the mandate 
ended and Palestine’s Jewish citizens declared the establishment of 
Israel, the British Government asked Palestine’s High Commissioner 
MacMichael to give an assurance that the mandatory would invest 
the same amount of energy into preventing illegal Arab immigration 
into the territory as it did in preventing illegal Jewish immigration. 
In response to MacMichael’s assurance, government offi cials asked 
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whether the answer proved that the Arabs of Palestine were ‘a sepa-
rate and distinct people from Arabs of other countries’.29 The answer 
to the latter question, even without MacMichael’s assurances, can 
most certainly be demonstrated by the preceding twenty years of 
legislation, discourses, representations and behaviours that shaped 
Palestinian nationality and citizenship. 
Conclusions: Citizenship at the End of the Palestine 
Mandate and upon the Creation of Israel
The Palestine Administration and the British Government acted in 
nearly all cases related to citizenship, nationality and passports from 
1918 to the year that saw the fi nal changes to citizenship legislation, 
1942, to maintain the status quo support for the mandate’s terms 
that supported Jewish immigration and naturalisation as the primary 
means through which the Jewish national homeland could be estab-
lished under the auspices of the mandate itself. For at least the fi rst 
decade of the civil administration, the fi rst consideration for all of the 
proposed legislation and regulations, whether by the local adminis-
tration offi cials or the offi cials and policy-makers in Whitehall, was 
towards the facilitation of this aim in as much as it did not contradict 
or call into question wider British imperial policy and norms. Citizen-
ship legislation received the same preliminary caution and treatment, 
although this legislation never progressed beyond its original aim to 
regulate the legal and international status and documentary identity 
of Palestine’s population. Thus, citizenship legislation was crucial to 
the success of the mandate policy, and the Palestine Administration 
and Great Britain ultimately surrendered to the need to maintain a 
successful policy and hold ultimate imperial authority in Palestine by 
regulating citizenship in the ways that it did – ways that did favour 
continued Jewish immigration. Even so, the 1925 Palestine Citizen-
ship Order-in-Council left various questions as to the status of the 
Arab and Jewish natives and inhabitants of the territory unsolved: it 
created more debate – within Palestine, Whitehall and the Arab (and 
Jewish) diaspora than it resolved in the long and short term. Nei-
ther Great Britain nor Palestine’s attorney-general clearly differenti-
ated in vocabulary between nationality and citizenship despite the 
practical differences emphasised by the mandate administration and 
the persistent appeals by the Arab community to design citizenship 
acquisition as based upon a primordial notion of Arab and Ottoman 
nationality. This lack of differentiation in terminology plagued the 
5028_Banko.indd   208 24/06/16   4:34 PM
discourses on citizenship at the close of the mandate | 209
Palestine Administration for some time, in large part because the 
Arabs confl ated the two terms and applied this confl ation to their 
understanding of Jewish nationality in Palestine. 
The new, mainly middle-class political public in Palestine, as else-
where in the interwar and post-colonial period, was an essential part 
of the creation, vocabulary, behaviours, and development of types 
of representations of citizenship. Alongside new civil society organ-
isations and the practices that they encouraged, the political public 
fi rmly separated itself from the administration and thus negotiated 
citizenship and nationality within a particular discursive space. The 
groundwork for the discussions of citizenship came out of the steady 
rise of mass politics bolstered by the Arabic press and as a reaction to 
British legislation in Palestine, including the reactionary hopes that 
this administration would grant self-governing institutions managed 
by the Arabs. The vocabulary of citizenship and nationality and the 
discussions on both that had been known since the mid-nineteenth 
century were the resources used by the Palestinian Arab educated 
leaders to explain, defi ne, strengthen and challenge the construction 
of citizenship by the government. In their own civic and political 
associations, the emigrant community refl ected upon the differences 
in meaning between nationality and citizenship, and the practical 
differences between the national and the citizen of a state. Partic-
ularly through use of the term ‘jinsiyya’ (nationality) rather than 
‘muwatana’ (citizenship), the emigrants and their supporters and the 
press within Palestine, reinforced a confl ation of the two terms. 
The British presence in Palestine and the institutions that the 
mandate established ultimately supported the conditions necessary 
to foster the Arabs’ claims to rights to Palestine. These conditions 
thus promoted the growing and general sense of participatory rights 
and duties and by the early 1930s, rural and lower-class Palestin-
ian Arabs actively demanded greater rights and protections from the 
administration. Yet before Palestinian citizenship and the Palestinian 
citizen vanished upon the proclamation of Israel as a Jewish state, 
the practical expressions of citizenship and the rights and duties 
associated with it, had stalled or regressed as spaces and tentative 
institutions for those expressions closed. The revolt, and the subse-
quent Peel Commission report, confi rmed the unequal distribution 
of rights, benefi ts and protections of mandate citizenship between 
Arabs and Jews in Palestine and the discontent felt by the former 
group over such a situation. At the same time, the Arab rebels refused 
to consider a future Palestine in which Arabs and Jews could hold an 
equal citizenship status.
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Despite the attempts of Palestine’s high commissioners to effect 
any favourable changes to citizenship legislation for the Arab emi-
grants, none actually succeeded in changing the structure of that leg-
islation. Tensions within the administration and between Palestine 
and London contributed to the application and approval of various 
legislative measures for Palestine. As needs no explanation here, at 
the end of November 1947 the new United Nations General Assem-
bly voted to partition Palestine (Resolution 181) and thus absolve 
Great Britain from further responsibility over the territory. The 1947 
UN Resolution 181 referred to Palestinian citizens in relation to elec-
tions for the proposed partitioned Arab and Jewish states: accord-
ing to the UN, those given the right of the franchise, the most basic 
political right of citizenship, were to be those over the age of eighteen 
who were Palestinian citizens resident in Palestine, as well as Jews 
and Arabs resident in Palestine who were not yet Palestinian citizens 
but would sign a note of intention to become citizens. ‘Citizens’ con-
tinued to be mentioned, albeit ambiguously, in terms of rights and 
freedoms given to all residents of the future Arab and Jewish states. 
Chapter 3 of Resolution 181 specifi cally focused on citizenship. Pal-
estinian citizens, according to legislation, in Palestine outside of Jeru-
salem and those Arabs and Jews without citizenship who lived in 
Palestine would become citizens of the state of their residence upon 
independence, and have all the civil and political rights of citizenship. 
The residents of Jerusalem were to become automatically citizens of 
the City of Jerusalem unless they gave intent to opt for citizenship of 
the Arab or Jewish state. Jerusalem citizens were to have the appro-
priate civil and political rights regardless of nationality.30 
The declaration of a Jewish state on 15 May 1948 and the intensi-
fi ed fi ghting between the Jewish militias and the Arab and Palestinian 
armies and irregulars before and after this date led to an exodus of 
from 250,000 to 350,000 Palestinian Arab citizens from the terri-
tory. From 1948 until 1952, when Israel passed its Nationality Law, 
Palestinian Arabs were effectively stateless because Israel’s Supreme 
Court held that Palestinian citizenship terminated on 14 May 1948. 
The Israeli Nationality Law was not a citizenship law. In fact, the law 
affi rmed the denaturalisation of the Arabs as retroactive from the 
date of Israel’s declaration of statehood. Article 3 of the law stated 
that children born to stateless Palestinian Arab parents were also 
stateless.31 A nationality committee convened under the command of 
Ben-Gurion in 1949 but until 1952 the legal status of Israeli citizen-
ship for Jews and Arabs both did not exist. Robinson has recently 
shown that for both Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel (post-1951) 
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and Palestinian Arabs who remained outside of Israel after 1948, the 
Israeli state’s citizenship law was framed to stop Palestinians from 
returning to their original homes from exile or from remaining in 
their homes.32 She argues that David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s fi rst prime 
minister, charged Israel’s fi rst policy-makers as early as 1947 to draft 
a future constitution that would reconcile Jewish statehood with 
popular democracy. This proved impossible: the Arabs in Israel were 
instead ‘invited’ to become a part of the new state as its citizens but 
such a status was not enshrined as a democratic principle.33 
In an odd twist, Israel’s immigrant Jewish population came to be 
called ‘native nationals’ of the land after 1948 despite the fact that 
they were not nationals of the land prior to May 1948, nor were 
they a native-born population. Israeli policy-makers categorised the 
Arabs, on the other hand, as foreigners or aliens (zarim).34 How-
ever, the discourse of democratic and rights-based citizenship claims 
continued to permeate petitions and demands submitted to the new 
government by its recently created Arab Israeli citizens. Instead of 
a democratic, rights-based citizenship, these Arabs received their 
Israeli citizenship by virtue of their residence in the territory upon 
the date of the passage of the 1952 Israeli Nationality Law. This 
method of offering citizenship mirrored the Lausanne Treaty’s pro-
visions for the ways in which the same status was automatically 
conferred in the Arab mandate territories. Additionally, as Lena 
Dallasheh has recently shown, negotiations over citizenship contin-
ued immediately after May 1948 in Arab-majority areas of Israel 
such as Nazareth, taking the form of negotiations over rights to 
water resources and land.35
The Palestinian Arabs who came under Jordanian administration 
in the West Bank did not receive Jordanian nationality until the West 
and East banks were united under one administration in 1950. All 
Arabs with Palestinian citizenship prior to 15 May 1948 (except for 
Jews) and permanently resident in the Hashemite Kingdom received 
Jordanian nationality after 1950. Meanwhile in Gaza under Egyptian 
Administration, the Basic Law of 1955 stipulated a constitution for 
the Gaza Strip and kept all laws in force from the 1922 Order-in-
Council as long as they did not contradict the Basic Law. Gaza’s 1962 
Constitutional Order emphasised Palestinian identity and affi rmed 
Gaza to be an integral part of Palestinian territory – its inhabitants 
did not receive Egyptian nationality. Instead, the 1962 order stated 
that all Palestinians, in Gaza and elsewhere, were one national entity 
with one Palestinian nationality.36 Four years after the formation of 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filastini) 
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(the PLO), the Palestinian National Charter of 1968 included Article 
4 that stated that Palestinian identity passed by blood, jus sanguinis, 
and the aftermath of the Arab expulsion in 1948 from the mandate 
territory did not negate that identity nor cause a loss of membership 
as Palestinians in the Palestinian community. Article 5 then defi ned 
the Palestinians, for the fi rst time offi cially under a Palestinian quasi-
government, as ‘those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally 
resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it 
or have stayed there. Anyone born after that date, of a Palestinian 
father – whether inside Palestine or outside it – is also a Palestin-
ian.’ The following article stated that Jews who normally resided in 
Palestine before the opening of the country to Zionist settlement were 
also Palestinian. At the same time, the Charter declared the mandate 
over Palestine and everything based upon it as null and void, noting 
that Judaism was not an independent nationality and that Jews were 
citizens of the states to which they belonged originally.37
In 1995, the interim government created by the Oslo Accords, 
the Palestinian Authority (PA), drafted a citizenship law but did not 
publicise or pass it. Citizenship could not have been regulated by the 
PA anyway, since the authority operated under Israeli occupation.38 
Next, the third Draft Palestine Constitution gave citizenship to any 
Palestinian resident of Palestine before 1948. It envisioned that citi-
zenship pass by descent through mothers and fathers and, impor-
tantly, that it would pass indefi nitely without time limits. Further, all 
those former citizens with the right of return were to have Palestinian 
nationality.39 The most recent offi cial mention of Palestinians in the 
context of nationality is from the Basic Law of the PA in 2003 but 
the law fails to defi ne Palestinians and is unclear as to whether Pal-
estinians resident outside of the West Bank and Gaza can claim the 
rights of citizenship, including the franchise. Article 7 of the Basic 
Law states that ‘Palestinian citizenship shall be regulated by law’ 
and Articles 21 through 33 list the political, civil and social rights of 
citizenship.40 According to the Draft Constitution of 2003, Palestin-
ian nationals who are not citizens will indeed have representation in 
a future Advisory Council.41 Within Israel, new government policies 
and certain political ideologies since the second intifada have created 
a consciousness that Arab citizens’ citizenship is not real citizenship 
in the sense of civil and political rights. The Israelis see citizenship as 
a ‘conditional privilege’ for their Arab residents rather than a right.42 
At the core of citizenship inclusion in the modern state is the way 
that the status allows for the regulation of power. Citizenship deter-
mines the criteria for membership into the decision-making processes 
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of a state, and it determines who receives the state’s assistance and 
benefi ts. In the case of an independent Palestinian state, the crite-
ria for citizenship must be more than superfi cially stated in order to 
give Palestinian nationals – whether refugees or not – clear terms for 
membership in that state and hence access to its decisions and bene-
fi ts. The laws of state succession that governed the transfer of nation-
ality after the end of the First World War no longer apply. Other legal 
norms and arguments have taken their place such as the argument by 
Victor Kattan that all Palestinians have been denationalised follow-
ing the end of 1948, and remain without nationality until the time 
when a Palestinian state will be able to provide such nationality.43
British colonial offi cials in Palestine and London debated for two 
years in the early 1920s on the subject of whether to pass a citizen-
ship law. They debated whether to fi rst defi ne the citizenry in order 
to give them the right to vote without a constitution, or whether 
to give citizenship fi rst to allow for a constitution to be formed by 
elected representatives. Ultimately, the Palestine Administration did 
not enact either option as such. The legacy continues even today: the 
same issue applies to the current situation in the West Bank, Gaza 
Strip and wherever Palestinian nationals have been scattered: should 
citizenship and the electorate in a Palestinian state be defi ned fi rst 
without a constitution or basic law in order for the citizens to draft 
a constitution, or must citizenship be imposed fi rst without represen-
tative decisions made upon its provisions? If nationality is decided 
upon as the criteria for citizenship, it is essential to recognise the 
Palestinian national and the Palestinian citizen as two different sta-
tuses; thus, nationality does not necessarily translate into citizenship. 
If the right of return is the criteria for determining citizenship, due 
to international law all Palestinian nationals (as all have the right to 
return) will be deemed citizens. 
Indeed, historically, the Palestinian Arabs – and likewise the Pales-
tinian Jews – never became ‘national citizens’ during the mandate in 
the sense that scholars today defi ne the phrase. In the absence of an 
autonomous nation-state, national citizenship remained out of reach. 
Part of the blame for this absence is to be laid indirectly on the actions 
of the British Administration, led largely by imperial concerns as well 
as initial disinterest in how legal citizenship impacted political under-
standings of rights, and the ways through which the administration 
in Palestine and the government in Great Britain bureaucratised citi-
zenship and categorised the citizens by their respective religious com-
munities. This, in turn, can be partly framed by Britain’s perception 
of Palestine within the imperial and international contexts and the 
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need felt by Great Britain that Palestine to conform to both contexts 
despite its international position. Without a doubt colonial, or man-
date, citizenship was imposed upon, and experienced by, Arabs and 
Jews in Palestine unequally. The institutionalisation of citizenship, 
and the nature of that insitutionalisation, ensured that the mandated 
citizens themselves had no share in their status – it was not a citizen-
ship that they envisioned nor was it for them. 
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